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Summary
Schizophrenia is a serious and debilitating mental illness, and sufferers frequently 
experience a multitude of symptoms. Of particular interest to the current Thesis are 
psychotic symptoms including delusions, hallucinations and associated self-
disturbances such as interference in the agency and ownership of thoughts and actions. 
Since the disorder was first described over a century ago, research into the 
pathogenesis of schizophrenia has advanced greatly. However, there are still large 
gaps in the current knowledge and understanding of the neuropsychological bases of 
this devastating illness. The current Thesis adopts a cognitive neuropsychiatric 
approach and applies a continuum model to the construct of psychosis. The aim of the 
current Thesis was to incorporate theories such as the source monitoring and the 
predictive processing frameworks across a range of behavioural tasks, in order to 
investigate some of the neuropsychological deficits in schizotypy and early psychotic 
symptoms.
Healthy individuals with schizotypal traits and patients with early psychosis who 
did not yet meet a full diagnosis of schizophrenia underwent a battery of behavioural 
paradigms, with each task aimed at a different aspect of predictive processing and 
source monitoring. In healthy individuals, nonclinical psychosis-like experiences
measured with schizotypy scales were significantly associated with difficulties in the 
source monitoring of actions, in particular deficits in reality monitoring and internal 
source monitoring. However, no significant relationships were found for the predictive 
processing tasks, which focused on the perceptual (force-matching), associative 
(Kamin blocking) and motivational (reversal learning) domains. In the patients with 
first episode psychosis, positive psychotic symptoms were not significantly correlated 
with specific deficits in either category of tasks, although this study was under-
powered and strong conclusion could not be drawn. Nevertheless, these findings have 
provided support for partial dimensionality in psychosis vulnerability and will serve 
as foundations for future research on a larger scale.
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1Chapter One: An Overview of Psychosis
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to introduce the concept of psychosis and its constituent 
symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations on multiple levels of explanation, from 
neurobiology to phenomenology. Drawing from current literature, this Chapter will 
also discuss the heterogeneity of psychotic symptoms, different approaches to the 
study of psychosis and implications for research.
1.1.1 What is ‘Psychosis’?
The etymology of the word ‘psychosis’ derives from Greek, psyche (mind, soul) and 
osis (ailment, condition): in other words, psychosis is an illness of the mind or soul. 
However, the clinical picture is much more complex. Often synonymous with ‘reality 
distortions’ or ‘a loss of touch with reality’, psychosis disrupts if not destroys the 
sufferer’s sense of reality and therefore has significant implications not only on a 
personal or medical level, but also on a philosophical level as to how a person’s 
selfhood is embedded in the world. Nevertheless, psychosis itself is not viewed as a 
disease entity but a group of symptoms within other psychiatric syndromes such as 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, some personality disorders or even organic 
brain diseases such as dementia. Psychosis is of particular importance to the diagnosis 
of schizophrenia: in fact, it has been referred to as ‘the clinical hallmark of 
schizophrenia’ (Kapur, 2003, p.13). The terms ‘psychosis’ and ‘schizophrenia’ are 
sometimes (incorrectly) used interchangeably due to the close relationship between 
the two concepts. Even psychosis itself is not necessarily a singular concept (although 
there is the notion of ‘unitary psychosis’; see Berrios and Beer, 1994) but consists of 
three major domains, namely delusions, hallucinations and thought disorder which are 
also called the ‘positive’ (i.e. added to the subject’s experience) symptoms of 
schizophrenia. 
Even the very definitions of delusions and hallucinations have not yet reached 
absolute consensus. However, the ‘standard’ definitions may seem straightforward at 
first glance: delusions are ‘false beliefs about which a person is firmly convinced and 
2is impervious to outside contradictory evidence’. Hallucinations, on the other hand,
are defined as ‘sensory perceptions in the absence of any externally generated stimulus’ 
(Lindenmayer and Khan, 2006). This Thesis will focus exclusively on delusions and 
hallucinations in the context of schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses.
1.1.2     Classification and Diagnosis
The earliest attempt to classify schizophrenia and related psychotic disorders can be 
traced back to Karl Kahlbaum’s descriptions of catatonia in 1868 (Barnes, Saunders, 
Walls, Saunders, Kirk, 1986). This influenced Emil Kraepelin’s dichotomous notions 
of ‘dementia praecox’ (lit. early dementia; see Bleuler, 1950) as the precedent to 
schizophrenia and ‘manic-depressive illness’ which evolved to what clinicians call 
bipolar affective disorder today. To Kraepelin, dementia praecox followed a chronic 
and deteriorating course with poor outcomes whereas manic depression often had an 
episodic course and more favourable outcomes. Soon after Kraepelin’s formulation, 
Eugen Bleuler first coined the term ‘schizophrenia’ or ‘the group of schizophrenias’ 
which focused more on signs and symptoms rather than course and outcome 
(Andreasen and Carpenter, 1993). Bleuler suggested that the term ‘schizophrenia’ (lit. 
split mind) should replace ‘dementia praecox’ because the consequence of the latter 
was not always as severe and debilitating as Kraepelin thought. Bleuler thought the 
key feature of schizophrenia was in fact the dissociation and fragmentation of 
normally integrated mental processes such as thought and affect, a feature which was 
different from and more persistent than delusions and hallucinations. 
However, perhaps the most influential contribution to the nosology of 
schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses which is reflected in the diagnostic systems today 
is that by Kurt Schneider. Schneider brought the focus back on specific types of 
delusions and hallucinations which were thought to be pathognomonic (i.e. defining 
features) of a schizophrenic psychosis. These ‘Schneiderian First-rank Symptoms’ 
include bizarre and implausible forms of delusion (e.g. thought interference symptoms 
such as thought insertion, broadcast and withdrawal, as well as passivity/delusions of 
control) partly based on Karl Jaspers’ concept of incomprehensibility, and third-
person auditory-verbal hallucinations which provide a running commentary on the 
patient’s behaviour or voices arguing with one another. Interestingly, all first-rank 
symptoms constitute a breach in the patient’s ego-boundary (i.e. breaking down of the 
3demarcation between self and other), especially thought interference (for example, in 
thought insertion the patient reports having thoughts that they did not author and did 
not belong to them, sometimes ‘transmitted’ from a specific external agent or entity), 
thought echo (patient hearing one’s own voice spoken aloud) and delusions of control. 
These seemingly unintelligible and outright impossible phenomena which have no 
basis in external or consensual reality have attracted great interest, both in terms of 
clinical presentation and philosophical investigation, to the degree that some theorists 
propose that (schizophrenic) psychosis is essentially an extreme form of self-
disturbance (Sass and Parnas, 2003).
Two of the most widely implemented diagnostic systems, the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD) by the World Health Organisation and the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM), subdivide the psychosis spectrum into individual disorders from full-blown 
schizophrenia (which comprises of multiple subtypes including paranoid, disorganised, 
catatonic, etc.) to schizotypal disorder (schizotypal personality disorder in the DSM), 
affective psychoses (e.g. schizoaffective disorder and psychotic depression) and to 
brief and reactive psychotic disorder. Such distinctions are not always made on the 
basis of phenomenology but on duration and severity. Whereas the ICD is particularly 
influenced by Schneiderian first-rank symptoms in the diagnosis of schizophrenia (the 
presentation of only one of such symptoms is sufficient provided the duration is a 
month or longer), the DSM in general has less of an emphasis on the actual content of 
the delusions and hallucinations and requires a duration of at least six months (Table 
1.1). Subtypes of schizophrenia have also been removed in DSM-5, as well as the 
‘bizarre delusion’ criterion.
4ICD-10 DSM-5 
At least one of: Two or more of:
• Thought echo, thought 
insertion/withdrawal/broadcast
• Passivity, delusional perception
• Third person auditory 
hallucination, running 
commentary
• Persistent bizarre delusions
• Hallucinations
• Bizarre or nonbizarre delusions
• Disorganised speech
• Grossly disorganised or 
catatonic behaviour
• Negative symptoms
Or two or more of: At least one symptom must be:
• Persistent hallucinations
• Thought disorder
• Catatonic behaviour
• Negative symptoms
• Significant behaviour change
• Hallucinations
• Bizarre or nonbizarre delusions
• Disorganised speech
Duration: Duration:
• At least 1 month • Continuous disturbance for 6 
months (attenuated and residual 
symptoms)
• Acute symptoms for at least 1 
month (less if successfully 
treated)
Exclusion criteria: Exclusion criteria:
• Mood disorders, schizoaffective 
disorder
• Overt brain disease
• Drug intoxication or withdrawal
• Mood disorders, schizoaffective 
disorder
• Overt brain disease
• Drug intoxication or withdrawal
Table 1.1. Comparison between ICD-10 and DSM-5 criteria for schizophrenia. ICD, International 
Classification of Diseases; DSM, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
Schizophrenia is perhaps the prototype of what clinicians call ‘non-affective 
functional (as opposed to organic) psychosis’; despite the frequent occurrence of 
depressive symptoms alongside a schizophrenic illness (Mulholland and Cooper, 
2000), symptoms of psychosis themselves are often viewed as non-affective. For 
example, although a patient with schizophrenia can exhibit significant depressed mood, 
it may be a secondary response to the frightening delusions and hallucinations they 
experience and not primary symptoms of the psychosis itself. By contrast, a diagnosis 
of affective psychoses in the case of schizoaffective disorder requires an almost 
equally prominent mixture of schizophrenic and affective symptoms (manic, 
depressive or mixed) which need to have been present simultaneously or within a few 
5days of each other, but psychotic symptoms must have also been present without
prominent mood symptoms for at least two weeks. This differentiates schizoaffective 
disorder from bipolar or unipolar depressive disorder with psychotic features as in the 
latter situations mood disturbances overshadow psychotic symptoms.
Nevertheless, despite similarities in modern diagnostic systems, the definition 
and incidence of schizoaffective disorder have faced inconsistencies and controversies. 
In fact, the modern definition of schizoaffective disorder departs quite substantially 
from its original description in the 1930’s, where the onset of emotional disturbances 
mixed with psychosis was sudden and patients often recovered fairly soon (Kasanin’s 
definition; see Brockington and Leff, 1979). It is generally agreed that the prevalence 
of schizoaffective disorder is less than that of schizophrenia, often with better 
prognosis and outcome, but poorer than that of mood disorders with psychotic features 
(Harrow, Grossman, Herbener and Davies, 2000). In particular, the presence of mood-
incongruent psychotic symptoms (e.g. delusional content that is not relevant to the 
mood of the patient) in affective psychoses seem to worsen the outcome compared 
with those with mood-congruent (e.g. a severely depressed patient with delusions of 
guilt) psychotic symptoms. Such observations place schizoaffective disorder in the 
middle of the spectrum between prominent mood disorders and ‘pure’ schizophrenia 
without an affective component (Cheniaux et al., 2008); indeed, first-degree relatives 
with schizoaffective disorder have been shown to be at higher risk for both mood 
disorders and schizophrenia (Tsuang, 1991).
There have been no definitive external validity criteria or reliable biomarkers for 
classifying and diagnosing psychotic disorders (Peralta and Cuesta, 2003, 2005); as a 
result, diagnosis is still determined by and dependent on descriptive psychopathology. 
More recently however, new approaches to the diagnosis and classification of 
psychotic disorders and psychiatric illnesses as a whole have emerged, largely due to 
the latest advancements in aetiology, neuroimaging and genetics research (Owen, 
2014). The most prominent example is probably the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) 
project by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in the US, as the former 
director of which has recently announced that research projects should distance 
themselves from the ‘traditional’ categorical approach of the DSM and implement 
dimensional approaches such as the RDoC. RDoC has four dimensions which cover 
different levels of explanations for disease mechanisms including domains of 
6functioning (e.g. positive and negative valence systems), units of analysis (from genes 
to behaviour), developmental aspects and environmental aspects (Cuthbert, 2014). In 
other words, the RDoC approach integrates the neural with the behavioural, the 
biological with the environmental and is conceived as a work in progress depending 
on the evidence available. It has already been applied to the study of hallucinations 
amongst other psychiatric symptoms (e.g. Ford et al., 2014). There has been concerns 
that an overhaul of the current DSM/ICD systems will be instigated by the RDoC 
(Owen, 2014) and the latter has attracted a number of criticisms such as ignoring the 
first-person experience and being too idealistic due to uncertainties in our current 
knowledge of the brain-behaviour relationship. Nevertheless, although it is not likely 
that the RDoC will (fully) replace the DSM/ICD systems in the foreseeable future, it 
does encourage new ways of thinking and can act as a valuable tool alongside the 
current systems. As the dimensional approach to psychosis as a whole (Section 1.5) 
gains acceptance more and popularity, the RDoC framework may well become 
increasingly influential.
1.1.3     Symptomatology and Treatment
As discussed above, the symptomatology of psychosis is multifaceted and 
heterogeneous. Consequently there is no consensus as to what is truly pathognomonic 
of a psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia. Delusions, hallucinations and formal 
thought disorder constitute the (largely descriptive) psychopathology of psychosis but 
are by no means exclusive to any single disorder. In addition, psychotic symptoms are 
often extremely frightening experiences (especially at first onset) to the suffering 
individual and can undoubtedly lead to severe distress and sometimes debilitating 
impairments in one’s functioning. Furthermore, the estimated lifetime prevalence of 
completed suicide in patients of schizophrenia is around 5% (Palmer, Pankratz and 
Bostwick, 2005) and the risk is particularly high after the first episode (in the ICD 
there is a diagnosis of post-psychotic depression) which is frequently when psychotic 
symptoms remit and depressive symptoms begin as the individual realises the 
devastating effects schizophrenia had on their life and prospects for their future 
(although evidence for this remains inconclusive; see Hawton, Sutton, Haw, Sinclair, 
and Deeks, 2005). Apart from depressive symptoms after the first episode, the 
presence of delusions and hallucinations during the acute phase can (understandably) 
7render a person extremely anxious and fearful, especially when the symptoms involve 
themes of persecution or alien control for example. Therefore, early intervention and 
effective treatment can be literally life-saving.
The first line treatment strategy of psychotic disorders remains the use of 
antipsychotic medications. Since the introduction of chlorpromazine and haloperidol 
(also called first-generation antipsychotics or FGA) in the 1950s and the 1960s, their 
efficacy and effectiveness in treating positive symptoms (although at the same time 
they can exacerbate negative symptoms such as lack of motivation, poverty of speech 
and catatonia) have played a major role in the de-institutionalisation of chronically ill 
patients from psychiatric hospitals back into the community. Interestingly the 
discovery of FGA was almost entirely serendipitous and their mechanism of action 
(dopamine D2 receptor antagonism) was only determined after their widespread use in 
the clinic. Nowadays there are more options in the treatment of psychosis, including 
second-generation antipsychotics (SGA; e.g. olanzapine, risperidone) which are 
antagonists at both dopamine D2 and serotonin 5-HT2A receptors. However, despite 
having a supposedly more favourable side effect profile compared to FGA (e.g. 
reduced extrapyramidal symptoms), SGA are not generally deemed as more
efficacious, with the exception of clozapine, and can contribute to other serious side 
effects such as metabolic syndromes (Stroup et al., 2003; Lieberman, 2007; McEvoy 
et al., 2005). Although dopamine antagonism has been the ‘gold standard’ of 
antipsychotic action, in 2002 a new drug, aripiprazole, broke this tradition by acting 
as a dopamine partial agonist (Shapiro et al., 2003). Marketed as a ‘dopamine-system 
stabiliser’, aripiprazole regulates dopamine concentrations in different areas of the 
brain depending on endogenous levels of the neurotransmitter (i.e. acting as an agonist 
in hypo-dopaminergic states and as an antagonist in hyper-dopaminergic states). 
Curiously however, aripiprazole has not proven to be more efficacious than other 
antipsychotics, either, albeit possessing minimal extrapyramidal or metabolic side 
effects. Agonists at metabotropic glutamatergic receptors are being trialled as the latest 
class of antipsychotics (e.g. Patil et al., 2007) alongside others such as those acting on 
GABA and glycine.
On the other hand, psychological therapies for psychosis have been increasingly 
recognised as effective and (seemingly at least) side effect-free treatments for 
psychosis, which has been considered by some as a purely biological disorder and 
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psychoanalysis (Eissler, 1951). Currently the most widely accepted and implemented 
psychotherapy for psychosis is cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBTp). Some recent 
evidence even suggests that CBTp can be effective in alleviating psychotic symptoms 
in place of antipsychotic drugs (Morrison et al., 2014), although such findings have 
sparked considerable controversy and a meta-analysis in the same year suggest that 
CBT for psychosis only has therapeutic effectiveness in the small range, at least when 
measuring statistical effect sizes (Jauhar, McKenna, Radua, Fung, Salvador, and Laws, 
2014).
The ‘safety’ of CBTp has also been called into question: one school of thought 
by phenomenologically-informed theorists and clinicians is the hyperreflexivity model 
of psychosis (e.g. Sass and Parnas, 2003), where the patient experiences a pervasive, 
immense and extreme self-absorption to the extent that self-awareness becomes an 
external focus of observation. CBTp can therefore be counter-productive as it may 
exacerbate such self-disturbances by stimulating hyperreflexive processes (Pérez
Álvarez, García Montes, Vallina Fernández, Perona Garcelán, and Cuevas Yust, 
2011; Nelson and Sass, 2009) and hence not completely ‘side effect-free’ as some 
believe. Other psychological and psychosocial therapies such as family intervention
(as opposed to individual-based therapies) can also play a key role in the management 
of early psychosis, and such therapies work most effectively when combined with an 
accurate evaluation of the patient’s individual needs (Penn, Waldheter, Perkins, 
Mueser, and Lieberman, 2005; Bird, Premkumar, Kendall, Whittington, Mitchell, and 
Kuipers, 2010). More research evidence is clearly needed in the fields of both 
pharmacology and psychotherapy; perhaps a personalised approach is the most 
beneficial given the sheer heterogeneity of psychosis, although the utilisation of 
‘tailor-made’ treatment regimens might still be unrealistic due to logistic (cost, 
resource, professional education etc.) constraints. 
91.2 Delusions
1.2.1 Types of Delusions
This section of the Chapter focuses on the symptom domain of delusion, which is by 
no means a homogeneous construct. Delusions may be monothematic (focusing on 
one theme) or polythematic (possessing multiple themes), functional (without known 
or detectable brain lesion or damage) or organic (occurring after brain injury), primary 
(occurring not as a consequence of other mental events, e.g. a hallucination) or 
secondary (occurring as a direct result or elaboration of other psychopathology), 
circumscribed (limited to the content of the present delusion only) or 
systemised/elaborated (leading to the formation and integration of other delusions) 
depending on the level of explanation. The most common themes of delusional content 
are summarised in Table 1.2:
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Type of delusion Theme
Delusions of control and thought 
interference
The control over one’s thought 
processes, feelings and actions are no 
longer one’s own, e.g. thought insertion, 
withdrawal, broadcasting, passivity 
phenomena of volition/affect/actions 
and somatic passivity
Delusions of persecution One is being persecuted by an often 
omnipotent and malevolent organisation 
or a group of individuals
Delusions of reference Other people, objects or entirely 
coincidental events carry a special 
message or meaning specifically related 
to the individual
Delusions of grandeur One is special or powerful in some way, 
e.g. a world-famous billionaire
Delusions of misidentification A familiar individual has been replaced 
by an imposter (Capgras delusion) or 
disguising as a stranger (Fregoli 
delusion)
Delusions of guilt One is responsible for disastrous event 
or has committed a despicable crime and 
deserves punishment e.g. being 
personally responsible for a natural 
disaster
Delusions of jealousy (Othello 
Syndrome)
One’s romantic partner or spouse is 
unfaithful e.g. having an affair
Delusions of love/erotomania (de 
Clérambault Syndrome)
One is loved by someone who is usually 
of higher social status and with whom 
one has little or no contact 
Somatic/hypochondriacal delusions Themed around the body or physical 
illness e.g. one has a terminal illness or 
severe disfigurement
Nihilistic delusions One has ceased to exist or is dead, one’s 
internal organs are decaying, the world 
is about to end (e.g. Cotard delusion)
Religious delusions One has a special relationship with 
God/prominent religious figures, has 
supernatural powers (cf. delusions of 
grandeur) or is persecuted/possessed by 
the devil (cf. delusions of 
persecution/control)
Table 1.2. Common delusional themes. Adapted from Bajorek and Stockmann (2012).
It is worth noting that although in the table above thought interference is 
categorised as a delusional belief (see Section 1.2.5), some more philosophically-
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informed theorists have argued that forms of thought interference (especially thought 
insertion) and passivity are ‘duplex phenomena’ and the delusional elaboration that 
commonly follows is not essential for the experience of thought interference (e.g. 
Humpston and Broome, 2016). In other words, the formation of a delusion per se
neither completes nor constitutes the totality of the anomalous experience. 
Furthermore, the types and contents of delusions present are not always indicative of 
a particular diagnosis (e.g. persistent delusional disorder versus paranoid 
schizophrenia). This challenges the notion of first-rank symptoms and add to the 
difficulties in differential diagnosis, although the prevalence of certain delusions does 
vary across disorders (Kendler, 1980; Appelbaum et al., 1999).
Concepts related to delusions include overvalued ideas (an unusual/atypical but 
socially acceptable belief which is firmly held but not fixed with delusional intensity 
or conviction), delusional mood/atmosphere (as a process in the psychosis prodrome; 
see Section 1.4) and delusional perception (the attachment of a delusional meaning to 
a normal perception, usually signifies the genesis of a primary delusion). 
1.2.2 Formation of Delusional Thought
How is a delusion formed? It is a question that has attracted much debate, interest and 
attention yet very little consensus. Theories for delusion formation have varied and 
evolved over time: the one-factor account of delusion by Maher (1974, 1999, 2006) 
proposes that delusions form as a perfectly normal and logical response to, and a 
consequence of, abnormal perceptual experiences. For example, the experience of 
hearing abusive voices when nobody is present is sufficient to lead to the delusional 
elaboration that one is persecuted by spirits. However, this does not explain why not 
everyone who hears voices will develop delusions, let alone the same type of delusions. 
On the other hand, the two-factor account advocated by Coltheart and colleagues 
(Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, and Breen, 2001; Coltheart, Langdon, and McKay, 2007; 
Coltheart, 2007) maintains that there is a second factor dissociable from anomalous 
perceptual experience. Whereas the first factor (abnormal perception) explains the 
content of the delusion, the second factor (deficit in belief evaluation) explains how 
the delusion is adopted and maintained. Nevertheless, the two-factor account has its 
own problems. This theory has, first of all, limited scope; it tends to be only applicable 
to monothematic delusions (e.g. Capgras and other delusions of misidentification). 
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Secondly, although Coltheart and colleagues suggest the second factor is an 
abnormality in belief evaluation systems, there is no agreement over a sufficiently 
specific and satisfactory definition of the second factor e.g. could it be a reasoning 
bias?
Most recently, a new approach has emerged which is in fact the focus of this 
Thesis: that is, the role of prediction error signalling in the formation of delusions (and 
also hallucinations). Predictive processing centres on the idea that perceptions, 
cognitions and motivational pursuits are the combined results of the agent’s actively 
generating models about the external world, responding to mismatches and 
discrepancies between expectation and actual outcome (i.e. minimising prediction 
errors) in order to draw inferences and update the model to an optimal state. The 
concept of predictive coding is not a new one, however, Corlett and colleagues are 
amongst the first to apply it to psychopathology research (Corlett et al., 2007, 2009, 
2010). The significance and application of this approach will be discussed throughout 
the current Thesis, hence only a brief overview is offered here in this Section. 
According to Corlett and colleagues, Kapur’s theory (Kapur, 2003) of aberrant 
salience in psychosis is a result of abnormal prediction error signalling (i.e. 
unnecessary salience is allocated to irrelevant stimuli due to faulty and excessive error 
signals with a high level of noise which give the ‘wrong impression’ that there is a 
mismatch between expectation and actual outcome). 
Also, this approach blurs the boundary between belief and perception which can 
be incorporated into a single principle of prediction error minimisation and which 
follows Bayesian inference (e.g. Fletcher and Frith, 2009). For example, in delusions 
of control, it may be that prediction errors arising from a mismatch between the 
expected and actual sensory stimuli (see forward model, below) of a self-initiated 
movement are not cancelled out or minimised. This would not only contribute to the 
perception of heightened sensation but may also lead to the belief that the movement 
was not initiated by oneself. As a result, this account is often viewed as another type 
of the one-factor approach, although some more recent theorists have also argued for 
compatibility within the two-factor approach (Miyazono, Bortolotti, and Broome, 
2015).
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1.2.3 Neurobiological and Cognitive-Psychological Theories
It is extremely unlikely that any single theory is sufficient to encapsulate every aspect 
of delusion; therefore, it should not be surprising that multiple levels of explanation 
are necessary if not essential for the study of such a complex phenomenon. This kind 
of complexity starts from the molecular (e.g. dopamine receptor gene expression, 
function and structure) to the cognitive (e.g. reasoning bias and attributional style) and 
continues right up to the level of phenomenology and subjective experience of 
psychosis. 
The abovementioned mechanisms of antipsychotic drugs (note they are 
antipsychotic and not necessarily ‘anti-schizophrenic’: see Kapur, 2004) might 
provide some insight into the neurochemistry of psychosis and point towards the 
pivotal role of dopamine. Indeed, the dopamine hypothesis (after much revision) is 
still the dominant school of thought in the biomedical model of psychotic symptoms. 
In its latest revision by Howes and Kapur (2009), presynaptic striatal 
hyperdopaminergia is deemed as the ‘final common pathway’ to psychosis which is 
the end product of multiple genetic, biochemical and environmental risk factors.  
Further, positron emission tomography (PET) imaging studies have shown that in 
patients resistant to antipsychotic treatment, dopamine function remains unaffected (in 
fact the results suggest that glutamate, and not dopamine, concentration is elevated in 
this group of patients) which potentially explains their resistance to dopaminergic drug 
effects (Demjaha et al., 2012, 2014). This has led to a very recent theory, that there 
may be a hyperdopaminergic and normodopaminergic division in the classification of 
schizophrenia (Howes and Kapur, 2014). It must be borne in mind that such 
neurobiological abnormalities underlie psychosis as a whole and not just delusions; to 
date, the prediction error theory of delusion formation (see above) is probably the best 
attempt to apply dopaminergic dysregulation specifically to delusions (Corlett et al., 
2010) although in this model there is no absolute difference between a delusional 
thought and a hallucinatory percept. Therefore, mechanisms differentiating various 
psychotic symptoms must occur at a higher (i.e. cognitive and experiential) level of 
explanation. Indeed, Corlett and Fletcher (2012) found that although the 
neurobiological bases of clinical and nonclinical delusions were similar in terms of 
striatal prediction error signalling, at a higher frontal cortical level the error responses 
were significantly associated with intrusion and distress, which were considered more 
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akin to the qualities consistent with clinical delusions – potentially separating healthy 
schizotypy with the manifestation of a psychotic disorder on a neural level.
Delusions as beliefs are difficult to define (in fact some theorists argue against 
the notion that they are beliefs at all: see Section 1.2.5) and their cognitive theories 
range from biases in probabilistic reasoning (e.g. jumping to conclusions based on 
little or insufficient evidence), attributional style (e.g. externalising bias), attention 
allocation (cf. aberrant salience) to metacognitive processes such as theory of mind 
and threat perception (Gilleen and David, 2005; Bell, Halligan, and Ellis, 2006a; 
Garety, Bebbington, Fowler, Freeman, and Kuipers, 2007). To present a 
comprehensive review of all the (neuro)psychological theories involved in delusion is 
beyond the scope of the current Thesis; with the increasing research into 
neuropsychological models of delusions and their emerging therapeutic application, 
there is clearly more focus on the psychology and not just the biology of delusional 
thinking. Indeed, critics of the biomedical approach often claim that biology is far too 
reductionist to explain psychological processes and undermines the value of the first-
person perspective. Nevertheless, although there is much controversy as to whether 
the mind is simply an epiphenomenon of the brain (still, it should require little doubt 
that mental processes cannot take place without an organic ‘container’- that is, the 
brain), psychological theories can be equally reductionist if viewed in isolation from 
biology, and neither approach can truly advance further until they are working in unity. 
Perhaps this is one of the reasons why the new field of cognitive neuropsychiatry 
(which is the approach adopted in the current Thesis) is so attractive as it is devoted 
to the integration between clinical presentation and cognitive mechanisms, which are 
essentially products of neural activities.        
1.2.4 Measuring Delusions
Delusions have long been considered as a solely clinical concept (i.e. as a symptom or 
symptom cluster of an identifiable mental illness); as such, their measurement and 
evaluation are often limited to methods used in clinical interviews. Interestingly, 
instruments dedicated to the measurement of delusions alone in a clinical setting are 
rare and are often incorporated with other positive symptoms such as hallucinations. 
Examples of this kind include the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, 
Kay, Fiszbein, and Opfer, 1987), Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms 
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(SAPS, Andreasen, 1984) and the PSYchotic symptom RATing Scales (PSYRATS, 
Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, and Faragher, 1999) which consists of subscales for 
delusions and hallucinations, respectively. As Bell et al. (2006b) suggest, although the 
diagnosis of delusions in general is rather reliable it does not seem to extend to the 
concept of ‘bizarre delusions’. Bizarre delusions are those that are entirely 
‘nonsensical’ and impossible to happen in real life (such as those that defy the laws of 
physics) and until recently, their manifestation alone could grant a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (in the latest instalment of the DSM, DSM-5, bizarre delusions can also 
occur in delusional disorder). The lack of reliability in measuring the ‘bizarreness’ in 
these types of delusions could be (at least partly) due to the observation that the 
expression of delusional thought is beyond verbal description and should be viewed 
not by its ‘literal’ meaning but in the context of the person’s general experiential 
dimensions (Cermolacce, Sass, and Parnas, 2010). 
The contemporary notion that subclinical or even nonclinical psychotic 
symptoms (Verdoux and van Os, 2002) are present and more prevalent than previously 
speculated in the general population who otherwise have no need for care called for 
the continuum approach to psychosis (Section 1.5 of this Chapter). This gave rise to 
the development of new instruments and scales. One notable example and one that is 
used in the current Thesis is the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 
1999, 2004) which, despite using clinical methods (the Present State Examination) as 
a template, is designed to measure delusional ideation in (subjectively) healthy 
populations (although it can also be used in psychiatric populations with active 
delusions) and adopts a multidimensional approach in its three subscales (distress, 
preoccupation and conviction). The PDI is likely the most widely known and 
implemented psychometric scale for measuring nonclinical delusions and has been 
translated into several other languages. Its psychometric properties, reliability and 
validity will be detailed in Chapter 4. Other nonclinical measurements, focusing more 
specifically on paranoia and persecutory delusions, include the Paranoia Scale
(Fenigstein and Vanable, 1992), the Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales (GPTS, 
which can also apply to psychiatric populations; see Green et al., 2008), the Paranoia 
Checklist (Freeman et al., 2005; again, it can be used in clinical settings as well) the 
Beliefs About Paranoia Scale (BAPS, Gumley, Gillan, Morrison, and Schwannauer, 
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2011) and the Persecutory Ideation Questionnaire (PIQ, McKay, Langdon, and 
Coltheart, 2006). 
The 21-item version of the PDI (PDI-21) is chosen for this Thesis because it does 
not focus exclusively on one type of delusional ideation (which is an advantage 
because of the lack of symptom specificity in psychosis-like experiences) and is 
comparatively more in-depth (having three subscales). In a validation study for the 
psychometric properties of PDI-21 (compared with the original PDI-40), the authors 
(Peters et al., 2004) found an average yes/no endorsement rate of 29.8% in healthy 
individuals which was only slightly higher than that in the 40-item version (25.2%). 
In a sample with clinical delusions, the yes/no endorsement rate was 53.2% for the 21-
item version (51.6% in the 40-item version). The most striking difference that set apart 
healthy versus deluded samples, however, was their conviction, distress, and 
preoccupation sub-scores. As the authors stated: ‘It is not what you think, it is how
you think about it’ (p. 1013, original italics).
1.2.5 Are Delusions Beliefs?
Both the one- and two-factor accounts are doxastic (lit. belief-related) approaches to 
the understanding of delusion which intrinsically assume that (just as defined in the 
DSM and the ICD) delusions are fixed false beliefs. The widespread acceptance of this 
approach, which has been consistently defended by doxastic theorists (e.g. Bayne and 
Pacherie, 2005), is reflected in the current measurement, diagnosis and treatment 
methods of delusional symptoms. However, there are also theorists who argue against 
the doxastic account. Indeed, many of the key features of delusional beliefs, such as 
absolute conviction and incomprehensibility (in the case of bizarre delusions) may not 
be accurate reflections of the actual phenomenology of delusional experiences. 
Alternative features based on first-person accounts, such as subjectivity, ambivalence 
and double-bookkeeping (the observation that delusional subjects are often ‘in two 
minds’ about the veridicality of their ideas which is a direct contrast to the notion of 
conviction and incorrigibility; see Sass, 2004) have emerged and are mainly supported 
by non-doxastic theorists. Nevertheless, the arguments put forward by non-doxastic 
theorists are not necessarily simply limited to personal-level explanations. 
Gerrans (2001, 2013, 2014) is one such theorist who eloquently defends the non-
doxastic approach with evidence not only from phenomenology but also from basic 
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neurobiology, which is compatible with the prediction error theory. He proposes that 
delusional thoughts are the result of excessive activities in the default mode network 
(e.g. ventromedial prefrontal cortex) overwhelmed with hypersalient information but 
is unsupervised by de contextualised processing (governed by the more dorsolateral 
prefrontal regions of the brain, such as parts of the central executive network) and 
generally refers to delusions as ‘default thoughts’. Their relevance to prediction error, 
as Gerrans argues, is that malfunctions in the sense of agency or ego-boundary (e.g. in
thought insertion and many other first-rank symptoms) occur when error signals are 
not minimised or corrected and instead are propagated up towards the highest level in 
the cognitive hierarchy where delusions are generated. His approach is attractive 
because it incorporates evidence from multiple levels of investigation (biological, 
psychological and phenomenological) and is not confined to a single theoretical 
framework. If faulty prediction error signalling really is the definitive underlying 
mechanism behind delusions (and hallucinations) from this point of view perhaps the 
conceptualisation of delusion needs to reorient itself away from the doxastic approach, 
although in the meantime the debate will certainly continue between one- and two-
factor, doxastic and non-doxastic theorists.
1.3 Hallucinations
1.3.1 Types of Hallucinations
Just like the notion that delusions are ‘false beliefs’ (at least according to the doxastic 
account), hallucinations are considered ‘false perceptions’ (perceptions without a 
corresponding sensory stimulus, unlike illusions which are misinterpretations of real 
stimuli). A hallucination can occur in any of the five sensory modalities (auditory, 
visual, olfactory, gustatory and somatic) but the auditory type is particularly linked to 
psychosis and specific forms of auditory-verbal hallucinations (AVHs) constitute 
some of the Schneiderian first-rank symptoms (e.g. voices providing a running 
commentary on the subject’s activities or voices heard arguing with one another). 
Apart from being classified by the sensory modality in which a hallucination manifests, 
the actual form of the hallucination also grants further classification which is 
summarised in Table 1.3.
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Type of hallucination Examples
Simple or elementary hallucinations Simple unstructured sounds, single 
words lacking grammatical complexity 
or simple flashes of light
Complex hallucinations Complex sounds such as voices in the 
form of structured sentences, music, or 
complex images of people or objects
Functional hallucinations Hallucinations triggered by a 
simultaneous external stimulus of the 
same modality e.g. hearing voices in 
traffic noise
Reflex hallucinations Hallucinations triggered by a 
simultaneous external stimulus of a 
different modality e.g. seeing a human 
face when a door slams shut
Hypnogogic and hypnopompic 
hallucinations
Hallucinations that occur when falling 
asleep and waking up, respectively
Extracampine hallucinations Hallucinations perceived as outside the 
limits of the sensory field e.g. hearing 
astronauts speaking in space
Table 1.3. Examples of hallucination types. Adapted from Bajorek and Stockmann (2012).
Due to its clinical significance to the differential diagnosis of psychosis, this 
Section of the Chapter discusses exclusively the auditory-verbal modality of 
hallucinations in schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses. However, AVHs are not a 
pathognomonic marker of either psychosis or schizophrenia and can occur, like 
delusions, in a range of other neuropsychiatric disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease, 
temporal lobe epilepsy, dissociative disorders and some mood and personality 
disorders (e.g. Borderline Personality Disorder). Although third-person AVHs (i.e. 
those heard referring to the patient as he/she) are historically thought to be more
typical of a schizophrenic pathology and second-person AVHs (i.e. voices addressing 
the patient directly as ‘you’) more relevant to psychotic depression, phenomenological 
surveys of AVH experiences have shown no conclusive evidence supporting this claim 
(Nayani and David, 1996; McCarthy-Jones, Trauer, Mackinnon, Sims, Thomas, and 
Copolov, 2014) and neither is there any evidence on the significance of internal versus 
external hallucinations (i.e. voices heard inside or outside the head) in psychosis. 
Nevertheless, some types of AVHs may require more clinical intervention (i.e. abusive, 
persecutory or command hallucinations) than for example positive, comforting or 
reassuring voices experienced by individuals without a need for care (see Johns et al., 
2014). 
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The observation that there are individuals who experience persistent AVHs yet 
never come to the attention of mental health professionals has contributed to the debate 
about the dimensional nature of nonclinical and subclinical psychotic symptoms 
(Section 1.5.2) and to many alternative (i.e. not conforming to the ‘mainstream’ 
biomedical model) views about AVHs. It must be noted that although such views are 
gaining popularity and acceptance in patient groups, they have not yet been subjected 
to the same level of scientific inquiry or rigour as the biomedical model and hence 
must be interpreted with much caution.
1.3.2 Neurobiology of Auditory-Verbal Hallucinations
Despite the uncertainty and lack of consensus for a unifying model of AVHs, there is 
strong evidence for their biological basis. Once again, on a neurochemical level it is 
the action of antipsychotic drugs in reducing psychotic symptoms and the propensity 
for certain psychoactive substances (e.g. amphetamine, ketamine, LSD) to induce 
psychotic-like hallucinations in their users that link dysfunctional neurotransmitter 
systems (e.g. dopamine, glutamate, serotonin) with the formation of hallucinations. 
However, such dysfunction is not necessarily specific to the pathogenesis of 
hallucinations but to that of psychosis as a whole as discussed above. For example, 
ketamine is used to model psychosis with all its complexity and not just hallucinations 
or delusions (Lahti, Koffel, LaPorte, and Tamminga, 1995; Corlett et al., 2007) and 
abnormal dopamine synthesis capacities have been shown in both nonclinical 
populations and treatment-resistant schizophrenia patients who experience both 
delusions and hallucinations (Howes et al., 2012, 2013).
The advent of structural and functional neuroimaging techniques and subsequent 
investigations in the past twenty years have enabled researchers to find a substantial 
amount of evidence for the neural bases of AVHs, even though such evidence remains 
inconclusive and insufficient for a complete understanding of AVHs. Earlier studies 
suggest that activation in an extensive network of cortical and subcortical areas may 
be involved in the pathogenesis of AVHs: these areas include the inferior frontal, 
insular, anterior cingulate and temporal cortices bilaterally, with a greater 
lateralisation to the right hemisphere in contrast to the usual left lateralisation of 
language areas (Shergill et al., 2000a; see also Hugdahl et al., 2008; Sommer et al., 
2008). 
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The same group (Shergill et al., 2000b) also studied auditory imagery and verbal 
self-monitoring in schizophrenia patients who had a history of prominent AVHs and 
found relatively attenuated activation patterns in inner-speech processing areas but not 
in inner-speech generation areas compared to those in the control group. The self-
monitoring model of AVHs is discussed in more details below. Structurally, on the 
other hand, decreases in local volumes of the right middle and inferior frontal gyri 
(containing a right hemisphere analogue of Broca’s area), the left transverse temporal 
gyrus (including the primary auditory cortex; e.g. Dierks et al., 1999) and the inferior 
part of the left supramarginal gyrus have been correlated with the severity of AVHs 
(Gaser, Nenadic, Volz, Büchel, and Sauer, 2004). In addition, functional connectivity 
studies have demonstrated that schizophrenia patients have altered connectivity 
between areas responsible for self-referential processing (e.g. the medial prefrontal 
cortex, part of the cortical midline structures) and the superior temporal gyrus, for
example (Allen et al., 2012). 
1.3.3 Cognitive-Psychological Theories
The abovementioned model, in which inner-speech is misattributed to an external 
source involving faulty self-monitoring, is perhaps one of the most influential 
cognitive theories of AVHs. The forward or ‘comparator’ model was originally 
proposed by Frith, Blakemore, and Wolpert (2000) in an attempt to explain passivity 
phenomena and related symptoms involving the misattribution of agency such as 
delusions of control; more recently it has also been applied to AVHs as the view of 
thought/inner speech as action is increasingly accepted by researchers. In the forward 
model, the brain issues an efference copy of the motor command required to achieve 
a particular goal based on the estimated current state and the desired end-state in order 
to predict the consequence of executing the motor command. If the actual sensory 
feedback matches the predicted state, awareness of performing the motor action will 
remain based on the predicted state which occurred before the actual execution of the 
motor command so that the subject has the experience of agency (i.e. awareness that 
the action is initiated by oneself) and then the predicted sensory feedback is cancelled 
out by the actual feedback, leading to sensory attenuation of the motor act. However, 
if there is a mismatch between the predicted and the actual sensory feedback the actual 
feedback will not be cancelled out, which leads to the feeling of external control (due 
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to increased activities in the parietal cortex) and a lack of wilfulness for that action. A 
diagrammatical representation of the forward model is shown in Figure 1.1 below 
(adapted from Frith et al., 2000, as cited by Jones and Fernyhough, 2007). It is also 
worth noting that the sense of agency could be viewed as two-fold (e.g. Synofzik, 
Vosgerau, and Newen, 2008) where there is a clear difference between the pre-
reflective feelings of agency and the reflective or even meta-cognitive judgements of 
agency. It is thought that the latter form of agency is more closely related to the 
formation of delusions of control and the lack of agential feelings alone is insufficient 
for a delusion to form.
Figure 1.1. Forward model of motor control (adapted from Frith et al., 2000, as cited by Jones and 
Fernyhough, 2007).
The hallucinating subject often reports AVHs as unintended, involuntary and 
intrusive, which has led to the hypothesis of inner speech or ‘verbal thought’ as being 
wrongly attributed to an external force so that the sense of agency is lost in AVHs. 
Under the assumption that inner speech is indeed reliant on motor commands, it would 
seem that such non-vocal or sub-vocal thoughts are the ‘raw materials’ for AVHs and 
the forward model can therefore apply. Nevertheless, according to Jones and 
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Fernyhough (2007)’s account, which is a revision of Seal, Aleman, and McGuire 
(2004)’s first application, the efference copy is not sent and hence there is no predicted 
state of the motor command for inner speech, leading to a mismatch between the actual 
sensory feedback and the (lack of) predicted feedback. Their adaptation is shown in 
Figure 1.2 below. It is not difficult to notice the significance of the forward model to 
the concept of self-monitoring and how it relates to prediction errors which are targets 
of investigation in the current Thesis: a prediction error would be generated from the 
mismatch between predicted and actual feedback which in itself reflects deficits in 
self- or reality-monitoring.
Figure 1.2. Forward model of motor control as applied to AVHs (adapted from Jones and Fernyhough, 
2007).
However, the inner speech framework is not the only cognitive theory applicable 
to the understanding of AVHs. Jones (2010) argues that there are sub-categories of 
AVHs which may be more memory-like than inner speech-like; this argument is 
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supported by a recent phenomenological survey (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014). In this 
survey of 199 psychiatric patients, the authors were able to distinguish four subtypes 
of AVHs using a semi-structured interview. The most prominent subtype was 
‘Constantly Commanding and Commenting AVHs’ (widely associated with 
schizophrenia), with the other three being ‘Replay AVHs’, ‘Own Thought AVHs’ and 
‘Nonverbal Auditory Hallucinations’. The phenomenological nuances of AVHs are
discussed in Section 1.3.5 below. In addition, top-down mechanisms involving the 
meaning and beliefs about hallucinations are also heavily implicated (what are voices 
without a listener?), such as in delusions of persecution arising secondary from hearing 
abusive voices. The beliefs about, and distress caused by, the experience of AVHs are 
key factors differentiating clinical (e.g. in schizophrenia) and nonclinical populations 
(Waters et al., 2012; Johns et al., 2014).
1.3.4 Measuring Hallucinations
The multifaceted nature of hallucinations means that their measurement can be as 
challenging as the measurement of delusions discussed above (Section 1.2.4.). Despite 
the potential difficulty in capturing their full features, there are various clinical and 
nonclinical psychometric scales designed for the assessment of AVHs (and also 
hallucinations in other sensory modalities). The abovementioned Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms 
(SAPS) and the PSYchotic symptom RATing Scales (PSYRATS, hallucinations 
subscale), with the addition of the Auditory Hallucinations Rating Scale (AHRS, 
Hoffman et al., 2003) and also other scales aiming to measure beliefs and actions 
associated with AVHs (e.g. Voice and You, Hayward, Denney, Vaughan, and Fowler, 
2008; Voices Acceptance and Action Scale, Shawyer, Ratcliff, Mackinnon, Hayes, 
and Copolov, 2007; Beliefs about Voices Questionnaire, Chadwick, Lees, and 
Birchwood, 2000) all fall into the clinical category, whereas the measurement of 
subclinical and nonclinical hallucinations is somewhat more varied and has relatively 
less focus on AVHs alone. 
The scale adopted in the studies in this Thesis is the Cardiff Anomalous 
Perceptions Scale (CAPS; Bell, Halligan, and Ellis, 2006c) which offers a 
comprehensive assessment of a range of perceptual aberrations across sensory 
modalities in the general population, unlike the focus on the auditory-verbal domain 
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in clinical populations. Like the PDI, it also consists of three subscales (distress, 
intrusiveness and frequency) and taps into both the presence of anomalous experiences 
and changes in clarity and intensity of perceptions. Its psychometric properties are 
discussed in Chapter 4; the CAPS is chosen in preference to other more AVH-specific 
scales because of the lack of specificity in psychosis-like experiences and at-risk 
mental states (see Section 1.4.1) in nonclinical populations. Other prominent examples 
include the widely-used Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS) which is also 
designed for use in the general population and measures unusual perceptual 
experiences across modalities (depending on the version, the focus can vary from vivid 
or intrusive thoughts to auditory/visual hallucinations), and the Perceptual Aberration 
Scale (PAS). However, once again the CAPS is chosen for this Thesis because it is 
comparatively more in-depth (e.g. having three subscales) and covers a wider range 
of experiences.
1.3.5 Soundless Voices and Audible Thoughts
The phenomenology of some first-rank symptoms, especially those of thought 
interference (e.g. thought insertion), challenges the traditional definitions of both 
delusions and hallucinations and is in fact thought to be somewhere in-between. 
Combined with the more recent concept that belief (at least from a doxastic point of 
view) and perception are interlinked and arise from the same cognitive processing 
hierarchy, it is perhaps not surprising that some theorists have proposed the idea of 
‘soundless voices and audible thoughts’ (e.g. Humpston and Broome, 2016; Jones and 
Luhrmann, 2016) to capture the phenomenology of AVHs and related symptoms 
which, according to these authors, lies on a spectrum (or even spectra) of varying 
degrees of audibility and externality. Indeed, first-person reports from patients often 
suggest that unlike the auditory hallucinations in alcohol hallucinosis or even in deaf 
individuals, AVHs or ‘voices’ heard by patients with psychosis frequently lack the 
sensory and acoustic features associated with external sounds and are more akin to ‘a 
sense of being spoken to’ or ‘inaudible voices’ (Moritz and Larøi, 2008; Waters and 
Jardri, 2014). 
Furthermore, the reality of voices perceived by patients is often more reliant on 
the lack of control rather than clarity and loudness when asked to tell apart ordinary 
verbal thought from AVHs (Hoffman, Varanko, Gilmore, and Mishara, 2008). 
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Therefore, it can be difficult for patients to subjectively differentiate AVHs from other 
intrusions such as thought insertion. This is not to say that truly external and audible 
hallucinations cannot occur in schizophrenia but is simply to challenge the definition 
that all AVHs have to possess clear sensory qualities. 
In fact, it is probably the second-order appraisal of mental events that attributes 
acoustic features to the experience of ‘hearing’ voices: in other words, it is possible 
that even when a patient reports voice-hearing through his ears, it is still more of a 
simulation than an actual perception. It must be pointed out that the patient is not lying 
when they say they are hearing voices even though there is no real sound being 
perceived; instead, it simply means they have no better way to label the experience 
otherwise. Certainly, this directly contradicts the orthodox conceptualisation (false 
sensory perception without external corresponding stimuli) of AVHs or any 
hallucinatory experience by limiting the sensory element, but it has been shown to be 
more consistent with patient reports at least in psychotic AVHs (i.e. the 
phenomenology of AVHs in organic disorders may well be drastically different).
Another related concept, thought echo, is not classed as a ‘true’ hallucination due 
to its ‘own-thought’ nature (i.e. one’s own thoughts diffusing outwards) but may 
actually be perceived as more audible than internal hallucinations, for example. Once 
again, this is directly dependent on how the subject appraises the experience: an 
internal hallucinator might be confident that his voices cannot be heard by others 
because they are solely within the confines of their head whereas another person 
experiencing thought echo might be extremely worried that their thoughts are heard 
by everyone else (which can lead to a delusional elaboration) because they themselves
can ‘hear’ them spoken aloud. In this sense, once thought echo loses the ‘own-thought’ 
nature (i.e. authorship and subjectivity) it will become ‘true’ external AVHs, 
indicating that psychotic symptoms or even psychological phenomena in general are 
not static and can often morph into one another and therefore cannot be understood as 
isolated mental events.
1.4 The Psychosis Prodrome
The term ‘prodrome’ denotes the period before frank illness onset where attenuated 
and nonspecific (yet still pathological) symptoms may be present alongside a certain 
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degree of functional decline or impairment. It is somewhat debatable because 
‘prodrome’ seems to suggest inevitable transition which is simply not the case. In fact, 
some have argued that it should be reserved in a solely retrospective sense (Yung and 
McGorry, 1996) as the presence of prodromal symptoms only predicts transition in 
around 30% of high-risk individuals (Fusar-Poli et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it is still a 
useful concept for studying the aetiology of psychosis and has important implications 
for treatment provision (e.g. early intervention services). In fact, the transition rate has 
been steadily decreasing over the past few years, perhaps at least partly due to the 
improvements in service provision and earlier access to treatment (Wiltink, Velthrost, 
Nelson, McGorry, and Young, 2015; Nelson et al., 2016).
The early stages of psychosis, including the ultra-high risk state, are defined as 
‘a period of escalating severity of symptoms or functional decline that lies between 
the end of the relatively asymptomatic premorbid phase and the beginning of the 
frankly psychotic phase of schizophrenic psychosis’ (Miller et al., 2003). Rather than 
a stable and enduring trait as it is often the case in schizotypy, the transitioning period 
from the prodrome to an episode of florid psychosis is characterised by escalating 
severity in a relatively short period of time. The duration of the prodrome can range 
between a few months to two years, sometimes longer (Yung and McGorry, 1996); 
however, as the prodrome is a retrospective concept, it can be difficult to differentiate 
between ‘true’ prodrome and untreated psychosis. 
1.4.1 Assessments of Prodromal Psychosis
The psychometric instrument for early psychosis chosen in the current project is the 
Structured Interview for Prodromal Syndromes (SIPS) and the Scale of Prodromal 
Symptoms (SOPS; see Miller et al., 2003) for its relatively straightforward rating 
scales and fully structured nature, in addition to the fact that training opportunities and 
expertise in using the interview are already available within Cardiff University. 
Similar to the Comprehensive Assessment of the At-Risk Mental State (CAARMS) 
instrument mentioned below, the SIPS has three prodromal criteria (APS, BIPS and 
GRD) but with different duration requirements from the CAARMS:
1) Attenuated positive symptom syndrome (APS): One or more of the 5 positive 
items scoring in the prodromal range of 1-5, AND symptoms beginning in the 
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past year or increasing 1 or more points within the past year, AND symptoms 
occurring at least once per week for the last month.
2) Brief intermittent psychotic symptom syndrome (BIPS): One or more of the 5 
positive items scoring in the psychotic range of 6, AND symptoms beginning 
in the past 3 months, AND symptoms occurring currently at least several 
minutes a day, once per month.
3) Genetic risk and deterioration syndrome (GRD): First degree relative with 
history of any psychotic disorder, OR criteria for schizotypal personality 
disorder met, AND a drop of at least 30% in the last year in the Global 
Assessment of Functioning (GAF).
The two related concepts, at-risk mental state (ARMS) and clinical ultra-high risk 
state (UHR) are often used interchangeably with the psychosis prodrome concept. 
Unlike ‘prodrome’, however, ARMS and UHR are not necessarily retrospective in 
nature and thus do not always indicate transition to a clinical status. The most widely 
accepted criteria for UHR status are those used by Yung and colleagues from the 
Personal Assessment and Crisis Evaluation (PACE) Clinic in Australia who also 
devised the CAARMS. The ARMS criteria are usually regarded as the presence of one 
or more of the following (Yung et al., 2005, 2008): 
1) Attenuated (subthreshold) psychotic symptoms (APS) within the previous 
12 months.
2) Brief limited intermittent psychotic symptoms (BLIPS): history of brief self-
limited psychotic symptoms which spontaneously resolve within the previous 
12 months. 
3) Trait group: presumed genetic vulnerability to psychotic disorder (either 
schizotypal personality disorder or family history of psychotic disorder in a 
first degree relative) plus persistent low functioning for at least 1 month within 
the previous 12 months.
As mentioned above, only around 30% of UHR or ARMS individuals will 
actually transition to frank psychosis. Therefore it is important for clinicians to be 
aware what the risk factors are and which ones might have the highest predictive value 
for later transition. Previous studies (e.g. Mason, Startup, Halpin, Schall, Conrad, and 
Carr, 2004) have found that when measured using psychometric scales, the most 
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reliable predictor is the presence of high schizotypal personality traits (see Section 
1.5.3 for details on schizotypy and risk for psychosis). Other risk factors with high 
predictive values include auditory hallucinations, odd beliefs and magical thinking, 
poor premorbid social adjustment and functioning, blunted/flattened affect and 
anhedonia/social withdrawal. 
However, just like the observation that there is no single symptom that is 
pathognomonic of psychosis, none of these risk factors is able to fully predict or 
‘guarantee’ a later transition. More recently, presence of basic self-disturbances (e.g. 
altered sense of ego-boundary and depersonalisation of thought agency/ownership) 
has also been shown to strongly predict eventual psychosis onset in UHR individuals 
(Nelson, Thompson, and Yung, 2012). 
From a neurobiological-neuropsychological point of view, UHR individuals 
already exhibit deficits in working memory, attention, executive control and general 
intelligence (Pflueger, Gschwandtner, Stieglitz, and Riecher-Rössler, 2007). Neural 
activation pattern abnormalities in this group are thought to be on an intermediate level 
(i.e. more severe than controls but milder than patients with established psychosis) 
which furthers the notion of a continuum approach to psychotic symptoms and levels 
of dysfunction (Broome et al., 2009). Impairments in functional connectivity between 
posterior, but not anterior, hippocampal regions and the prefrontal cortex have also 
been found to be disrupted in both unmedicated UHR individuals and patients who 
have just received a diagnosis of (first episode) schizophrenia (Benetti, Mechelli, 
Picchioni, Broome, Williams, and McGuire, 2009) indicating that these brain 
abnormalities may be present from the very early stages (sometimes even when the 
individual is still asymptomatic). However, as an individual responds to timely and 
effective treatment, the potential progression to chronic schizophrenia and further 
decline in functioning can be prevented (Wood, Yung, McGorry, and Pantelis, 2011).
1.4.2 Stages of the Psychosis Prodrome
Two main approaches to the staging of psychosis have been proposed, one based on 
(psycho)pathological measures/clinical presentation (Wood et al., 2011) and the other 
on phenomenology (Conrad’s ‘Beginning Schizophrenia’ model, see Mishara, 2009). 
The former approach focuses on disease progression and levels of abnormality (see 
Table 1.4) although the transition between stages is considered bidirectional. In other 
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words, even physiological changes may be reversed with treatment. Wood and 
colleagues also argue that such treatment, whether pharmacological or psychological, 
should be most effective in the early stages and ‘milder’ in terms of side effect profiles
(choosing medications other than clozapine for example, which is an antipsychotic 
with severe side effects but can be highly effective in treatment-resistant 
schizophrenia).
Table 1.4. Clinical staging model of psychosis (adapted from Wood et al., 2011). CAARMS, 
Comprehensive Assessment of the At-Risk Mental State.
Conrad’s model of beginning schizophrenia was proposed long before the advent 
of sophisticated neuroimaging techniques but is still influential due to its particular 
significance for the phenomenological investigation of early psychosis. Table 1.5
outlines the earlier stages in Conrad’s model (he also had his own terminology for the 
later stages, e.g. apocalyptic-catatonic, consolidation/partial remission and residual 
defect). 
Table 1.5. Conrad’s stage model of Beginning Schizophrenia (adapted from Mishara, 2010). 
It is apparent that the three stages (trema, apophany and anastrophe) in this model 
can ‘match’ onto the clinical staging model (clinical stages Ia, Ib and II respectively) 
30
by Wood and colleagues. Especially relevant to the psychosis prodrome is the presence 
of delusional mood/atmosphere as an ‘ideal’ environment for the subsequent 
formation of delusions and/or hallucinations and the subtle changes in thinking, 
perception in behaviour may reflect such ‘primordial’ forms of emerging psychotic 
symptoms. Once again, the sense of perplexity and confusion experienced by the at-
risk individual during this period (long before any indication of an impending 
psychotic episode) is very much nonspecific despite having (retrospective) clinical 
significance, and therefore not considered a screening tool for psychosis. 
However, with the support from more recent studies where early shifts in one’s 
self-world relationship and existential orientation (i.e. self-disturbances; Nelson et al., 
2012) could in fact be trait markers for the clinical manifestation of illness that can 
eventually be used to reduce false-positive rates (Nelson, Yung, Bechdolf, and 
McGorry, 2008). Such emphasis on self-disorders is not without biological basis (e.g. 
Postmes, Sno, Goedhart, van der Stel, Heering, and de Haan, 2014): for instance, the 
roles of the default mode network (DMN; see also Section 1.2.5) and cortical midline 
structures (CMS) in self-referential processing (for a comprehensive review, see 
Nelson et al., 2009). 
1.5 The Continuum Approach
The dichotomous classification of psychosis has been challenged on numerous 
occasions; in particular, the dimensional approach of a ‘Psychosis Continuum’ (or 
even continua) that ranges from transient suspiciousness in the general population 
without any need for care and extends into clinical patients with severe paranoia has 
proven to be a highly influential alternative (van Os et al., 2000, 2009; Kaymaz and 
van Os, 2010). 
According to this view, many of the symptoms seen in schizophrenia, such as 
paranoid ideation and hearing voices, can also be found in the general population,
albeit to a milder or attenuated degree which would normally cause much less distress 
to the experiencing individual (Freeman et al., 2008; Johns et al., 2014). In this sense, 
the psychosis prodrome is but a component of the continuum linking nonclinical 
psychotic experiences and clinical disorder. Symptoms of schizophrenia themselves, 
on the other hand, are not necessarily pathognomonic of the illness (Verdoux and van 
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Os, 2002) Interestingly, persistence of these unusual experiences is not always an 
indicator of impairment, as many individuals can, for example, hear voices most of 
the day but do not cross the clinical threshold for a diagnosable psychotic disorder 
(Powers, Kelley, and Corlett, 2017), often due to the lack of distress. 
Individuals who report such nonclinical psychosis-like experiences are often 
viewed from two angles, one from a latent psychosis risk perspective (Debbané et al., 
2015) and the other from a normally distributed schizotypal personality trait 
perspective (Claridge, 1997). These two schools of thought have not yet reached 
agreement. Additionally, the continuum approach is supported by a relatively recent 
factor analysis of the structures of different diagnostic systems used for schizophrenia 
(Peralta and Cuesta, 2005).
1.5.1 Schizotypy 
Schizotypy in the current Thesis is defined as nonclinical and subclinical levels of 
subjective personality traits and unusual experiences akin to those found in 
schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses, but do not lead to functional impairment or a need 
for care. There are two main schools of thought regarding schizotypy: one from the 
study of extended phenotypes of schizophrenia (e.g. milder forms of perceptual and 
behavioural oddities in unaffected first-degree relatives of schizophrenia patients), and 
the other from that of individual differences/personality approach. This however does 
not mean there is no overlap between the two approaches; indeed, some argue (Hewitt 
and Claridge, 1989, Johns and van Os, 2001, Kendler et al., 2008) that schizotypal 
traits result from a combination of genetic, environmental and personality factors 
which, like their counterparts in other fields of medicine, are normally distributed in 
the general population (i.e. everyone has a certain level of expression of these traits). 
Nevertheless, the division between these viewpoints may be seen as a reflection in two 
of the major diagnostic systems: in the DSM, schizotypal personality disorder is 
classed (as its name suggests) as a cluster A personality disorder whereas in the ICD, 
schizotypal disorder is grouped with other schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses. 
It has also been proposed that schizotypy itself is multidimensional (dimensions 
within the psychosis continuum), representing underlying vulnerabilities across 
personality, subclinical and clinical phenomenology. In other words, schizophrenia is 
not a separate entity from schizotypy and neither is schizotypy simply an analogue of 
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schizophrenia; instead, schizophrenia is the most extreme expression of schizotypy 
(Kwapil and Barrantes-Vidal, 2014). Also, the presence of schizotypal traits cannot 
be equated to the psychosis prodrome (at best, it conveys psychosis-proneness or risk 
states) let alone an ‘inevitable’ transition to clinical status due to protective factors and 
potential reversal against the stages of the ‘psychosis trajectory’. 
As a result, the current Thesis prefers the individual differences approach and 
measures overall schizotypy (in addition to more specific psychosis-like experiences 
such as those measured by the PDI-21 and the CAPS) using the Oxford-Liverpool 
Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et al., 1995; Mason and 
Claridge, 2006). The O-LIFE consists of four subscales (unusual experiences, 
cognitive disorganisation, introvertive anhedonia and impulsive nonconformity) 
which aim to reflect the positive, negative and disorganised dimensions of schizotypy 
in the general population only. It is chosen over the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire (SPQ; Raine, 1991; Vollema, Sitskoorn, Appels, and Kahn, 2002) 
because it is less driven by a disease model. The O-LIFE is derived from the 
personality framework and it has been designed to give a normal distribution of 
responses. Consequently, it is made very clear that the psychometric scales used in the 
current project are nonclinical, hence they do not measure schizophrenia and cannot 
offer information on the respondent’s mental health in general (see Chapters 4 and 5).
1.5.2 Nonclinical and Subclinical Psychotic Symptoms
It is difficult to define what is ‘purely’ nonclinical and what is sub-threshold given the 
continuum approach; they could simply be different levels of expression of the same 
schizotypal traits (with nonclinical considered even milder than subclinical psychotic 
symptoms). Indeed, phenomenologically it is probably a case of quantitative rather 
than just qualitative difference in experience between nonclinical and clinical 
populations (i.e. intensity and duration and not just the content of the psychotic 
experience). Empirical studies demonstrating the presence of the psychosis continuum 
can be traced back to at over a decade ago at least (if not further back – Sidgwick and 
colleagues’ report on the Consensus of Hallucinations surveyed approximately 17,000 
adults – see Beavan, Read, and Cartwright, 2011) when Stefanis and colleagues 
measured positive, negative and depressive symptoms as related to psychosis in a large 
general population sample (Stefanis et al., 2002). The authors found that the three 
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symptom dimensions were intercorrelated and had a distribution in the general 
population. Depressive symptoms were prominent in members of the general 
population experiencing psychosis-like symptoms. Prior to this Ohayon (2000) used 
general population samples from three European countries (with a total number of 
over 13,000 participants) to investigate the prevalence of hallucinations in all sensory 
modalities. Ohayon found that around 38% of all respondents reported hallucinatory 
experience, with hypnogogic and hypnopompic hallucinations being the most 
common. Nevertheless, the samples were not purely nonclinical as although they were 
drawn from the general populations they also included psychiatric patients receiving 
care in the community. 
Perhaps a more suitable example comes from Hanssen, Bak, Bijl, Vollebergh, 
and van Os (2005) who followed up over 7,000 individuals for two years, again from 
the general population, for the presence, (dis)continuity and outcome of positive 
psychotic experiences. The authors found that the incidence of such experiences was 
around 100 times greater than what had been originally estimated as the incidence of 
clinical psychotic disorders, and the most likely outcome for these experiences was 
spontaneous resolution/discontinuity. In those (a much smaller number of individuals) 
who had more persistent experiences, there was an equally large likelihood of 
subclinical and clinical 2-year outcomes. They conclude that ‘emotional appraisal and 
degree of intrusiveness of psychotic experiences are important modifiers not for 
continuity per se but for clinical outcome specifically’ (p. 181, a finding that is 
supported by Johns et al. (2014)’s analysis. 
A more recent study by Freeman, McManus, Brugha, Meltzer, Jenkins, and 
Bebbington. (2011) is also worth mentioning: the authors specifically measured the 
prevalence of paranoia and paranoid thinking in the general population with different 
levels of severity and found that around 20% of respondents (obtained from the Adult 
Psychiatric Morbidity Survey in England) reported feelings or ideas that others are 
against them, whereas a much lower proportion (less than 2%) reported that others are 
plotting against them to cause serious harm. Their findings again demonstrate a 
multidimensional nature of psychosis-like experiences; interestingly, the prevalence 
of those reporting severe paranoia is still lower than the prevalence of those diagnosed 
with schizophrenia (estimated to be around 1%), suggesting it is very likely that other 
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factors (e.g. coping methods, appraisal, social and cultural influences) act as 
modulators in the development of clinical disorders. 
1.5.3 Schizotypy and Risk for Psychosis
Given that the concept of schizotypy in the current Thesis adopts an individual 
difference/personality perspective rather than necessarily a risk marker one, and the 
fact that there is still insufficient evidence supporting a solid association between 
schizotypy and later development of psychosis (although retrospectively schizotypy 
can be found in the early stages of many psychosis patients; Morrison et al., 2002; 
Perkins, Leserman, Jarskog, Graham, Kazmer, and Lieberman, 2000), predicting the 
onset of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders from schizotypal traits alone would perhaps 
prove overly ambitious. Previous research such as the Edinburgh High-Risk Study (e.g. 
Miller, Byrne, Hodges, Lawrie, Owens, and Johnstone, 2002; Johnstone, Ebmeier, 
Miller, Owens, and Lawrie, 2005) has identified multiple factors underlying the 
heterogeneity in schizotypal traits. They found that isolated schizotypal signs seldom 
lead to an impending onset of schizophrenia and hence are not reliable precursors. The 
risk therefore is more likely to be highest when a combination of factors (in the 
Edinburgh study, the factors are social withdrawal, psychotic symptoms, socio-
emotional dysfunction and odd behaviour) are present; it is also apparent that 
psychotic or positive schizotypal traits do not necessarily lead to psychotic outcomes. 
It is also possible that amongst all the potential predictors, there is an interaction effect 
between schizotypy measures and other variables. 
Another important difference lies between state and trait markers: as discussed 
above, clinical high risk is a state whereas schizotypal personality is a trait. As 
Debbané, Eliez, Badoud, Conus, Flückiger, and Schultze-Lutter (2014) argue, 
schizotypy is probably more useful when acting as a ‘distal risk marker’ and may not 
be as predictive as other indicators in the UHR state criteria in identifying those at 
imminent risk. However, the predictive value of schizotypy seems to originate from 
its ability to detect psychosis-prone subjects in the community who are otherwise 
healthy. Therefore, prospective research in large general population samples which 
combines state and trait markers is needed in order to devise potentially more sensitive 
clinical measures for predicting psychosis onset. For the purposes of the current 
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research, all measures used are nonclinical and as such, they are neither able nor 
intended to offer any clinical information.
1.6 Conclusion
This Chapter has offered an overview of the diagnosis, symptomatology, assessment 
and treatment of schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses with a special emphasis on 
positive symptoms (delusions and hallucinations), integrating multiple levels of 
explanation from the molecular to the experiential. It has also discussed the various 
aspects of psychosis risk states and the concept of schizotypy which are central to the 
present Thesis. Debatable topics such as whether all delusions are beliefs and all 
hallucinations are sensory are also included as part of the phenomenological argument 
based on the latest theoretical and empirical research. The next Chapter focuses on the 
role of prediction error in the pathogenesis of positive psychotic symptoms and 
provides a review and synthesis of current literature.
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Chapter Two: Predictive Processing and the Pathogenesis of 
Psychosis
2.1 Introduction
One of the most widely accepted theories of first-rank psychotic symptoms such as 
hallucinations and passivity phenomena focus on source monitoring deficits; that is, 
‘a difficulty distinguishing between the origins of endogenous and exogenous stimuli’ 
(for a detailed review, see Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie, Sass, 2014a) as a result of 
abnormal neural mechanisms involved in the differentiation of internal/external 
boundaries of stimuli. Another emerging approach based on the concepts of predictive 
coding and prediction error is often applied to the processes of belief and delusion 
formation (Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher, and Krystal, 2010); however, relatively 
little research has been done in an attempt to link the two theories in terms of a 
common pathway. Considering delusions and hallucinations are intricately related 
phenomena phenomenologically (Maher, 2006; Humpston and Broome, 2016), it 
should not be a surprise that in cognitive terms, source monitoring and predictive 
coding are interrelated or even interdependent processes. In the following two Sections
the aim is to review the relevant literature for both accounts and link the main cognitive 
neuropsychiatric approaches to the pathogenesis of delusions and hallucinations, with 
predictive processing as the centre stage. 
A prediction error (PE) occurs when there is a mismatch or discrepancy between 
the expectation of an experience and the actual experience itself. It has been suggested 
that PEs are ‘a general neural coding strategy’ present in the whole brain which are 
involved in perception, cognition and motivational control (den Ouden, Kok, and de 
Lange, 2012). Consequently, PEs are divided into three main classes: perceptual, 
cognitive and motivational PEs. Sometimes the first two classes are further grouped 
together because unlike motivational PEs, perceptual and cognitive PEs only report 
the degree of surprise or deviation from prior experiences whereas motivational PEs 
carry a ‘sign’ or valance (better or worse) of the outcome experienced which can drive 
behaviour (e.g. reward-seeking). 
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2.2 Types of Predictive Processing
Perceptual PEs are most frequently investigated by electrophysiological studies, in 
particular those using electroencephalography (EEG). Such studies often focus on the 
neural responses to surprising and unexpected stimuli with the oddball paradigm, in 
which an ‘oddball’ stimulus that stands out from a series of repetitive and standard 
stimuli leading to a phenomenon called mismatch negativity (MMN). MMN has been 
reported in both auditory and visual sensory modalities (Näätänen, Paavilainen, Rinne, 
and Alho, 2007; Stagg, Hindley, Tales, and Butler, 2004; Czigler, 2007). Interestingly, 
it has also been found that multisensory regions such as the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS) are functionally connected to unimodal regions (e.g. auditory and visual 
cortices). The strength of the violation of prior expectations positively correlated with 
the STS oscillatory response in terms of both frequency (high or slow) and spatial 
distribution of cortical activity (Arnal, Morillon, Kell, and Giraud, 2009; Arnal, Wyart, 
and Giraud, 2011), suggesting a predictive hierarchy of message transmission across 
modalities (den Ouden et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, cognitive PEs arise from cortical areas responsible for higher-
order representations which also share the propensity to respond to prediction and 
surprise. Higher in the predictive hierarchy and above the sensory PEs, cognitive PEs 
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) are sensitive to the violation of abstract 
rules. The activity of the dlPFC was maximal when all associations were unpredictable 
in a causal associative learning task in which participants were asked to predict 
outcome stimuli based on previously learnt associations, suggesting that PEs are a 
‘driving force’ in associative learning (Fletcher et al., 2001; Corlett et al., 2004). 
Signed PEs or the motivational/reward type of PEs reflects whether the surprising 
outcome is better or worse than expected, which allows an update of the value of the 
stimulus currently experienced. Motivational PEs are so called because they have the 
potential to drive behaviour as they are associated with reward and punishment and 
hence are key to reinforcement learning (den Ouden et al., 2012). Unlike most 
unsigned PEs which are usually generated in cortical areas, signed PEs are coded by 
subcortical areas such as the dopaminergic ventral tegmental area (VTA) for reward 
PEs, which have been shown to be disrupted in psychosis (Murray et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, unsigned PEs have been reported in subcortical areas such as the 
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midbrain dopaminergic substantia nigra (for a study in primates, see Matsumoto and 
Hikosaka, 2009) and signed PEs in the orbitofrontal cortex for reward which are 
related to PEs in the VTA (Takahashi et al., 2009). Therefore it would be more helpful 
to view the relationship between signed and unsigned PEs as dynamic and interlinked 
rather than a simple and absolute cortical/subcortical divide, although such a divide 
may still be useful for classification purposes. 
2.3 The Neurobiology and Function of Prediction Error
Due to the observation that all currently licensed antipsychotic drugs are either full 
antagonists or partial agonists at the dopamine D2 receptor (although it must borne in 
mind that clozapine, often reserved for treatment-resistant schizophrenia, only has low 
affinity for D2) and their efficacy in treating positive symptoms (Seeman and Tallerico, 
1998; Nordström et al., 1993), the dominant theory for explaining delusions and 
hallucinations, at least in terms of neurobiology, has long been the dopamine 
hypothesis of schizophrenia (Howes and Kapur, 2009; Carlsson, 1988; Meltzer and 
Stahl, 1976). Neuropsychological theories (e.g. ‘jumping to conclusions’ in 
persecutory delusions), on the other hand, were not often viewed in conjunction with 
the biochemical model. However, in more recent years with the advent of the scientific 
discipline Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, the neurochemical and neuropsychological 
approaches to the understanding of delusions and hallucinations have begun to 
converge. According to the founders of the discipline, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 
‘represents a systematic and theoretically driven approach to explain clinical 
psychopathologies in terms of deficits to normal cognitive mechanisms’ (Halligan and 
David, 2001): for example, explaining delusions with semantic processing and 
probabilistic reasoning, and hallucinations with verbal self- or source monitoring 
deficits. These cognitive processes can be further extrapolated to brain (dys)function; 
typical corresponding brain areas involved in the previous examples would be the 
fronto-temporal network for delusions and superior temporal gyrus for AVHs 
(Halligan and David, 2001). 
The Section above mentioned the brain regions from where different types of PEs 
arise; here the aim is to give a more detailed account as to how PEs are generated and 
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what functions they may serve. Figure 2.1(A-C) exemplifies the generation of PEs in 
the three classes mentioned above (perceptual, cognitive and motivational). 
Figure 2.1(A-C). Generation of different types of prediction errors in cortical and subcortical areas. 
V1, primary visual cortex; V2, prestriate cortex; LGN, lateral geniculate nucleus; CA, cornu ammonis; 
PFC, prefrontal cortex; GABA, gamma-aminobutyric acid; VTA, ventral tegmental area; DA, 
dopamine.  Adapted from den Ouden et al., 2012.
In terms of cortical PEs, it has been suggested that separate ‘representation’ or 
‘presentation’ (P) units exist alongside PE units which connect between one another 
either within each cortical column (intrinsic) or between columns (extrinsic). The
model in Figure 2.1(A) illustrates the generation of perceptual PEs in the visual cortex 
as the result of a mismatch between predictions (P, inhibitory, red) and input 
(excitatory, green), leading to the PE unit as the difference between input and 
prediction which will then be minimised by the activity in P units. P units can be sent 
forwards as input to a higher level in the hierarchy or backwards in order to update 
lower-level predictions and the excitatory feedback from higher-level P units activate 
lower-level P units. Figure 2.1(B) shows the generation of cognitive PEs in the 
hippocampus; predictions based on prior memories in layer 2 of the entorhinal cortex 
act together to drive the activity in CA3 whereas the P unit in CA3 inhibits the PE 
signal in CA1 (it is viewed as a general principle that P units are inhibitory to PE units). 
Sensory inputs (layer 3 of the entorhinal cortex) are in turn excitatory to CA1, which 
then computes an output based on the comparison between predictions and inputs (den 
Ouden et al., 2012).
Subcortical motivational PEs are thought to have arisen via similar mechanisms 
with those of cortical (in particular cognitive) PEs; an optogenetic study by Cohen, 
Haesler, Vong, Lowell, and Uchida (2012) found that activity in GABAergic 
inhibitory neurons signals/ indicates the delay between a reward-predicting cue and 
the outcome, whereas dopaminergic neurons in the VTA were active when encoding 
reward PEs. The actual outcome (presence or omission) of the reward played little role 
40
in how the GABAergic neurons responded; instead, their activity was proportional to 
how much the cue predicted reward itself. Figure 2.1(C) shows how GABAergic 
neurons in the VTA inhibit the excitatory input from sensory and limbic regions 
(primary rewards) when the reward is expected (minimal PE). Punishment or negative 
reward PEs on the other hand are thought to result from the activity of lateral habenula 
neurons which project to VTA GABAergic neurons (Jhou et al., 2009). It is also worth 
noting that although some subcortical PEs are entirely contained in subcortical areas 
(e.g. midbrain), some may also result from cortical inputs. Area CA1 of the 
hippocampus (Figure 2.1B) is able to compare between the predictions from CA3 and 
the actual outcome from sensory inputs which sends the output to the dopaminergic 
neurons in the VTA (Lisman and Grace, 2005). As den Ouden et al. (2012) summarises, 
‘the exact content and nature of the PEs is determined by the neural circuitry in which 
the PEs arise’.
Unsigned and signed PEs serve different functions: for example, unsigned 
perceptual PEs draw attention to the surprising nature of a presence or absence in the 
visual scene and allows the updating of how one experiences the world, whereas 
signed motivational or reward PEs signal the direction of the update by informing the 
subject about the valance of the stimulus. Also, PEs can either directly lead to changes 
in perception, cognition, action and motivation by inducing short-lived postsynaptic 
effects or modulate the storage and updating of prior predictions by regulating synaptic 
strength (den Ouden et al., 2012). The brain creates a generative model in which one 
predicts what sensory stimuli will be next experienced or observed in the world and 
perceptual PEs inform the subject how good their predictions are (perceptual 
inference). PE minimisation or ‘iterative hypothesis testing’ across the cortical 
hierarchy gives rise to the most appropriate and energy-efficient explanation of the 
sensory inputs in that model and therefore shapes perception itself and helps to reduce 
its ambiguity unless there are very strong PE signals (Sterzer, Frith, and Petrovic, 
2008). On the other hand, signed or motivational PEs play important roles in 
reinforcement learning such as the concept of blocking where if a cue or cues fully 
predict a reinforcer, it will not be associated with an additional cue even if the later 
cue and the reinforcer are consistently paired together. 
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2.4. Predictive Processing and Psychotic Experiences
One of the most influential theories about altered cognition in psychosis posits that 
predictive processing is altered in healthy individuals prone to psychosis-like 
experiences (e.g. Corlett and Fletcher, 2012; Palmer, Davare and Kilner, 2016), 
patients with first-episode psychosis (e.g. Corlett et al., 2007) and patients with 
established schizophrenia (e.g. Schlagenhauf et al., 2014). 
Perceptual or sensory predictive processing is central to the monitoring and 
control of motor acts (Shadmehr, Smith, and Krakauer, 2010); in self-generated 
actions, the predicted outcome of a motor command matches the actual sensory 
feedback. It has been argued that this match in turn becomes our experiential marker 
for the sense of agency (i.e. one is the causal agent of one’s action) (Sato and Yasuda, 
2005). In other words, sensory input caused by self-initiated motor acts is attenuated 
and there is very little prediction error to minimise (Bays, Flanagan, and Wolpert, 2006; 
Brown, Adams, Parees, Edwards, and Friston, 2013). Of particular interest is the 
failure to assign agency to the self in delusion of control (Frith, 2012; Wilkinson, 
2014), which is one of the ‘first-rank’ symptoms of schizophrenia. 
Previous studies have demonstrated sensory prediction deficits in patients with 
established schizophrenia (Lindner, Thier, Kircher, Haarmeier, and Leube, 2005; 
Shergill, Samson, Bays, Frith, and Wolpert, 2005; Synofzik, Thier, Leube, 
Schlotterbeck, and Lindner, 2010). To date, three studies have used a nonclinical 
sample with schizotypal traits who were otherwise healthy (Teufel, Kingdon, Ingram, 
Wolpert, and Fletcher, 2010; Lemaitre, Luyat and Lafargue, 2016; Palmer, Davare and 
Kilner, 2016). The authors of the first study (Teufel et al., 2010) found a statistically 
significant negative correlation between predictive processing in the sensory-motor 
domain (as indexed by an overcompensation score in a force-matching task; Chapter 
4) and delusional ideation as measured by PDI-21, which followed the same pattern 
as Shergill et al. (2005)’s finding in schizophrenia patients. Using a similar force-
matching paradigm, Palmer et al. (2016) have replicated this relationship with PDI-21. 
Another very recent study (Lemaitre et al., 2016) used a measure of ‘self-tickling’ as 
an index of sensory prediction in a student population with high and low positive 
schizotypy who experienced aberrant perceptions as well as passivity-like phenomena 
using more specific scales; it followed the same principle that self-initiated tickling 
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sensations should be reduced due to the same sensory attenuation. The authors found 
that individuals who rated highly in positive schizotypy (as measured by the 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire) were better at tickling themselves, suggesting 
reduced sensory attenuation and therefore heightened prediction error signals. 
The phenomenon of ‘blocking’ (Kamin, 1969) mentioned above in associative 
learning occurs when only one stimulus of a stimulus pair with a given outcome (e.g. 
AB+) has been previously associated with the same outcome (A+). Responses to 
stimulus B alone are usually attenuated (‘blocked’) compared to responses to stimulus 
A alone or if A had not been associated with the outcome. This weakening of 
associative strength for B, or indeed any change in the strength of association between 
stimulus and outcome, can be formalised as a function of a prediction error (the 
Rescorla-Wagner model; see Tobler, O’Doherty, Dolan, and Schultz, 2006; 
Haselgrove and Evans, 2010). 
There is a significant amount of evidence that in patients with schizophrenia 
blocking is attenuated or even absent. Patients often view both cues A and B as equally 
salient or equally good predictors of the outcome and the associative strength for B 
does not change even after previous training with A+. What is more equivocal is the 
particular symptom dimension that is associated with this deficit. According to the 
predictive processing model it would be anticipated that relationships would be found 
between the positive dimension of schizophrenia and a decrement in blocking. This 
was supported by Jones, Gray, and Hemsley (1992) who found that blocking was 
abolished in patients in the acute phase of the disorder, where there is a preponderance 
of positive symptoms, but was present in those with chronic schizophrenia. Further 
support is provided by Corlett and colleagues who found links between neural 
prediction error signals and delusional symptoms (Corlett et al., 2007). However, and 
in contrast, other researchers have found links between reductions in blocking and 
negative or nonparanoid symptoms (Oades, Zimmermann, and Eggers, 1996; Bender, 
Müller, Oades, and Sartory, 2001; Moran, Al-Uzri, Watson, and Reveley, 2003; 
Moran, Owen, Crookes, Al-Uzri, and Reveley, 2008). 
This situation has been mirrored when researchers have adopted a continuum 
model of schizophrenia and examined schizotypy. Blocking has been found to be 
reduced in those high in: positive (Moran et al., 2003), and the negative dimension 
(Haselgrove and Evans, 2010), delusions (Moore, Dickenson and Fletcher, 2011) and 
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the distress associated with schizotypal delusion-like beliefs (Corlett and Fletcher, 
2012). 
Patients with schizophrenia show a multitude of deficits in reward processing 
(see Gold, Waltz, Prentice, Morris, and Heerey, 2008). Previous studies have used a 
reversal learning paradigm in both medicated and unmedicated patients (Murray et al., 
2008a, 2008b; Waltz and Gold, 2007; McKirdy, Sussmann, Hall, Lawrie, Johnstone, 
and McIntosh, 2009; Schlagenhauf et al., 2014; Reinen et al., 2016). The simplest 
design of a reversal learning task involves participants choosing between two visually 
presented stimuli (e.g. geometrical shapes): participants receive some kind of reward 
for choosing the correct stimulus and are punished (e.g. a reduction in the amount of 
money earned) for choosing the wrong stimulus. When a reversal happens, the rules 
are switched so that the previously correct stimulus becomes the wrong one, and vice 
versa. Of particular importance to psychosis is the observation that manipulation of 
dopamine levels modulates reversal learning, in which subjects with high baseline 
dopamine synthesis in the striatum showed relatively better reversal learning from 
unexpected rewards than from unexpected punishments. This pattern was reversed in 
those with low baseline dopamine synthesis (Cools, Frank, Gibbs, Miyakawa, Jagust, 
and D'Esposito, 2009). In addition, when the positive reward PE is large it will 
strengthen the association between reward and action and lead to a selection bias. 
Reward PEs hence have both immediate and direct influence on action selection and 
also longer term effects on learning due to a selection bias towards reinforced actions. 
Significant to the pathogenesis of psychosis is that abnormally large PEs result in 
increased salience of stimuli as top-down predictions can no longer find suitable 
explanations for such events (Murray et al., 2007; Heinz and Schlagenhauf, 2010; 
Berridge, 2007).
Current evidence (e.g. Schlagenhauf et al., 2014; Reinen et al., 2016) suggest that 
acutely psychotic patients display an insensitivity to positive reinforcement and 
increased tendency to switch regardless of reversal status which corresponds to 
reduced error signals in the ventral striatum. This is consistent with other studies on 
delusions, proneness to switching and reward insensitivity across a variety of tasks not 
limited to reversal learning, but also other set-shifting tasks (e.g. Cella, Dymond, and 
Cooper, 2009). Chronically medicated schizophrenia patients, on the other hand, tend 
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to show more deficits in perseveration but not switching (Elliott, McKenna, Robbins, 
and Sahakian, 1995).
To date, the vast majority of studies using the predictive processing framework 
in psychosis have been done in patients with non-affective psychoses (mostly 
schizophrenia); as outlined in the previous Chapter, affective psychoses are a related 
yet distinctly heterogeneous group within the spectrum of psychotic disorders, but 
have received comparatively little focus. Perhaps due to the low prevalence, patients 
with schizoaffective disorder only constitute a very small proportion of patients 
recruited in such studies and are mixed with patients with non-affective psychoses (e.g. 
Fogelson, Litvak, Peled, Fernandez-del-Olmo, and Friston, 2014) and there have not 
yet been any studies exclusively on predictive processing in patients with 
schizoaffective disorder. However, Gradin et al. (2011) found significant differences 
in reward predictive coding between patients with unipolar depression without 
psychotic features and those with schizophrenia: the abnormally blunted encoding of 
PEs contributed to anhedonia in depression whereas disruptions in PE-dependent 
inferences/belief updating were responsible for psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia. 
Therefore, the presence of significant mood symptoms could confound or complicate 
the predictive and/or source monitoring processes in an affective psychosis. For the 
purposes of the current Thesis, depressive symptoms in clinical patients were assessed 
to ensure a full diagnosis of affective psychosis or mood disorder was not met, and as 
such non-affective psychotic symptoms were the sole focus of investigation.
2.5 Delusions and Hallucinations: ‘Perceiving is Believing’?
Previous research has mostly focused on delusion formation and hallucinations as if 
they are separate processes, with prediction error and source monitoring deficits as 
their ‘corresponding’ bases in psychopathology. However, more recent efforts (e.g. 
Fletcher and Frith, 2009, Griffin and Fletcher, 2017) have attempted to establish a 
relationship between belief and perception which can be extrapolated to a unified 
account for explaining delusions and hallucinations. In this approach the fundamental 
deficit lies within a Bayesian framework where experiences are dependent on one’s 
beliefs and the extent to which one updates the beliefs are affected by the experiences 
themselves. In other words, there is significant interaction between abnormalities in 
45
belief (i.e. delusions) and those in perception (i.e. hallucinations). Learnt associations 
can influence perception and delusional beliefs can alter the content of hallucinations 
so that they are consistent with that of the delusions (Kot and Serper, 2002). 
Within this Bayesian hierarchy, the PE signal acts as an internal marker that the 
existing inference cannot fully account for the input (Fletcher and Frith, 2009). It has 
been proposed that minimisation of PE signals at the next level of the hierarchy may 
improve the accuracy of the current model; however, if this fails higher-level 
adjustments are needed in order to keep the inferences of sensory input internally 
consistent. According to Fletcher and Frith, what drives the learning of new 
associations is the fact that lower-level PEs cannot be accounted for by the current 
model, hence creating a heightened salience towards the newly emerged attention-
grabbing stimuli. 
In schizophrenia, patients’ falsely generated and imprecise PE signals are sent to 
higher-levels of the hierarchy and are constantly demanding an update of the current 
inference, yet because they are ‘false alarm’ signals the higher-level readjustments are 
never enough to resolve the problem. Therefore, it leads to a vicious circle where these 
abnormal PE signals go higher and higher in the levels of abstraction and the higher 
they propagate, the more severe the disruption is to the Bayesian system. This may not 
only result in the formation of delusions but also their maintenance and persistence 
because of repeated reinforcement and reconsolidation (Corlett, Krystal, Taylor, and 
Fletcher, 2009). 
Nevertheless, there is also a distinction between the presence of PE themselves 
and their precision or uncertainty (Corlett et al., 2010): as precision and uncertainty 
are inverse concepts to each other, delusions form because of a failure to accommodate 
for such uncertainty and imprecise PEs. Dopaminergic hyperfunction in the VTA-PFC 
circuit has been suggested to play a key role in both encoding reward PEs and 
modulating the level of precision (i.e. signal-to-noise ratio) of reward and non-reward 
PEs, whereas glutamate (NMDA receptors) signalling would be diminished. 
Interestingly, although this account has been primarily attributed to delusions, 
motivational states and reward-driven learning can also influence perceptual 
judgement which leads to the (related) theory of source or reality monitoring deficits 
in some delusions (e.g. delusions of control) and auditory-verbal hallucinations (Frith, 
2012). 
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For example, in passivity phenomena the efference copy of motor commands 
which makes a prediction about their sensory outcome is either not sent by the internal 
forward model or is unable to cancel out the prediction of the consequences of the 
patient’s actions (Chapter 1). Sometimes passivity and delusions of control are used 
interchangeably; however, there is some debate over whether the delusional 
elaboration is in fact phenomenologically separate and is not an intrinsic requirement 
for passivity experiences to arise. If this argument is indeed true it might be that PE 
signals can mediate both the formation of the delusion and the passivity experience 
itself, of which the latter can also be extrapolated to explaining certain subtypes of 
AVHs.
The two-factor account of delusions proposes that both perceptual and reasoning 
deficits are needed in order for a delusion to form (Coltheart et al., 2007; McKay et 
al., 2007; Davies et al., 2001): this is based on empirical findings that the sites of 
damage in neurological patients who also have delusions include both a perceptual site 
and a belief evaluation site which are responsible for perceptual abnormalities and 
their delusional explanations, respectively. Also, the first factor is thought to explain 
the content of the delusion and the second factor the maintenance of the delusion. 
Nevetheless, some argue that the two-factor account cannot accommodate all types of 
delusions, especially polythematic delusions. On the other hand, the Bayesian 
approach based on PE signalling combines the two-factor theory into a single deficit 
in Bayesian inference: abnormal perceptions originate from faulty or noisy PE signals 
which lead to the need for updating prior beliefs and further, delusion formation. 
The key region for registering PE signals in causal learning is the right dlPFC 
whose abnormal activities are correlated with the severity of delusions in both 
endogenous and psychotogenic drug-induced (e.g. ketamine) psychosis (Corlett, 
Honey, and Fletcher, 2007a). Although the PE approach is sometimes viewed as a part 
of the damage to the belief evaluation site by two-factor theorists, it has been suggested 
that the former can better account for many of the abovementioned interactions 
between belief and perception by applying the faulty PE signal to the entire hierarchy, 
both bottom-up and top-down (feedforward/feedback) with deficits in Bayesian 
inference as the single factor that has become abnormal. Similarly however, this 
approach has also received criticism that aberrant PE signalling alone is insufficient 
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for a delusion to fully develop and does not explain the elasticity of some delusional 
experiences such as double-bookkeeping (Sass, 2004). 
In order to solve the problems in both accounts, some of the latest theories 
propose that the PE approach should not be considered a rival to the two-factor account 
but as an ‘ally’ in the sense that the PE approach can in fact be integrated into both 
factors of the two-factor account despite many of their intrinsic differences (Miyazono 
et al., 2015). 
2.6 Conclusion
This Chapter consists of summaries of both theoretical underpinnings and recent 
empirical support for the roles of prediction error in the pathogenesis of positive 
psychotic symptoms, namely delusions and hallucinations. Areas covered include the 
classification of positive symptoms and their diagnostic significance, the various types 
of prediction errors (perceptual, cognitive and motivational), their function and 
neurobiological basis. Some of the latest cognitive neuropsychiatric approaches to 
explaining delusions and hallucinations, in particular the Bayesian framework in 
relation to the link between belief and perception, are also reviewed. The theoretical 
validity of the roles played by predictive processing is indeed convincing and there 
should be little doubt about the significance of their involvement in the development 
of early psychosis. 
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Chapter Three: Source Monitoring and Psychotic Symptoms
3.1. Introduction
Having discussed how psychotic symptoms may arise from the perspective of the 
predictive processing framework and the concepts of prediction error, this Chapter 
focuses on the other main component of this Thesis: the source monitoring framework. 
Building upon theories of recognition memory in general, this framework is then 
applied to empirical studies about how deficits in source monitoring can contribute to 
the genesis of psychotic experiences. More specifically, how the genesis of such 
symptoms and experiences results from failures to attribute the correct source (as a 
consequence of disruptions in source monitoring) of internal mental states and 
processes which may be linked to the detection of prediction error. With a more 
integrative account in mind, the aim of this Chapter alongside with the previous one 
is to demonstrate that predictive processing and source monitoring are two interlinked 
frameworks which, when considered in unity, may have significant theoretical and 
practical implications for the understanding of psychosis and related symptoms. 
3.2. Recognition Memory
Before introducing the source monitoring framework, it is important to offer a brief 
review of the most influential theories of recognition memory. Recognition memory 
is a subcomponent within episodic memory which, together with semantic memory, 
fall under the umbrella category of declarative memory. 
3.2.1. Signal-Detection Theory
The signal-detection theory is in essence a single-process model and views familiarity 
as the unidimensional signal underlying the strength of recognition memory (Wixted, 
2007) which originated from the 1960s. The classical signal-detection theory is 
comprised of two Gaussian distributions with equal variance (Fig. 3.1 below), one 
representing targets and the other representing new items, together with a single 
decision criterion. Any memory signal exceeding the criterion strength is deemed old 
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(‘this really happened’) whereas any signal falling under the criterion threshold is 
deemed new (‘first time encounter’). 
Figure 3.1. A schematic representation of signal detection theory showing two Gaussian distributions 
with equal variance. Adapted from Oliver et al., 2008.
Instead of the equal variance (or symmetrical) version of the theory which may 
initially seem more appealing, a more recent revision of the signal-detection theory 
suggests that the unequal variance model is more plausible (Mickes, Wixted, and Wais, 
2007). For example, each item on a standard memory recall list would not have exactly 
the same amount of memory strength added during the study (the equal variance 
version assumes that targets have memory strength added to them in equal increments) 
and as such resulting in the unequal variance. 
This type of model (whether the variance of the distributions is equal or not) 
proposes a single process that needs accounting for, namely familiarity. The strongest 
evidence for this theory perhaps comes from study findings employing receiver-
operating characteristics (ROC), the function which relates the proportion of correct
recognitions (hit rates) with the proportion of incorrect recognitions (false alarm rates). 
3.2.2. Dual-Process Model
Whilst it is indisputable that the signal-detection theory has offered crucial 
contributions to the studies of memory, more contemporary researchers have instead 
suggested that two processes contribute to recognition memory decisions.   Familiarity 
describes the ability to determine whether an event has happened or not but without 
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any contextual details, whereas recollection is the ability to retrieve specific details 
about the said event (Yonelinas, 2001). 
Empirical evidence supporting the dual-process model is substantial, and 
consistently converge towards the dissociable nature of recollection and familiarity. 
These findings range from behavioural studies to neuropsychology, electrophysiology 
and neuroimaging (Rugg and Yonelinas, 2003). Studies using imaging methods (e.g. 
Rugg and Curran, 2007) such as electroencephalography (EEG) and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) support the notion that there are dissociable
neural correlates of recollection and familiarity. For example, Woodruff, Hayama and 
Rugg (2006) demonstrated that recollection is not just a consequence of strong 
familiarity (as one variation of a single-process model would propose): in their study 
they found a double dissociation between a mid-frontal Event-Related Potential (ERP) 
associated with familiarity and a left parietal ERP which indexed recollection. 
Recollection and familiarity dissociated across temporal, functional and topological 
domains. In a follow-up study by Yu and Rugg (2010), they replicated this dissociable 
effect and offered strong supporting evidence for the dual-process model. This 
dissociation is also supported by fMRI studies (e.g. Yonelinas, Otten, Shaw, and Rugg, 
2005) demonstrating separable activation patterns across different subregions of the 
frontal and parietal cortices when performing tasks designed to differentiate between 
familiarity- and recollection-based memory. Further evidence comes from studies in 
amnesiac patients (regardless of aetiology), who have severe and persistent deficits in 
episodic memory but otherwise maintain unaffected cognition in other areas. 
Recollection is more severely affected than familiarity in amnesia and brain injuries, 
indicating separable processes which are dependent on different brain regions 
(Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, and Knight, 1998).
It is worth noting that there are multiple methods by which one can measure 
familiarity and recollection. The first of these is the ROC procedure already mentioned 
above, where participants rate the confidence of their recognition judgements. Hits 
(accurate ‘old’ judgements) can either be made by above-threshold familiarity in the 
absence of recollection or on the basis of recollection, whereas false alarms can only 
be driven by above-threshold familiarity. An ROC is then plotted as a function of hits 
relating to false alarms. A different but also well-used approach is the Remember-
Know-New (RKN, Tulving, 1985) procedure where participants are asked about the 
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basis of their judgements, for example, report ‘remember’ (remembering an item as 
old), ‘know’ (familiar items without recollection, i.e. just knowing an item is old) or 
‘new’ (neither process is involved). A third method, the process-dissociation (PD, 
Gruppuso, Lindsay, and Kelley, 1997) procedure, uses accuracies in relational 
recognition judgements (where participants are asked to retrieve specific aspects or 
context about the study phase) as an estimate of recollection and the conditional 
probability of recognising an item that is not recollected as an estimate of familiarity. 
When the dual-process model by Yonelinas was first proposed it was considered 
in direct opposition to the signal-detection theory, given that the former introduced a 
second separable process of recollection. For instance, provided a participant is able 
to successfully retrieve information that the recall item passes the familiarity threshold 
and is recognised as old, the confidence response would be naturally high not because 
of familiarity but because the recollection of additional information surrounding that 
item without affecting the false alarm rates (the item is still judged as old, just with 
higher confidence). The signal-detection theory may explain this as an increase in the 
variance of the old item distribution but proponents of the dual-process model would 
argue that the old item distribution is right-skewed because of the factor of recollection, 
whereas the familiarity factor in fact does exhibit equal variance by itself.
More recently, Wixted (2007) put forward an alternative model which aims to
reconcile the differences between the more traditional signal-detection and dual-
process theories. According to these authors, old-new recognition decisions are made 
with increasing confidence to the extent that graded recollection of source and 
associative information, together with familiarity, is retrieved. By combining the 
processes of familiarity and recollection, this alternative model revises the 
unidimensional memory strength variable of signal-detection theory whilst 
incorporating the second factor of recollection as well. In other words, an individual’s 
recognition decisions are not based on just familiarity or recollection but rather on the 
aggregate of the two processes. There is still much research to be completed to 
determine which of these models most accurately describes recognition memory but 
for the purposes of the current Thesis the critical factor is that there are two processes: 
Recollection and Familiarity.
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3.3. Recollection and Familiarity in Schizophrenia
In certain psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, difficulties in episodic memory 
reflect a core cognitive impairment (Elvevag and Goldberg, 2000; Ragland et al., 
2009), which is observed in young medication-naïve patients (MacDonald III et al., 
2005) and healthy first-degree relatives of those with schizophrenia (Toulopoulou et 
al., 2003; Snitz et al., 2006). These memory impairments are largely unaffected by 
antipsychotic medication (Vinogradov et al., 1997). Research which elucidates the 
nature of the memory impairment is of vital importance because memory performance 
is one of the strongest predictors of functional outcome (Green, 1996; Milev et al., 
2005).  
Given that impairments in episodic memory are a core feature of the 
schizophrenic illness (Clare et al., 1993), many researchers have examined whether 
the deficit is in recollection and/or familiarity. In a recent quantitative review, Libby, 
Yonelinas, Ranganath, and Ragland (2013) concluded that deficits exist in both 
processes in patients with schizophrenia even after accounting for methodological 
differences; however, effect sizes in familiarity-based memory deficits tended to be 
smaller. Weiss, Goff, Duff, Roffman, and Schacter (2008), on the other hand, only 
found specific deficits in familiarity but not in recollection in 18 established 
schizophrenia patients and 18 matched controls. In the study phase of their study 
participants saw and heard 26 consecutive items, 13 spoken by a male and 13 by a 
female and identified the gender of the voice. In the test phase, participants were 
presented with 26 previously studied items and 26 new items, then asked to identify 
the source (male, female or new). Control participants were significantly more 
accurate than patients in old-new recognition (familiarity) but there was no evidence 
for difficulties associated with source memory (recollection) in patients. Weiss and 
colleagues also did not find any significant relationship between corrected recognition, 
source accuracy and psychopathology measurements. 
Of the studies included in Libby et al.’s review, the majority employed the RKN 
model which the authors argue drove the hypothesis that recollection is the form of 
memory most impaired in schizophrenia, as studies using this procedure did not 
usually account for the non-independence between familiarity and recollection or 
response bias. In other words, in classic RKN models the ‘remember’ responses would 
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also rely on a certain degree of familiarity and not just the ‘know’ responses. It was 
only after a re-analysis of existing results by the RKN studies that the magnitude of
deficits in familiarity-based memory increased in patients, although the effect sizes 
were smaller than those for recollection-related deficits. ROC and PD studies were not 
reanalysed and these were also the types of studies that found deficits in both retrieval 
processes. On the other hand, all the studies included in the review which either found 
unaffected familiarity (7 studies) or increased familiarity (5 studies) in patients with 
schizophrenia employed the RKN procedure.
A potential confound in the RKN procedure is the heavy reliance on 
metacognitive capacities which have been shown to be impaired in schizophrenia 
(Moritz, Woodward, Jelinek, and Klinge, 2008; Lysaker and Dimaggio, 2014; but also 
see Bacon and Izaute, 2009). This is more complex from the memory confidence 
ratings in the ROC approach in that it places a higher cognitive load on patients, even 
though some (albeit much less) metacognition is indeed required for the ROC 
procedure as well. Difficulties in metacognition are likely to also relate to the source 
judgement deficits frequently seen in patients with schizophrenia (see below), 
confidence and liberal acceptance over ‘false’ memories are found to be associated 
with delusional thoughts (Moritz and Woodward, 2006) compared with hallucinations. 
Nevertheless, such false memories may well be the consequences of hallucinated 
voices, for example. 
As can be seen from the evidence outlined above, patients with schizophrenia 
frequently have larger deficits in recollection-based recognition memory than in 
familiarity-based recognition memory. The source monitoring framework will be 
described next, which relates to how one decides upon the contextual features of a 
memory.
3.4. The Source Monitoring Framework
In a seminal paper by Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993), the authors define 
source monitoring as ‘the set of processes involved in making attributions about the 
origins of memories, knowledge and beliefs’ (p.3). Most importantly, the source 
monitoring framework posits that individuals do not retrieve some kind of abstract tag 
or label about the source of a certain memory record, but such a memory record is 
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evaluated by decision processes during remembering and eventually attributed to a 
particular source. ‘Source’ here refers to the combination of characteristics that specify 
the conditions under which an episode was committed to memory. The various types 
of sources include perceptual details (e.g. sound, colour), contextual information 
(when and where), semantic detail and emotional reactions (affective information) and 
cognitive operations. It is worth noting that although Johnson and colleagues propose 
that source monitoring involves decision making, such a process needs not to be 
deliberative and may well occur quite rapidly in the course of remembering without 
much conscious effort, especially when the memory record is rich with contextual 
information. One can arrive at a decision based upon these different characteristics 
heuristically or systematically. Heuristic source judgements involve criteria or 
thresholds, e.g. if the familiarity level exceeds X, the event is likely to have happened, 
or if the amount of perceptual detail is over Y, the event is likely to have been 
perceived externally. Most source judgements are made heuristically, but systematic 
processes are slower and can check the plausibility of a memory judgement which 
would have otherwise passed the heuristic threshold (especially in the case of highly 
salient perceptual information being present). On the other hand, sometimes
recollections are easily accepted because they fit well with one’s beliefs and 
knowledge, and in this case heuristic processes can ensure such memory events 
possess sufficient sensory detail.
Source monitoring, however, is by no means a unitary concept. Different types 
of source monitoring have been proposed based on the perceived internality or 
externality of the ‘source’ of a certain event to be remembered and there are three 
different subcategories of source monitoring:
1) Reality monitoring, defined as the act of differentiating memories of internally 
generated information from externally generated information, such as 
discriminating internal mental events (memories for imaginations and thoughts, 
for example) from external perceptions;
2) Internal source monitoring, defined as the act of discriminating memories 
between two internal sources (e.g. between what one has said or performed 
from memories of what one has imagined or thought); and
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3) External source monitoring, defined as the act of differentiating between 
memories from two different external sources (e.g. statements made by person 
A from those by person B).
It may seem apparent that the first component, errors in reality monitoring (also 
called internal-external source monitoring), can in fact go both ways: one could 
confuse having thought of something with seeing someone else do the same thing, but 
also vice versa. Indeed, Johnson and colleagues (1993) also point out that one type of 
reality monitoring emphasises the self (such as discriminating one’s own imagination 
from externally occurring events, like hearing someone else say something) and the 
other type puts the emphasis on the covert or private properties of internal mental 
events rather than the public qualities of other events. However, this second emphasis 
may entangle some instances of internal source monitoring with those of reality 
monitoring: for example, if one confuses what one did with what one thought, which 
kind of source memory error would this be? With the first type of definition it would 
be an internal source monitoring error but with the second type of definition it would 
be classed as a reality monitoring error. The authors seem to think that it is not a case 
of one definition being more correct than the other, but it is simply that ‘one is 
emphasising the self versus external source as the origin of information whereas the 
other is emphasising the actual (public) versus imaginal (private) status of information’ 
(p.4). However, for the current Thesis the first classification is adopted given its 
importance in the genesis of psychotic symptoms.
In patients with schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses, source monitoring 
mechanisms (in particular, reality monitoring) are thought to be severely disrupted and 
may act as some of the generative processes underpinning positive psychotic 
symptoms, especially hallucinations (Bentall et al., 1991; Johns et al., 2001). The next 
section will outline the evidence as to whether these individuals have deficits in certain 
types of source monitoring and if so, whether these are related to any symptoms.
3.5. The Role of Source Monitoring Deficits in Psychotic Experiences
One paradigm that has been used to investigate the relationship between deficits in 
source monitoring and psychotic experiences in both schizophrenia and healthy 
schizotypy involves presenting incomplete but well known word pairs (e.g. fish and ?) 
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or sentences for the participants to fill in the blank in the study phase (e.g. fish and 
chips) and in the test phase, participants are asked to decide whether they generated 
the word, the word was given to them or new (for example, see Simons, Henson, 
Gilbert, and Fletcher., 2008; Garrison et al., 2017a, 2017c). Other studies involved 
filling in the blank part of a sentence (e.g. Vinogradov et al., 2008). 
A great deal of research has focused on reality monitoring because it has been 
proposed that it may play a role in the pathogenesis of some of the positive symptoms 
of schizophrenia, such as hallucinations and delusions (Bentall et al., 1991; Frith, 1992; 
Frith and Done, 1988; Rankin and O'Carroll, 1995). Studies which have examined this 
capacity have typically involved presenting participants with either a complete 
sentence or one where they need to fill in the blank. In the test phase participants need 
to indicate whether they generated the word, it was given to them or is new 
(Vinogradov et al., 1997). Some findings suggest that individuals with schizophrenia 
have deficits in reality monitoring and, in particular, that they misattribute self-
generated events to an external source (Johns et al., 2001; Keefe et al., 2002; 
Vinogradov et al., 2008). As anticipated, many of these studies found the deficit to be 
linked to the positive symptoms (Brébion et al., 2000, 2002). A study by Johns et al. 
(2010) specifically investigated verbal self-monitoring in individuals at clinical high 
risk of psychosis and found that at-risk individuals misattributed the source of their 
speech to ‘other’ when acoustic distortions were applied to their own speech, and these 
misattributions were at an intermediate level between established schizophrenia 
patients and healthy controls. Their paradigm was significantly different from that 
used in Chapter 5 as no acoustic distortions or any external interference were used in 
the latter study; however, their findings may still have implications that verbal self-
monitoring impairments were already present in the prodromal phase.
More recently, internal source monitoring has also been examined because the 
distinction between imagination and reality is often blurred in schizophrenia (Mintz 
and Alpert, 1972; Brébion et al., 2008). A wide variety of source monitoring tasks 
have been utilised to study the performance of patients with schizophrenia. For 
example, Gawęda et al. (2012) asked patients to either imagine or actually perform an 
action and found that they confused the source of these actions in a subsequent test 
phase. 
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However, the overall evidence is mixed with regard to the notion that reality 
monitoring errors made by patients with schizophrenia, in particular those involving 
attributing internally generated stimuli to an external source, are associated with 
positive symptoms. In a study comparing hallucinating versus non-hallucinating 
patients with schizophrenia, Brunelin et al. (2006) investigated their performance in a 
‘Say-Imagine’ condition and a ‘Hear-Imagine’ condition corresponding to internal 
source monitoring and reality monitoring, respectively. The authors found that 
hallucinating patients misattributed an internal event to an external source more 
frequently (reality monitoring errors) than non-hallucinating patients with 
schizophrenia, and the two groups did not differ significantly on internal source 
monitoring errors (‘Say-Imagine’ condition). They concluded that reality monitoring 
deficits could be seen as a state marker for auditory verbal hallucinations whereas 
internal source monitoring deficits were trait markers for a schizophrenic illness in 
general, and may relate to symptoms such as thought insertion and delusions of control 
where the patient fails to correctly monitor their own thoughts and actions.
In other studies the specificity of reality monitoring deficits to hallucinations has 
been brought into question. In addition to hallucinations, reality monitoring deficits 
have also been associated with delusional ideation (e.g. Brébion et al., 2000, 2002), 
with some authors reporting relationships with delusions only (Anselmetti et al., 2007). 
In Brébion and colleagues’ study of 40 inpatients with schizophrenia and 40 matched 
controls, higher hallucinations scores were associated with increased tendency 
towards false recognition of new (non-produced) items and hallucinators were more 
prone to misattributing self-produced items to another source. In addition, 
hallucinators as well as delusional patients more prone to report spoken items as 
pictures. Anselmetti et al. (2007) studied 45 patients with chronic schizophrenia and 
54 healthy controls using a task involving conditions of word-stem completion, 
viewing pictures or listening to the experimenter read out words. Both old/new item 
recognition and source attribution were investigated, and the authors reported that only 
delusions significantly related to internal-external source misattribution but not 
hallucinations or disorganisation. 
Such findings fit well with the concept of schizophrenia as an ego-boundary 
disorder where patients experience a disturbed sense of agency over inner speech and 
thought processes (e.g. McGuire et al., 1995; Jones and Fernyhough, 2007) which then 
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manifest as auditory-verbal hallucinations and thought interference symptoms (e.g. 
thought insertion with delusional elaboration). However, measures of delusions and 
hallucinations do not typically focus on these subtypes and it is difficult if implausible 
to apply the source monitoring model to other types of delusions which do not usually 
involve a lack of agency but a heightened sense of the self as the central point of 
psychopathological experience (such as delusions of persecution and reference). 
Moreover, some theorists propose that hallucinations are extremely heterogeneous and 
cannot always be accounted for by misattributed inner speech (McCarthy-Jones et al., 
2014). Further, other researchers have found no correlations between reality 
monitoring deficits and schizophrenia symptomatology (Henquet, Krabbendam, 
Dautzenberg, Jolles, and Merckelbach., 2005) even though difficulties in 
differentiating imagined thoughts and verbalised speech were still prominent in 
patients. Other researchers have found poor reality monitoring to be associated with 
negative symptoms (Brébion et al., 2002; Moritz et al., 2003) as well as thought 
disorder (Nienow and Docherty, 2004).
Source monitoring deficits in schizophrenia are not only apparent in the domain 
of words and speech, but also in the monitoring of actions. However, studies 
employing action-based source memory tasks tend to find impairments in internal 
source monitoring but no association with symptomatology (e.g. hallucinations). For 
example, Gawęda et al., (2012, 2013) found significant deficits in distinguishing 
imagined versus performed actions in patients with schizophrenia but such deficits 
were not more prominent in patients who reported frequent auditory hallucinations 
than those who did not. These findings may indicate general source monitoring deficits 
in schizophrenia, regardless of symptom severity; however, they could also mean that 
the assessment tools used were not sensitive enough to detect effects often associated 
with very specific forms of symptoms, for example delusions of control and passivity 
symptoms, as many of the commonly used symptom assessment tools do not separate 
out ego-boundary disturbances. These kinds of ‘first-rank’ symptoms are of particular 
interest because they involve failures in monitoring the source of one’s own thoughts 
and actions by definition (Frith, 2005, 2012). It might just be that the effect has been 
diluted because different kinds of psychopathological symptoms are often ‘bundled’ 
together which would in fact require more focused assessments due to potentially 
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different pathogenetic mechanisms involving both diminished and heightened senses 
of agency (van Duppen, 2016).
Hallucination-proneness and high schizotypy in general have both been linked 
with deficits in internal source monitoring for action-based tasks (Collignon, van der 
Linden, and Larøi, 2005; Peters, Smeets, Giesbrecht, Jelicic, and Merckelbach, 2007). 
In Collignon and colleagues’ study, 65 normal participants underwent a source 
monitoring task of five conditions (participant perform the action, watch the 
experimenter perform the action, imagine oneself perform the action, imagine the 
experimenter perform the action, or listen to the experimenter say the action verbally) 
and were tested for old-new recognition and identifying the source for old items. 
Participants were stratified according to their scores on the Launay-Slade 
Hallucinations Scale (Revised), with the top quartile and the bottom quartile 
corresponding to hallucination-prone and non-hallucinators, respectively. 
Hallucination-prone participants displayed more internal source monitoring errors but 
not reality monitoring errors. In Peters et al.’s study, similar patterns were found in 
internal source monitoring deficits (confusing participant performed and participant 
imagined actions) in a healthy undergraduate sample assessed by the Schizotypal 
Personality Scale. Further, source misattribution was related to working memory 
capacities.
Such findings about internal source monitoring are interesting because, in a sense, 
they challenge the traditional notions of first-rank symptoms (third-person auditory 
hallucinations, thought interference, etc.) and even the nature of disordered ego-
boundary in schizophrenia: although the sense of agency is rarely measured directly 
alongside source monitoring, some studies on agency and schizotypy suggest that 
healthy individuals with schizotypal traits also experience the lack of agency over 
thoughts and actions because of such source monitoring difficulties (Asai and Tanno, 
2007; Asai, Sugimori, and Tanno, 2008). However, these individuals are by no means 
psychotic at the time of study and the vast majority will never become clinically 
psychotic. This suggests that the presence of unusual experiences or even problems 
with agency are not the sole indicators of an illness, and rather than defining 
schizophrenia as an ego-boundary disorder, it might be more useful to focus on why 
some individuals, despite significant difficulties in source monitoring and feelings of 
agency, do not find their experiences distressing or bothersome. 
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However, it must be mentioned that very recent evidence (Garrison, Moseley, 
Alderson-Day, Smailes, Fernyhough, and Simons, 2017b) suggests that there is no 
reduction in both reality and internal source monitoring abilities in hallucination-prone 
(more specifically, hallucinations in the auditory-verbal modality) but otherwise 
healthy individuals. Although the authors used a word-based task rather than an action-
based one, the absence of deficits in the hallucination-prone group challenged a fully 
dimensional model of schizotypy and provided support for a quasi-dimensional model, 
where the distribution of psychosis-like symptoms does not follow the normal bell-
shaped curve but skews towards very few symptoms in the majority of the general 
population. The authors also acknowledged a potential specificity regarding 
impairments in the monitoring of actions, which classes the intention to speak as an 
action prior to the production of inner speech as described by the comparator or 
forward model (Chapter 1), which follows a predictive processing framework.
3.6. Conclusion
This Chapter offered an overview of source monitoring from the viewpoint of 
recognition memory and discussed how source monitoring processes are often 
impaired in both patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and healthy individuals with 
schizotypal personality traits. Although the current evidence is mixed as to what kind 
of source monitoring deficits is most relevant to specific psychotic experiences and 
symptoms of schizophrenia, it is widely accepted that there are clear cognitive deficits 
associated with source monitoring in individuals with psychosis-like experiences and 
more severely, in individuals with clinical schizophrenia.
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Chapter Four: Aims and Hypotheses of the Current Thesis
4.1. Introduction
The previous three Chapters provided detailed background information about 
psychosis and review of the literature in predictive processing and source memory 
relevant to psychosis research. Although both frameworks have already been 
examined in individuals with various schizotypal traits and also in patients at different 
stages of psychosis (e.g. early versus chronic), there has been no research to date which 
combines the different domains of these frameworks in the same cohort of individuals. 
Given that the different types of predictive coding drive learning and inferential 
processes in unique ways (Chapter 2) yet are interrelated at the neural level, it is 
important to study these types of prediction error-based mechanisms in the same 
individuals, and how these processes relate to their ratings of schizotypy. For example, 
previous evidence has been rather inconsistent in terms of blocking and dimensions of 
schizotypy (positive, negative, disorganised, etc.); in contrast, findings in sensory 
predictive processing have been relatively consistently related to delusional ideation.
A similar line of reasoning follows with the source monitoring tasks, which 
despite having been extensively used in healthy individuals and patient populations in 
an isolated manner, these tasks have not been employed in the same individuals 
combining different types of source monitoring. Many previous studies have found 
that deficits in the source monitoring of words correlate most significantly with 
auditory-verbal hallucinations, for example, but again these findings vary across 
individuals and largely depend on the features of the tasks used and the measures taken. 
Therefore, it is crucial to use a battery of tasks aimed at tapping into these different 
processes in the same cohort.
The general aim of the current Thesis is to report the findings from two empirical 
studies, one in a large number of healthy individuals with varying degrees of 
schizotypal traits and the other in a much smaller sample of individuals displaying an 
early stage of psychosis and matched controls from the general population. The first 
study employed a battery of behavioural tasks aimed at tapping into domains of 
predictive processing (sensory, associative and reward) and source monitoring 
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(actions and words), whereas the clinical study used a subset of these behavioural tasks. 
Each study is divided into two Chapters according to theme (predictive 
processing/source monitoring), with Chapters 5 and 6 being the healthy schizotypy 
study and Chapters 7 and 8 the clinical study. 
4.2. Study 1: Predictive Processing and Source Monitoring in Healthy Individuals 
with Schizotypal Traits
4.2.1. Aims
The primary aims of Study 1 were to examine the associations between schizotypy in 
healthy individuals and any behavioural deficits in prediction error responses and 
source monitoring.
For predictive processing, associations were examined between delusional 
ideation (measured by PDI-21), hallucinatory experiences across modalities 
(measured by CAPS), and general schizotypy domains (measured by O-LIFE) and 
different domains (sensory, associative and reward types) of predictive processing as 
measured by three well-validated behavioural tasks (force-matching, blocking and 
reversal learning).
For source monitoring, associations were examined between general positive 
schizotypy (as measured by O-LIFE) and old/new recognition, source memory 
accuracy, internal source monitoring errors and reality monitoring errors in both 
action-based and word pair-based tasks. It is important to note that O-LIFE was the 
only schizotypy measure used in the analysis of the source monitoring tasks; PDI-21 
and CAPS were omitted on purpose due to the fact that only limited prior evidence 
was available on specific associations between hallucinations across modalities (as 
opposed to the auditory-verbal domain) and delusional ideation and source monitoring 
deficits.
The secondary aims of Study 1 were to compare results with those from previous 
studies using similar (but not identical) behavioural tasks and to determine the 
reproducibility of such findings.
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4.2.2. Hypotheses
In order to avoid the inflation of family-wise errors resulting from multiple 
comparisons, frequentist confirmatory analyses were only carried out based on the 
following a priori hypotheses tailored to each task:
1) Force-matching task:
a) Participants would consistently apply more force in the Finger condition 
(applying force directly by finger) than the Slider condition, creating an 
overcompensation score.
b) Overcompensation scores would negatively correlate with the participants’ 
PDI-21 (delusional ideation) total scores.
2) Kamin blocking task:
a) Participants would show the blocking effect by giving stimulus B a lower 
rating than stimulus D.
b) Participants who score highly on positive schizotypy (O-LIFE unusual 
experiences) and those who score highly on negative schizotypy (O-LIFE 
introvertive anhedonia) would both exhibit attenuated blocking by giving 
stimulus B a higher rating than those who have low negative schizotypy.
c) The extent of blocking (rating of D minus that of B) would correlate 
negatively with introvertive anhedonia scores.
d) The extent of blocking (rating of D minus that of B) would correlate 
positively with the distress subscale of PDI-21.
3) Reversal learning task:
a) The tendency to switch after probabilistic errors would correlate positively 
with delusional ideation (PDI-21) total scores.
b) The same pattern of correlation would not be seen with perseveration (post 
true reversal accuracy) scores.
4) Action and word-based source monitoring tasks:
a) O-LIFE unusual experience scores would negatively correlate with 
old/new recognition measures in both tasks.
b) O-LIFE unusual experience scores would negatively correlate with overall 
source accuracy measures in both tasks.
c) O-LIFE unusual experience scores would positively correlate with the 
number of internal source monitoring errors in both tasks.
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d) O-LIFE unusual experience scores would positively correlate with the 
number of reality monitoring errors in both tasks.
In addition to frequentist analyses, Bayesian statistics were also employed to ascertain 
the levels of evidence supporting each of the hypotheses in a given direction (as 
opposed to significance testing) for the prediction error tasks only. Exploratory 
frequentist analyses were also carried out for both prediction error and source 
monitoring tasks, but inferences were not drawn due to the abovementioned issues 
with multiple comparisons which were not hypothesis-driven.
4.3. Study 2: Predictive Processing and Source Monitoring in Patients with Early 
Psychosis
4.3.1. Aims
The aims of Study 2 were to examine the associations between psychotic 
symptomatology in individuals with early (first episode) psychosis and any 
behavioural deficits compared with healthy controls in prediction error responses of 
the sensory and reward domain, and source monitoring of actions, which constituted 
a shortened battery of behavioural tasks from those used in Study 1.
For predictive processing, associations were examined between delusions, 
hallucinations, and general positive psychotic symptoms (measured by SOPS) and 
predictive processing as measured by force-matching and reversal learning tasks.
For source monitoring, associations were examined between delusions, 
hallucinations, and general positive psychotic symptoms (measured by SOPS) and 
old/new recognition, source memory accuracy, internal source monitoring errors and 
reality monitoring errors in the action-based task.
4.3.2. Hypotheses
The a priori hypotheses for Study 2 were as follows:
1) Force-matching task:
a) All participants would consistently apply more force in the Finger 
condition (applying force directly by finger) than the Slider condition, 
creating an overcompensation score.
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b) Overcompensation scores would be significantly lower in patients than in 
controls, and would negatively correlate with patients’ delusional 
symptomatology scores. 
2) Reversal learning task:
a) Patients would be significantly less accurate than controls after both 
true reversal and probabilistic error trials.
b) The tendency to switch after probabilistic errors would correlate 
positively with general positive symptom scores.
c) The same pattern of correlation would not be seen with perseveration 
(post true reversal accuracy) scores in patients.
3) Action source monitoring task:
a) Patients would make significantly more errors than controls in old/new 
recognition and source accuracy.
b) More specifically, patients would make significantly more internal source 
monitoring and reality monitoring errors than controls.
c) Patients would be significantly slower than controls when making source 
judgements.
d) The number of errors in internal and reality monitoring would positively 
correlate with general positive symptom scores.
In addition to frequentist analyses, Bayesian statistics were also employed to ascertain 
the levels of evidence supporting each of the hypotheses in a given direction (as 
opposed to significance testing) for both prediction error tasks and source monitoring 
tasks. Exploratory frequentist analyses were also carried out for both sets of tasks, but 
inferences were not drawn due to the abovementioned issues with multiple 
comparisons which were not hypothesis-driven.
4.4. Author’s Contributions to the Current Thesis
The author of the current Thesis was responsible for the initial conceptualisation of 
the project, study design, gaining ethical approval (both within the Cardiff School of 
Psychology and from NHS/R&D organisations in England and Wales), attending 
research governance training, recruitment of all participants for both studies, 
consenting of all participants, all behavioural testing, psychometric assessments and 
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clinical interviews, the entirety of data entry and data analyses and writing of two 
publications resulting from Study 1 as first author.
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Chapter Five: Dimensions of Schizotypy in Relation to 
Different Types of Predictive Processing 
Parts of this Chapter have been published the following paper:
Humpston, C. S., Evans, L. H., Teufel, C., Ihssen, N., & Linden, D. E. (2017). 
Evidence of absence: no relationship between behaviourally measured prediction error 
response and schizotypy. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 22(5), 373-390. 
DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2017.1348289.
5.1. Abstract
The predictive processing framework has attracted much interest in the field of 
schizophrenia research in recent years, with an increasing number of studies also 
carried out in healthy individuals with nonclinical psychosis-like experiences. The 
current research adopted a continuum approach to psychosis and aimed to investigate 
different types of prediction error responses in relation to psychometrically defined 
schizotypy. One hundred and two healthy volunteers underwent a battery of 
behavioural tasks including a) a force-matching task, b) a Kamin blocking task, and c) 
a reversal learning task together with three questionnaires measuring domains of 
schizotypy from different approaches. Neither frequentist nor Bayesian statistical 
methods supported the notion that alterations in prediction error responses were 
related to schizotypal traits in any of the three tasks. These null results suggest that 
deficits in predictive processing associated with clinical states of psychosis are not 
always present in healthy individuals with schizotypal traits.
5.2. Introduction
The predictive processing model has been adduced to explain the positive symptoms 
of schizophrenia (delusions and hallucinations; Fletcher and Frith, 2009). This 
framework proposes that sensory and cognitive experiences are not simply passive 
events but involve the active prediction of incoming information, with the purpose of 
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minimising prediction errors. A prediction error occurs when there is a mismatch or 
discrepancy between the expectation of an experience and the actual experience itself; 
it has been suggested that PEs are ‘a general neural coding strategy’ present in the 
whole brain which are involved in perception, cognition and motivational control (den 
Ouden et al., 2012). In the present study different aspects of predictive processing 
were tested, namely that in the perceptual/sensory and motivational/reward domains, 
in relation to the same individuals’ psychometrically measured schizotypal traits. The 
reward domain was further divided into associative learning and probabilistic (reversal) 
learning. 
The three prediction error-based tasks (force-matching, blocking, reversal 
learning) were chosen because they tapped into multiple aspects of the predictive 
processing framework as outlined in Chapter 2 above and could potentially elicit error 
signals in different domains. As detailed in Chapter 4, the general hypothesis was that 
participants scoring highly on schizotypy measures would exhibit deficits in prediction 
error responses across sensory, associative and reward domains. In the force-matching 
task, participants rating highly on delusional ideation would exhibit reduced sensory 
attenuation as indexed by an overcompensation score; in the blocking task, the 
blocking effect would be attenuated in individuals high in general negative schizotypy; 
and in the reversal learning task, individuals scoring highly on delusional ideation 
would display increased switching tendency.
5.3.Methods
5.3.1. Task Piloting and Power Calculation
The behavioural battery of five tasks (three prediction error tasks and two source-
monitoring tasks; see Chapter 5 for details of the latter) were piloted in eight female 
psychology undergraduates recruited from the School of Psychology online 
Experimental Management System in order to determine the feasibility and optimal 
timing of tasks, levels of performance (whether the task showed the phenomena they 
were designed to measure) and time intervals between the study and the test phases of 
source-monitoring tasks. Five participants completed all behavioural tasks whilst the 
first three participants only completed the source-monitoring tasks. A fixed order of 
tests was adopted in preference to a counterbalanced order purely due to logistic 
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reasons (conflicts in the timing and booking of equipment and laboratory space). All 
participants in the piloting phase received appropriate course credits according to the 
School of Psychology guidelines.
Power calculations were carried out in GPower 3.1 to determine a suitable sample 
size. In the sensory domain, previous work examining schizotypy by Teufel et al. 
(2010), Lemaitre et al. (2016) and Palmer et al. (2016) indicate effect sizes ranging 
from r = -0.35 to r = -0.58 (negative correlations between schizotypy and diminished 
sensory attenuation). Given an alpha level of .05 and a power level of 0.90, this gives 
an estimated sample size of 23 – 78 (two-tailed correlations). For the blocking task, 
previous studies by Haselgrove and Evans (2010) and Moran et al. (2003) have 
estimated effect sizes from Cohen’s f = 0.30 to 0.39, giving a sample size of 61 - 109. 
In the reward domain due to a lack of studies examining schizotypy, an effect size of 
Cohen’s f = 0.59 have been generated from schizophrenia patient datasets 
(Schlagenhauf et al., 2014) yielding a sample size of 22. However, it should be noted 
that the effects in schizotypy would be anticipated to be smaller and hence a larger 
sample size would be necessary. In other to maximise power, it was decided to recruit 
up to 120 participants (greater than the highest number estimated).
5.3.2. Participants
One hundred and fifteen healthy volunteers (25 males; mean age 22.23 years, standard 
deviation 3.18 years, range 18-33 years) were recruited through the Experimental 
Management System (EMS) as well as the electronic Noticeboard from different 
departments across Cardiff University (Ethical approval number: 
EC.14.12.09.4044R2A). Inclusion criteria were that participants must be aged 
between 18-35 years, have normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing and 
possess a high level of fluency in English. Exclusion criteria were a current diagnosis 
of any psychiatric illness, taking psychotropic medication, experiences of current 
illicit substance abuse or having mobility problems. Fifteen participants identified 
themselves as left-handed. Eligibility relied on self-report. All participants gave 
informed consent in written form and were fully debriefed after the experimental 
session. The majority of participants also gave written consent to potentially being 
contacted for future studies. All participants received 8 course credits (for those 
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recruited from EMS) or a single sum of £15 (for those recruited from Noticeboard) 
after the session as reimbursement for their time. 
Of the 115 participants, all but one (who did not complete the O-LIFE) participant 
completed all three schizotypy measures. Thirteen participants were excluded from 
the current study because they failed to meet the inclusion criteria for one or more of 
the behavioural tasks (see below for the specific criteria and the number excluded for 
each task). The final 102 participants consisted of 21 males and 81 females with a 
mean age of 21.96 (SD = 3.14) years. Assuming the smallest effect size of 0.30, this 
has yielded an achieved power of 0.88.
5.3.3. Procedure
Each experimental session took 2 hours in total. Participants were tested individually 
and completed the tasks and questionnaires in the following order: study phase of 
action source-monitoring; blocking; study phase of verbal source-monitoring; all three 
questionnaires; reversal learning; test phase of verbal-source-monitoring; force-
matching; test phase of action source-monitoring. 
5.3.4. Force-matching Task
This procedure (Teufel et al., 2010) focused on the perceptual/sensory type of 
prediction error. Participants were asked to place their left index finger under a lever 
attached to a torque motor, which then applied four different levels of forces (1.0N, 
1.5N, 2.0N and 2.5N) in a random order. Participants were asked to match the 
presented force in two conditions, which were always counterbalanced across 
participants. In the ‘Finger’ condition, participants matched the force by directly 
pressing down onto the tip of the lever using their right index finger in order to exert 
the same (perceived) level of force on their left index finger. In the ‘Slider’ condition, 
participants matched the force indirectly by moving a linear potentiometer up and 
down which controlled the torque motor. The gain of the slider was 0.5N/cm. 
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Figure 5.1. The force-matching task. A) A force is applied on the participant’s left index finger; B) 
Participant matches the force in the Finger condition; C) Participant matches the force in the Slider 
condition. Adapted from Teufel et al. (2010).
Participants were predicted to exert more force (hence less accurate 
matching/overcompensation of the applied force) than the actual applied force in the 
Finger condition due to sensory attenuation (i.e. efference copy of motor command 
matching the outcome of motor act) so that the sensation of the force was perceived 
as weaker. The Slider condition by contrast involved an unusual relationship between 
the action and its sensory consequences and as such, participants’ performance were 
expected to be more accurate with much less or no overcompensation of the applied 
force. Participants received training of the task in the form of a practice session (8 
trials) of both conditions before progressing to testing sessions of 32 trials each. Five 
outliers (differences in applied forces deviating two standard deviations from the mean) 
were removed in the final analysis according to the same criteria by Teufel et al. (2010).
5.3.5. Kamin Blocking Task
This task focused on the associative type of prediction error and used the same 
paradigm as that by Haselgrove and Evans (2010). Participants were asked to play the 
role of a hospital inspector and evaluate whether certain food items and pairings of 
food items caused food poisoning by putting in numbers with the keyboard between 1
(completely safe to eat) and 9 (completely dangerous) with number 5 as being 
uncertain. Then they would click on the ‘Results’ button to find out whether the food 
item(s) actually led to food poisoning. The task was programmed in VisualBasic and 
ran under Microsoft Windows XP. There were 12 types of food items (e.g. salmon, 
lamb, peas, potatoes, etc.) which were randomly assigned as cues A to L. Stage 1 
contained 10 trials whereas Stage 2 (which followed from Stage 1 with no indication 
of a break) had 5 trials, both in a block randomised manner. In the test stage 
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participants were asked to give their final ratings of cues B, D, F and K without any 
feedback. If there is blocking present the participants’ ratings of B would be smaller 
than those for D or F; in other words, blocking occurs because the associative strength 
for B from compound AB+ is attenuated due to prior association with stimulus A+. 
Table 5.1 below details the task design. Data from nine participants were excluded due 
to a failure to learn or failure to respond with appropriate keys (remaining N = 106). 
The blocking effect was denoted as a final rating of D minus B.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Test
A+ AB+ B
CD+ D
E- EF+ F
K+ K
GH+ L- 
IJ- IJ-
Table 5.1. Design of Kamin blocking task. Cues A to L indicate each food item, either associated with 
the outcome of food poisoning (+) or not (-). GH+. L- and IJ- are filler trials.
5.3.6. Reversal Learning Task 
This task aimed to tap into the reward/motivational type of prediction error and used 
Lancaster et al. (2015) and Ihssen et al. (2016)’s baseline reversal learning paradigm 
(i.e. the private condition). Participants were asked to choose between two coloured 
squares, blue and green, which were displayed on the same screen side by side. 
Participants earned 1 penny (reward; +1p) if they chose the correct colour and lost 1 
penny (punishment; -1p) if they chose the wrong colour. Participants were informed 
that they would not lose any money if their total was negative at the end and their final 
payment would remain the same (£15) due to ethical considerations. The experiment 
was programmed in Presentation and ran under Microsoft Windows 8 on a laptop. A 
practice block was offered prior to the actual experimental session.
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At the beginning the colour blue was set to be the correct colour; however, after 
a variable number (between 7 and 15) of trials the reward/punishment contingencies 
(0.8/0.2) were reversed (true reversal) so that blue became the wrong colour and was 
punished, whereas green became the corrected colour and was rewarded. Feedback 
was given immediately after each choice in the form of a smiley face (reward) or a sad 
face (punishment). Probabilistic errors were also included between two true reversal 
trials, whose numbers were again variable (between 1 and 3). Such errors meant that 
participants were unexpectedly punished even though they chose the correct colour 
(i.e. ‘wrong feedback’). Participants were told that only one colour would be correct 
at one time and were aware of the existence of true reversals as well as probabilistic 
error trials, but did not know when they would occur. The task contained 132 trials 
with an average of 11 true reversals in total. Fig. 5.2 below shows a diagrammatical 
representation of the task design. No participants were excluded on the basis of 
performance on this task. 
Figure 5.2. Design of reversal learning task showing one reversal episode. X refers to choices made by 
a hypothetical participant. Adapted from Ihssen et al. (2016). ProbErr, Probabilistic errors.
5.3.7 Questionnaires
Participants were asked to complete three questionnaires on the different dimensions 
of schizotypy: the 21-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI-21; Peters et al., 
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2004), the 34-item Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS; Bell et al., 2006) and 
the Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (Mason et al., 1995). 
PDI-21 and CAPS were in pen and paper format whereas the O-LIFE was 
computerised running under Microsoft Windows XP on a laptop.
The PDI-21 contains distress, preoccupation and conviction subscales and was 
the closest to a clinical scale for delusional ideation (in other words, akin to 
schizophrenic psychopathology). The O-LIFE on the other hand measured different 
dimensions of schizotypy with a much stronger focus on the individual-
difference/personality trait approach rather than a pathological one, and was therefore 
chosen over the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ) which was based on 
DSM-III criteria for schizotypal personality disorder. The O-LIFE contained four 
subscales: unusual experiences (positive domain), cognitive disorganisation 
(disorganised domain), introvertive anhedonia (negative domain) and impulsive 
nonconformity (behavioural domain). The three questionnaires used in the present 
study tapped into of schizotypal traits from different approaches, from the most benign 
and everyday experiences as purely a personality construct (as measured by O-LIFE) 
to mild sensory distortions and hallucinatory phenomena (as measured by CAPS) to 
the more clinical delusion-like beliefs (as measured by PDI-21). Based on findings 
from previous studies, these scales have been examined in relation to the various types 
of prediction error responses and so were included in this study in order to fully 
replicate previous study procedures.    
5.4. Data Analysis
5.4.1. Checks for Normality and Reliability
Five percent of the questionnaire scores in pen and paper format (PDI-21 and CAPS) 
were re-scored by another rater in order to ensure there were no systematic errors in 
scoring. All three schizotypy questionnaires including the fully computerised O-LIFE 
and their subscales were also subjected to a split-half reliability test, yielding a 
Spearman-Brown coefficient of 0.940. This indicates that the psychometric scores 
obtained in this experiment were highly reliable.
Both questionnaire scores and task performance data were checked by Shapiro-
Wilk tests for normal distribution. All schizotypy questionnaire scores except O-LIFE 
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impulsive nonconformity (which was not of interest in the current study) subscale 
yielded statistically significant results (test statistics above 0.900, p < 0.001), which 
indicated that they did not follow a normal distribution. Q-Q plots further confirmed 
this observation. Log transform was considered but rejected due to the fact that some 
of the scores were zeroes. Consequently, nonparametric correlations (Spearman’s rho) 
were chosen as the main method for correlational analyses.
5.4.2. Analysis of Behavioural Data
A parallel analysis strategy was employed in which both frequentist (Null Hypothesis 
Significance Testing) and Bayesian approaches were used; Bayes factors were 
calculated in order to explore the strength of evidence or the confidence with which 
the null hypotheses are supported. It has also been suggested that Bayesian approaches 
are resistant to multiple comparison problems (Dienes, 2011). All frequentist data 
analyses were carried out using SPSS 23 (IBM Corp.) and all correlations were two-
tailed; all Bayesian analyses (Bayesian Correlation Pairs) were carried out in JASP 
Version 0.8.0.0 (https://jasp-stats.org/).
Measures or proxy measures of prediction error-based behavioural responses are 
as follows: in the force-matching task, an overcompensation score was calculated for 
each participant by subtracting the mean difference between active (applied by the 
participant) and passive (original force applied by the machinery) forces in the Slider 
condition from that in the Finger condition. In the Kamin blocking task, the extent of 
blocking was calculated by the final rating for cue D minus the final rating for cue B. 
Data (i.e. participants’ ratings) for each learning stage are plotted as line graphs to 
ensure that learning occurred. Total accuracy, post-probabilistic error accuracy (an 
index of switching or ‘switchiness’) and post-true reversal accuracy (an index of 
perseveration) were entered in the analysis as dependent variables for the reversal 
learning task. 
For all three tasks, the main outcome measures were correlated with 
corresponding schizotypy scales (the same as those used in frequentist statistics) by 
using a Bayesian Correlation Pairs analysis in JASP; for the force-matching task, this 
was the overcompensation score and the grand total score of PDI-21; for Kamin 
blocking, this was the blocking score and the unusual experiences score of O-LIFE; 
and for the reversal learning task the correlation was done between switching tendency 
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and PDI-21 total score. Bayesian factors in the form of BF01 (null over alternative) 
were calculated from a prori hypotheses regarding the direction of the correlation 
together with robustness checks to reflect the strength of evidence. For the force-
matching and Kamin blocking tasks, the direction of the correlations was hypothesised 
to be negative whereas for reversal learning, the direction of the correlation was 
hypothesised to be positive. Beta* (stretched beta) prior width for these correlations 
was set to a relatively conservative value of 0.5.
5.5. Results
5.5.1. Schizotypy Questionnaire Scores
Descriptive data for the three scales are shown in Table 5.2 below. The mean total 
scores of PDI-21 and CAPS were consistent with those from previous research 
(approximately 6 and 8, respectively) by Peters et al. (2004) and Bell et al. (2006); 
whereas scores for the O-LIFE unusual experiences and introvertive anhedonia 
subscale were lower than the expected mean reported (7.1/4.8 in the current sample 
versus 8.8/6.4) by Mason and Claridge (2006).
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Table 5.2. Descriptive data for schizotypy scales and their subscales (N = 102). SD, standard deviation; 
PDI-21, 21-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory; CAPS, Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale; O-
LIFE, Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; UnExp, Unusual experiences; IntAn, 
Introvertive anhedonia.
5.5.2. Force-matching
Participants consistently applied more force in the Finger than in the Slider condition, 
demonstrating the overcompensation effect (Fig. 5.3). A paired-sample t-test showed 
that the mean difference between active and passive forces applied in the Finger 
condition was significantly greater than that in the Slider condition [t (101) = 13.26, p
< .001), Cohen’s d = 1.53].
Mean (SD) Range Normative Mean (SD)
PDI-21 Total Y/N 5.88 (3.47) 0 – 16 6.7 (4.4)
PDI-21 Distress 15.95 (12.01) 0 – 51 15.5 (14.1)
PDI-21 Preoccupation 14.84 (11.45) 0 – 57 15.4 (14.1)
PDI-21 Conviction 17.92 (11.79) 0 – 52 20.4 (16.0)
CAPS Total Y/N 8.29 (6.03) 0 – 22 7.3 (5.8)
CAPS Distress 20.92 (18.13) 0 – 84 15.5 (14.5)
CAPS Intrusiveness 22.43 (19.09) 0 – 92 18.0 (17.0)
CAPS Frequency 17.65 (15.72) 0 - 79 14.6 (14.2)
O-LIFE UnExp 7.14 (5.44) 0 – 25 8.82 (6.16)
O-LIFE IntAn 4.79 (4.31) 0 – 22 6.38 (4.49)
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Figure 5.3. Comparisons between mean applied forces in the Finger and Slider conditions.
In terms of the relationship between the overcompensation score and delusional 
ideation (as measured by PDI-21 total score), a two-tailed Spearman’s correlation was 
calculated. There was a non-significant correlation between these two variables [ρ(100) 
= 0.139, p = 0.163]. Table 5.3 shows exploratory correlations with other schizotypy 
scales.
5.5.3. Kamin Blocking 
When correlated with O-LIFE unusual experience and introvertive anhedonia 
(positive and negative schizotypy, respectively) scores, there was no significant 
correlation between these variables ρ(100) = 0.028, p = 0.782 for the positive 
dimension and ρ(100) = -0.106, p = 0.290 for the negative dimension). In order to 
replicate the methodology used by Haselgrove and Evans (2010), median splits of O-
LIFE unusual experiences and introvertive anhedonia scores were computed which 
divided the participants into high and low positive/negative schizotypy groups. The 
median value for unusual experiences was 6, with scores equal to these values included 
in the ‘low’ group whereas that for introvertive anhedonia was 4.  Fig. 5.4 visualises 
the mean ratings for each stimulus in the testing stage for low and high positive (A) 
and negative (B) schizotypy groups. There was no significant effect of group for either 
positive [F(1, 416) = 3.544, p = 0.680, partial eta squared = 0.008] or negative [F(1, 
416) = 15.975, p = 0.078, partial eta squared = 0.037] schizotypy. A Spearman’s rho 
correlation was calculated between the extent of blocking and the distress subscale of 
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PDI-21, as previous research (Corlett and Fletcher, 2012) indicated a specific 
relationship; no significant relationship was found [ρ(100) = .130, p = .191].
Figure 5.4 (A-B). Low and high group ratings for each stimulus in the test stage for O-LIFE unusual 
experiences (A) and introvertive anhedonia (B).
Further still, the learning of stimulus-outcome associations in Stages 1 and 2 were 
analysed to determine whether there were differences between individuals high and 
low in positive and negative schizotypy. There were no differences in the learning 
acquisition between these two groups in unusual experiences (Fig. 5.5). For Stage 1,
a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with factors of group (high versus low 
unusual experiences) and stimulus (A+ and E-) and mean ratings as dependent variable 
yielded a highly significant effect of stimulus [F(1, 200) = 4013.03, p < 0.001, partial 
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eta squared = 0.953], but no significant effect of group [F(1, 200) = 0.715, p = 0.399, 
partial eta squared = 0.004] or group*stimulus interaction [F(1, 200) = 0.372, p = 
0.543, partial eta squared = 0.004]. An identical ANOVA carried out with stimuli GH+ 
and IJ- also revealed a highly significant effect of stimulus [F(1, 200) = 1980.24, p < 
0.001, , partial eta squared = 0.908], no significant effect of group [F(1, 200) = 0.688, 
p = 0.408, partial eta squared = 0.003] but a significant group*stimulus interaction 
[F(1, 208) = 4.398, p = 0.037, partial eta squared = 0.021].
For Stage 2, a two-way ANOVA performed with factors of group (high/low 
unusual experiences) and stimulus (AB+, CD+) and mean ratings as dependent 
variable did yield a weak but significant effect of group [F(1, 200) = 4.668, p = 0.032, 
partial eta squared = 0.023], a highly significant effect of stimulus [F(1, 200) = 41.904, 
p < 0.001, partial eta squared = 0.173], but no significant interaction [F(1, 200) = 0.012, 
p = 0.911, partial eta squared = 0.00006]. An identical ANOVA carried out with 
stimuli EF+, K+ and IJ- also revealed a highly significant effect of stimulus [F(2, 300) 
= 968.28, p < 0.001, partial eta squared = 0.433], no significant effect of group [F(2, 
300) = 0.426, p = 0.514, partial eta squared = 0.001] and no significant group*stimulus 
interaction [F(2, 312) = 1.765, p = 0.173, partial eta squared = 0.006]. There was a 
similar pattern of results when identical ANOVAs were performed with data split by 
negative schizotypy scores (as measured by introvertive anhedonia, Fig. 4.6): only 
stimulus type yielded significant effects whereas group status did not.
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Figure 5.5. Low and high group ratings for unusual experiences across learning stages. + and – refer to 
the presence or the absence of the outcome, respectively.
Figure 5.6. Low and high group ratings for introvertive anhedonia across learning stages. + and – refer
to the presence or the absence of the outcome, respectively.
5.5.4. Reversal Learning
Fig. 5.7 shows mean accuracy data for trials surrounding true reversals and 
probabilistic errors; the latter was further divided into first and late (second/third) 
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probabilistic errors, as participants tend to display more switching in the second than 
in the third errors. Accuracy was greatly reduced at reversal trials from 90% to below 
10% and then recovered within two trials to the pre-reversal level. Trials after late
probabilistic errors demonstrated a lower accuracy than those after the first error (30% 
versus 40%). It required at least two further trials to restore task performance back to 
ceiling level in both situations. This pattern of results is compatible with other studies 
employing this and similar reversal learning paradigms (Ihssen et al., 2016). Switching 
and perseveration scores for each participant were calculated as the inverse of post-
probabilistic error and post-reversal accuracies. In a subsequent correlational analysis 
switching score was not significantly correlated with delusional ideation as measured 
by PDI-21 total scores [ρ(100) = 0.008, p = 0.937].
Figure 5.7 (A-B). Accuracies of true reversal trials (A) and probabilistic error trials (B).
Additional bivariate relationships in the form of a correlation matrix can be found 
in Table 5.3 for reference. As can be seen none of these relationships reached 
conventional levels of significance (p < 0.05) even without the application of a 
correlation for multiple comparisons.
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Table 5.3. Nonparametric bivariate correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho, two-tailed) between 
schizotypy measures and task measures (N = 102). PDI-21, 21-item Peters et al. Delusions Inventory; 
CAPS, Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale; Tot, Total yes/no endorsements; O-LIFE, Oxford-
Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; UnExp, Unusual experiences; IntAn, Introvertive 
anhedonia.
5.5.5. Bayesian Analysis: Evidence of Absence
Results from Bayesian analyses are presented in Fig. 5.8. For the force-matching task, 
BF01 was estimated to be 19.623, meaning that the data provided were highly in favour 
of the null hypothesis (19 times the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis, in this 
case a negative correlation between overcompensation and PDI-21 total scores) with 
strong to very strong evidence, meaning that there was a significant amount of support 
for no effect. 
For the Kamin blocking task where BF01 was estimated to be 11.434 for the 
positive dimension, which also meant that the data was in favour of the null hypothesis 
(10 times the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis, in this case a negative correlation 
between blocking and O-LIFE unusual experiences scores). BF01 was estimated to be 
5.092 for the negative dimension, which also meant that the data provided support in 
favour of the null hypothesis (5 times the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis, in 
this case a negative correlation between blocking and O-LIFE introvertive anhedonia 
scores, graphs not included in Figure). Robustness checks demonstrated a moderate to 
strong level of evidence favouring the null hypothesis for both correlations.
For switching tendency of the reversal learning task, BF01 was estimated to be 
11.083 which meant that the data was favouring the null hypothesis 11 times; in other 
PDI-21Tot CAPSTot OLIFEUnExp OLIFEIntAn
Force-matching 
Overcompensation
.139 .074 .127 .100
Blocking Score .108 .130 .028 -.196
Post Reversal 
Perseveration
.025 -.113 -.075 .013
Post Probabilistic 
Error Switching
.008 .063 .089 .046
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words, the alternative hypothesis was highly improbable. Robustness checks 
demonstrated a strong level of evidence for the null hypothesis. In terms of the 
correlation between perseveration and PDI-21 total score, BF01 values were estimated 
to be 8.031, which favoured the null hypothesis with strong to very strong levels of 
evidence (graphs not included in Fig. 5.8).
Figure 5.8 (A-C). Results from Bayesian correlation pairs analyses. Panels A, B and C show results 
for the force-matching, Kamin blocking and reversal learning tasks respectively. CI, Credibility 
Interval; BF, Bayes Factor.
5.6. Discussion
The current study investigated the relationships between different types of predictive 
processing and domains of psychometrically defined schizotypy in the same 
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individuals. There was little evidence for disrupted sensory predictive processing (as 
indexed by the force-matching task) in individuals with high scores of delusional 
ideation. Moreover, there was no significant difference in associative learning (as 
indexed by the blocking effect) between individuals with high and low positive or 
negative schizotypy or distress caused by delusion-like beliefs (as found by Corlett 
and Fletcher, 2012). Also, there was no evidence for alterations in switching tendency 
or perseveration as indexed by the reversal learning task in individuals with higher 
levels of delusional ideation. Importantly, the present study failed to demonstrate the 
same pattern of findings from previous studies which separately investigated sensory 
prediction, blocking phenomenon and reversal learning in relation to domains of 
schizotypy.
In the force-matching task, participants significantly overcompensated in the 
finger condition, which demonstrates the classic force-matching effect, which has 
been found in previous studies reviewed in Chapter 2. However sensory attenuation 
was not impaired in individuals with high delusional ideation. The use of PDI-21 
rather than the PDI-40 may raise some concerns about the omission of items capturing 
delusions of control or passivity-like experiences which, by definition, have higher 
relevance with sensory prediction than other delusions such as paranoia. This is 
supported by the observation that in addition to positive schizotypy in general, 
Lemaitre et al. (2016) also found a significant negative correlation specifically 
between passivity-like experiences and the index of sensory attenuation. However, 
given that previous studies examining force-matching, such as those by Teufel et al. 
(2010) and Palmer et al (2016), used the PDI-21 and not the PDI-40, this does not 
explain the failure to observe this relationship in the current study. In addition, the 
PDI-21 was derived from the 40-item version with very similar psychometric 
properties (Peters et al., 2004). One methodological detail which differs between the 
current study and that of Teufel et al. (2010) is that in the latter study more repetitions 
were used to average applied and presented force (eight rather than four levels of 
forces). Therefore, it may be the case that the measurements were somewhat noisier
in the current study because of the necessity of reducing the length of tasks to 
accommodate for the overall duration of testing (2 hours). 
In the associative learning task, the blocking task utilised was exactly the same 
as that used by Haselgrove and Evans (2010). In contrast to their study, there was a 
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failure to find any relationships with the negative dimension of schizotypy, even when 
following the same analytic methods used in that study (e.g. carrying out a median 
split with the same median). Given it is a well-powered study it could be that the failure 
to find this relationship might have been affected by other factors such as smoking 
status which was not measured in the current study. For example, nicotine has been 
shown to reduce dopamine release (Zhang and Sulzer, 2004) and may attenuate the 
prediction error responses mediated by dopamine. Furthermore, there were no 
significant relationships between blocking and any other schizotypy dimensions, such 
as the positive dimension as previously found by Moran et al. (2003), the total PDI 
score (as found by Moore et al., 2011) or the distress aspect of delusional ideation (as 
found by Corlett and Fletcher, 2012). For these correlations the same schizotypy 
measures as those in previous studies were used but the blocking task and measure of 
this phenomenon were different. For example, Corlett and colleagues used computer-
paced tasks whereas a self-paced task was used in the present study, and the former 
group did not use behavioural measures for blocking unlike in this study. There is 
some debate about whether prediction error as a latent process in associative learning 
is best studied by neuroimaging or behavioural methods, or perhaps a combination of 
both (see Griffiths, Langdon, Le Pelley, and Coltheart, 2014; Corlett and Fletcher, 
2015).
In the reversal learning task, switching tendency was used as an index of reward 
sensitivity driven by prediction error-related learning and found no significant 
associations between an increased tendency to switch after probabilistic errors and 
delusional ideation in either frequentist or Bayesian statistical analyses. In fact, 
accurate responding was restored very soon after both true reversals and probabilistic 
errors, suggesting that participants performed the task effectively and learnt when to 
switch or stay relatively quickly. These findings are clearly in contrast with findings 
in schizophrenia (e.g. Schlagenhauf et al., 2014), but due to a lack of studies using 
reversal learning in healthy schizotypy, comparisons can only be made with other set-
shifting tasks in individuals prone to psychosis-like experiences (e.g. Cella et al., 2009) 
which once again do not support current findings. Also, the reward/punishment 
manipulation (1p) was perhaps too weak, as participants were told they would not win 
or lose real money. However, this theoretically would have increased randomness in 
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switching, but this was not shown to be the case in the restoration of post-reversal and 
post-probabilistic error accuracies.
The current hypotheses focused on delusion-proneness and there were no
significant correlations between hallucination measures (i.e. CAPS) and behavioural 
performance in the current study. Hallucinations have been recently linked with 
predictive coding (e.g. Horga, Schatz, Abi-Dargham, and Peterson, 2014) in 
established schizophrenia; however, in nonclinical groups hallucinations can also 
persist without causing distress or leading to a need for psychiatric care (Linden et al., 
2010; Hill, Varese, Jackson, and Linden, 2012; Johns et al., 2014) in many high-
functioning individuals. 
In this sample, participants were all functioning relatively highly. In fact, 
although there were some individuals who endorsed the more ‘bizarre’ items such as 
thought echo in the schizotypy questionnaires, these were a very small minority of 
participants. The majority of schizotypy scores in the current sample were positively 
skewed towards ‘normal experience’ even though the means of these scores were 
comparable to those from previous general population studies of schizotypal traits. 
However, it is also possible that there was potential disconnection between 
subjective experiences of schizotypy and objective measures of neurocognitive 
deficits, in which the subjective complaints from psychometrically-measured 
schizotypy do not match the magnitude of deficits seen in behavioural tasks (e.g. Chun, 
Minor and Cohen, 2013). This could have led to the observation that individuals rating 
highly in subjective reports of schizotypal (psychosis-like) experiences did not display 
significant deficits in behaviours supposedly affected by such experiences.
Cross-sectional studies of this kind are unable to establish causal relationships. A 
possibility for future research would thus be a longitudinal study with structured 
assessments at regular intervals in order to determine the persistence of psychosis-like 
experiences and any rate of transition to clinical disorders, as well as incorporating a 
range of methods for measuring prediction error responses (e.g. combining imaging 
with behavioural testing). 
The present study may also have been affected by a selection bias where only 
participants with certain traits and interests were ‘attracted’ to research or motivated 
to take part in the study (see Martin et al., 2016, who found significant relationships 
between non-participation and individuals’ risk factors for schizophrenia) which 
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would further reduce the generalisability of these findings. However, this factor would 
similarly apply to previous studies on this topic. 
In sum, although much caution needs to be taken when interpreting the results, 
the present study furthers our understanding of the construct of schizotypy by 
employing an integrative approach to predictive processing in relation to different 
domains of schizotypal traits in a large sample of high-functioning individuals with 
no past or present psychiatric diagnosis. These null findings suggest that predictive 
processing mechanisms, at least in the forms of sensory, associative and reward 
prediction error responses, are not always associated with positive schizotypal 
personality traits in the general population.
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Chapter Six: Source-Monitoring for Action and Speech in 
Healthy Individuals with Schizotypal Personality Traits
Parts of this Chapter have been published the following paper:
Humpston, C. S., Linden, D. E., & Evans, L. H. (2017). Deficits in reality and internal 
source monitoring of actions are associated with the positive dimension of schizotypy. 
Psychiatry Research, 250, 44-49. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.psychres.2017.01.063.
6.1 Abstract
Adopting a continuum approach to psychosis, the aim of the current study was to 
assess the relation between schizotypy and source memory of actions and word pairs 
in healthy volunteers. One hundred and two participants completed two source 
memory tasks: one which involved the completion of well-known word pairs (e.g. fish 
and ?) and an action based task (e.g. nod your head). At test participants needed to 
indicate whether the act had been performed or imagined by themselves, performed 
by the experimenter, or was new. The positive dimension of schizotypy was positively 
correlated with source errors in both reality monitoring and internal source monitoring. 
Individuals with high ratings of unusual experiences attributed self-performed actions 
and imaginations to the experimenter (reality monitoring errors), as well as confusing 
self-performed actions with their own imaginations (internal source monitoring errors). 
However, these relationships were not found in the word pair task. Such findings 
suggest a degree of specificity for the source monitoring of actions in a schizotypal 
population and may have implications for the study of clinical symptoms such as 
delusions of control.
6.2 Introduction
The aim of the current study was to provide a more detailed and integrated 
understanding of source memory and its relationship to schizotypy in a large sample 
of healthy volunteers. The first issue was whether individuals high in schizotypy 
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would display deficits in familiarity (i.e. knowing the event has previously occurred). 
On the basis of the review by Libby et al. (2013) it would be anticipated that a deficit 
in discriminating old from new items would be seen in those high in schizotypal traits. 
However, research findings on this issue have been mixed: Peters et al. (2007) found 
evidence for a deficit, whereas Collignon et al. (2005) did not. Next, source memory 
was investigated by assessing in the same participants reality monitoring 
(discriminating between internally and externally generated stimuli) and internal 
source monitoring (discriminating between two internally generated stimuli, such as 
one’s own speech and imagination). Previous work reported only deficits in internal 
source monitoring but not in reality monitoring (Collignon et al., 2005). This is 
surprising given the wealth of work highlighting problems in reality monitoring in 
schizophrenia (Johns et al., 2001; Keefe et al., 2002; Vinogradov et al., 2008). 
Therefore, the overall aim was to examine whether individuals scoring high on the 
positive dimension of schizotypy (psychosis-like experiences) would have a deficit in 
both of these types of memory. 
It has been argued by some researchers that the generalisability of word based 
paradigms to real-world situations is limited (Henquet et al., 2005; Parks, 1997) and 
that action based tasks might be a more naturalistic method of examining source 
memory. However, no study has given participants these two types of tasks and 
assessed whether they both lead to the same findings. Therefore in this study 
participants completed two source memory tasks: one where a word needed to be 
generated (e.g. fish and ?) and an action based task (e.g. nod your head). In both tasks, 
participants needed to indicate at test whether the action was i) performed, ii) imagined, 
iii) performed by the experimenter, or iv) was new. It was hypothesised that source 
memory deficits would be related to the positive dimension of schizotypy and so 
focused primarily on this dimension, due to the findings of previous studies in this 
area (e.g. Brébion et al., 2000, 2002; Collignon et al., 2005; Peters et al., 2007).  
6.3 Methods
6.3.1. Participants
This study used the same pool of participants as those in Chapter 5. Five of the 115 
participants did not complete the source monitoring task, and of the remaining 110, 
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eight participants were excluded from the study because their performance on the 
memory task(s) failed to exceed a threshold of 0.1 above chance i.e. less than 0.1 for 
corrected recognition and source accuracy of less than 0.43. Thus 102 participants 
(mean age 22.30 years, 80 females) were included in the study. 
6.3.2. Procedure
The two source monitoring tasks were a part of a larger battery consisting of five tasks 
(the remaining three focused on predictive processing, whose results are reported in 
Chapter 5); each experimental session took a maximum of two hours in total and 
participants were all tested individually. All tasks were piloted first in eight 
psychology undergraduate students before the study began.
6.3.3. Action Source Monitoring Task
The action task involved one study-test block separated by 100 minutes. At study 
participants were asked to sit in a neutral position (arms and legs uncrossed) at a table 
opposite the experimenter. On the table were objects needed to complete some of the 
actions and a stack of cards with an action printed on it and above this who should 
complete it (Participant Perform, Participant Imagine, Experimenter Perform). Each 
card was turned over by the experimenter one at a time and the 
participant/experimenter was encouraged to complete the action in a maximum of 6 
seconds. There were 75 actions with an equal number in each action condition. 
Approximately half required everyday objects (e.g. stretch the rubber band, staple 
pieces of paper together, draw a line with the ruler) and the others were actions without 
using objects (e.g. nod your head, stand up and sit down, look backwards). The 
majority of these actions were taken from Collignon et al. (2005). An additional 12 
actions were used as practice trials at the start of the study and test phases. All objects 
were removed prior to the test phase. Here all actions presented in the study phase 
were randomly intermixed with 25 new actions. The action was presented on a 
computer screen for 2000ms. Participants were asked to recall whether they performed 
the action in the study phase (Participant Perform, PP), did they imagine completing 
the action (Participant Imagine, PI), whether they watched the experimenter perform 
the action (Experimenter Perform, EP) or whether the action was New. 
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Figure 6.1. Examples from the action source-monitoring task.
6.3.4. Word Pair Source Monitoring Task
The word task also had one study-test block but with an interval of 45 minutes. It was 
completed on a computer. In the study phase 72 widely known but incomplete word 
pairs were presented in the centre of the display one at a time, e.g. Mum and ?, Bread 
and ? (most were taken from Simons et al., 2008) with the condition displayed directly 
above the incomplete word pairs. In the Participant Perform condition the participant 
generated the second word and said it out loud, or they imagined the second word 
(Participant Imagine condition) or listened to the experimenter complete the word pair 
(Experimenter Perform condition). After the act had been performed the participant 
needed to press a key to indicate which condition had just been completed. This 
terminated the trial and the next one commenced. An additional 12 word pairs were 
used as practice trials at the start of the study and test phases. Participants were asked 
to complete the word pairs to create a rich encoding context and to produce 
comparable levels of performance between the two source tasks. In the test phase all 
actions presented in the study phase were randomly intermixed with 24 new actions. 
The first word of the pair was presented until the participant made a response. Only 
the first word of the pair was presented because occasionally participants generate a 
different second word to what would normally be expected. The discrimination at test 
was the same as in the action task test phase. For both memory tests participants were 
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encouraged to respond as quickly but as accurately as they could and actions/word 
pairs were counterbalanced across conditions.
Figure 6.2. Examples from the word pair source-monitoring task.
6.3.5. Measurement of Schizotypy
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et al., 
1995) has four dimensions: unusual experiences, which indexes experiences akin to 
hallucinations and delusions; introvertive anhedonia, which describes a lack of 
pleasure in social or physical activities; cognitive disorganisation, which taps 
distractibility and disorganisation; and impulsive nonconformity which describes 
reckless and antisocial behaviour. There has been evidence which questions whether 
impulsive nonconformity is a meaningful schizotypy construct, so this dimension will 
not be considered further (Cochrane et al., 2010). 
6.3.6. Analysis
For both action and verbal source-monitoring tasks, performance ratios (the accuracy 
in telling old stimuli from new, i.e. hit rate minus false alarm rate) and conditional 
probabilities (how accurate one’s choices were of the source given the stimulus was 
old) were calculated for each participant. More specific source memory errors, of 
particular interest were errors made in the differentiation between internal and external 
stimuli (i.e. between participant perform/imagine and experimenter perform 
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conditions) or reality monitoring errors, were also calculated by dividing the number 
of mistakes made by the total number of stimuli in a given condition. 
Figure 6.3. Types of source monitoring errors. SM, source monitoring.
A Shapiro-Wilk test for normality was carried out on data from both tasks and 
schizotypy questionnaires, which revealed that the data were not normally distributed; 
as a result, a non-parametric correlational analysis was used (Spearman’s rho).
6.4 Results
6.4.1. Schizotypy Questionnaires
The mean schizotypy scores obtained were as follows (standard deviations in 
parentheses): unusual experiences, 7.31 (5.83); introvertive anhedonia, 5.05 (4.52); 
and cognitive disorganisation, 12.31 (5.83). 
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6.4.2. Overall task performance
The descriptive data from the memory tasks can be seen in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Mean proportions with standard deviations in parentheses for each of the memory tasks.
6.4.3. Action Source Monitoring Task
Initially data were examined in terms of the proportion of actions correctly recognised 
as old (Hits) and the new items falsely identified as old (False Alarms). From these 
data a corrected recognition score can be calculated (Hits – False Alarms; Snodgrass 
and Corwin, 1988) which gives an index of a participant’s ability to discriminate old 
from new items, see Table 6.1. A significant negative correlation was found between 
the corrected recognition score and the unusual experiences dimension of schizotypy 
[ρ(100) = -0.28, p = 0.004]. 
A measure of overall source accuracy was calculated as the total number of items 
correctly assigned to Participant Perform, Participant Imagine and Experimenter 
Perform sources divided by the number of Participant Perform, Participant Imagine 
and Experimenter Perform items correctly identified as old (regardless of whether the 
source judgment was correct). There was a negative correlation between source 
accuracy and scores on the unusual experiences dimension, ρ(100) = -0.21, p = 0.034. 
Given that source errors on this task could be due to internal source monitoring i.e. 
confusing Participant Imagine with Participant Perform and vice versa; or reality 
monitoring i.e. confusing Participant Perform/Imagine with Experimenter Perform 
Action Task Word Pair Task
Hits 0.79 (0.10) 0.75 (0.11)
False Alarms 0.20 (0.17) 0.22 (0.18)
Corrected Recognition 0.59 (0.18) 0.54 (0.17)
Source Accuracy 0.81 (0.10) 0.75 (0.10)
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and vice versa, these were assessed separately. Fig. 6.4 displays the number of internal 
source monitoring and reality monitoring errors, which correspond to the black and 
white bars, respectively. The notation used in the figure and below is that the first 
abbreviation corresponds to the actual source and the one after is the participant’s 
memory judgement e.g. PP/PI would be an item that the participant performed but 
which they thought they had imagined. A significant relationship was found between 
unusual experiences and total number of internal source memory errors (the sum of 
errors in PP/PI and PI/PP conditions, see Fig. 5.1), ρ(100) = 0.22, p = 0.03. 
Figure 6.4. The mean number of errors produced in each memory task (action on the left, word pairs 
on the right) with error bars (± SEM). Internal source monitoring errors are in the filled bars and reality 
monitoring errors in the unfilled bars. Abbreviations are as follows: PP (Participant Perform), PI 
(Participant Imagine), and EP (Experimenter Perform). The first abbreviation is the actual source of the 
event and the second one is what the participant stated.
Moreover, there was also a significant positive correlation between unusual 
experiences and the overall number of reality monitoring errors (the sum of errors in 
PP/EP, PI/EP, EP/PP, and EP/PI conditions, see Figure 6.3), ρ(100) = 0.24, p = 0.014. 
There is a wealth of evidence demonstrating that reality monitoring problems in 
schizophrenia are in the direction of misattributing self-generated events to an external 
source i.e. externalising (e.g. Vinogradov et al., 1997, 2008). Therefore two additional 
correlations were conducted separately for two components of the reality monitoring 
score. There was a significant relationship between unusual experiences and errors in 
attributing an action that the participant performed to the experimenter (PP/EP), ρ(100) 
= 0.27, p = 0.005; but the same relationship was not found for imagined actions (PI/EP), 
ρ(100) = 0.13, p = 0.19. 
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6.4.4. Word Pair Source Monitoring Task
This task was analysed within the same framework as described above for the action 
task. There were no significant correlations between unusual experiences and 
corrected recognition score [ρ(100) = -0.02, p = 0.81] or overall source memory 
accuracy [ρ(100) = -0.07, p = 0.48]. There were also no significant associations with 
number of internal source memory errors [ρ(100) = 0.15, p = 0.14] or reality 
monitoring errors [ρ(100) = 0.19, p = 0.06]. No significant relationships were found 
between unusual experiences and externalising errors (ps > 0.88).
6.4.5. Other Schizotypy Dimensions
Although the focus of this study was on the unusual experiences dimension 
correlations were also conducted with the introvertive anhedonia and cognitive 
disorganisation dimensions of schizotypy to determine the specificity of the 
relationship. As can be seen from Table 6.2, there were no relationships with the 
introvertive anhedonia dimension but some with cognitive disorganisation. This might 
have resulted from the high degree of correlation between unusual experiences and 
cognitive disorganisation [ρ(100) = 0.65, p < 0.001)].
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Action Task Word Pair Task
RM ISM RM ISM
Unusual 
Experiences
0.24* 0.22 0.19 0.15
Introvertive 
Anhedonia
0.06 0.07 -0.05 -0.01
Cognitive 
Disorganisation
0.14 0.22* 0.24* 0.13
Table 6.2. Spearman’s rho correlation matrix showing coefficients between reality and internal source 
monitoring errors and different domains of the O-LIFE. Abbreviations are as follows: RM (reality 
monitoring), ISM (internal source monitoring).
6.5 Discussion
The aim of this study was to provide a more detailed understanding of the nature of 
the memory deficits associated with the schizotypy continuum. A significant negative 
correlation was found between the positive dimension of schizotypy (unusual 
experiences) and the corrected recognition score, indicating that participants high in 
unusual experiences exhibited poorer old-new discrimination. Furthermore, they were 
also more inclined to make errors in determining the source of the memory, even in 
those items correctly recalled as old. In particular, there was a positive correlation 
between unusual experiences and internal source monitoring errors; those participants 
with high scores on this dimension confused whether they had performed an act or just 
imagined doing it. There was also a positive relationship between the same schizotypy 
dimension and reality monitoring errors i.e. in determining whether the act originated 
from the participant (performed or imagined) or the experimenter. Consistent with 
previous research there was an externalising bias, such that those high in unusual 
experiences tended to attribute actions they had physically performed themselves to 
the experimenter (PP/EP errors). However, the same pattern of results was not found 
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for those acts the participant had just imagined (PI/EP errors). All of these 
relationships were only found in the action based task. 
It is widely acknowledged that individuals with schizophrenia have deficits in 
recollection but findings on familiarity have been less consistent (Achim and Lepage, 
2003; Libby et al., 2013; Ranganath et al., 2008). This is also true in schizotypy work, 
for example Peters et al. (2007) found evidence for deficits in old-new recognition, 
whereas Collignon et al. (2005) did not. It is possible that the particular measure of 
schizotypy used may be important. Collignon et al. (2005) used a measure that 
specifically assessed hallucinatory proneness (Launay and Slade Hallucinations Scale; 
Launay and Slade, 1981), whereas Peters et al. (2007) used the Schizotypal Personality 
Questionnaire (Claridge and Broks, 1984) and the current study used the unusual 
experiences dimension of the O-LIFE (Mason et al., 1995). These latter questionnaires 
index positive symptoms more widely and, for example, also encompass distortions in 
sensory experiences and psychotic-like delusional ideation. Thus it would appear to 
be the case that difficulties in making old-new discriminations are related to positive 
symptom-like experiences more broadly, or a specific aspect of these, but not 
hallucinations.  
The finding of more internal source errors being related to high unusual 
experiences is consistent with the work of Collignon et al. (2005) and Peters et al. 
(2007). However, this finding was extended to include reality monitoring errors being 
associated with the positive dimension of schizotypy as well, which was not found by 
Collignon et al. (2005). There are methodological differences between the current 
study and that by Collignon et al. (2005) which might explain this. Firstly, in the latter 
study there were more conditions for participants to differentiate between; they had 
the added conditions of the participant imagining the experimenter performing the 
action and the experimenter verbalising the action (but not performing it). Secondly, 
the way the test response was made was quite different with Collignon et al. (2005) 
requiring participants to make a four-stage response at test compared to just one-stage 
in this study. Finally, their participants made very few errors (mean of < 1) in some of 
the conditions, particularly those relevant to reality monitoring, such as participant 
performed and experimenter performed. These floor effects might have precluded 
relationships being found with hallucinatory proneness by Collignon et al. (2005).
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The Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson et al., 1993; See Chapter 3) offers 
a useful way of understanding the errors that people make when trying to retrieve the 
source of a piece of information. According to this framework there are no specific 
memory ‘tags’ or markers on events indicating where they originated. Instead, various 
attributes of the memory encoded at the time it happened later serve as the basis for 
making the decision as to its origin. These attributes include qualities like perceptual, 
semantic, spatial, temporal, sensorimotor and affective details and records of cognitive 
operations that created them (Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson and Raye, 1981). For 
example, a memory that is rich in perceptual detail, with substantial contextual 
information but a lack of consciously remembered details of the cognitive operations 
which might have generated it would likely be judged as having been perceived, 
whereas the opposite profile would be associated with imagined experiences. 
Therefore, anything which increases the similarity of these memory attributes from 
different sources will decrease source accuracy. For example, if imagination was 
particularly vivid and detailed this could be confused with an event that was actually 
experienced. This is pertinent because there has been a wealth of research 
demonstrating that people with schizophrenia (Mintz and Alpert, 1972; Rasmussen 
and Parnas, 2015) and those high in schizotypy (Winfield and Kamboj, 2010; Currie, 
2000) tend to have more active and vibrant imaginations (Oertel et al., 2009; Sack et 
al., 2005). In future research it might be useful to include a measure of how well 
participants feel they are able to imagine completing acts as this could mediate the 
relationship between schizotypy/schizophrenia and memory performance.      
The novel finding from this study is that significant relationships were found 
between memory measures and unusual experiences in the action task but not the word 
pair one, indicating specificity of deficits in monitoring actions. No previous work has 
examined both action and verbal source monitoring concurrently in the same cohort 
of participants, although deficits in both domains have been found separately in either 
different participants or unrelated tasks. The same direction of result was found in the 
word pair task, between schizotypy and internal and reality monitoring errors, but 
these did not reach statistical significance. This suggests that the action task might 
have greater utility in examining relationships with symptoms or experiences. Due to 
the well-known enactment effect (Cohen, 1989; Madan and Singhal, 2012) the study-
test interval for the action task was longer (100 minutes) than for the word pair task 
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(45 minutes). This was done to ensure that performance was not at ceiling in the action 
task and both tasks were broadly comparable in terms of participant performance. As 
can be seen from Fig 5-3 the profile of errors between tasks is similar. Moreover, the 
errors also exhibit a similar profile as to what might be anticipated. For example, there 
is less overall confusion between Participant Perform and Experimenter Perform than 
between Participant Imagine and Experimenter Perform. This is likely due to the fact 
that when the participant performs the act there is movement as well as afferent 
feedback but this is not present when they imagine the act or watch the experimenter 
perform it, which makes the former two conditions more distinctive than the latter two. 
The action memory task has been used in a number of studies both in 
schizophrenia and schizotypy (Collignon et al., 2005; Gawęda et al., 2012; Peters et 
al., 2007) and there is substantial evidence that people with schizophrenia have 
abnormalities in the awareness of motor actions (Frith et al., 2000; Blakemore et al., 
2002). Computational models of motor control have been developed and these have 
been applied to schizophrenia, particularly the forward model (Wolpert, 1997). 
According to this account, whenever a motor command is initiated a parallel efference 
copy is also generated (Von Holst, 1954). This can be used to make predictions about 
the sensory consequences of an action, which can be compared with the actual sensory 
feedback of a movement. If the predicted action and the sensory input match then the 
action would be considered to be self-generated. 
In schizophrenia, it is thought that there may be deficits in the generation of the 
efference copy and/or in the comparison between predicted and actual action which 
results in certain positive symptoms (Frith, 2005, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2010). 
Importantly, this would produce externalising errors, which have been found in a 
number of studies (for a review, see Brookwell et al., 2013), because no efference 
copy or a mismatch between prediction and reality would suggest an external source. 
In the current study, the only relationship found was between schizotypy and one type 
of externalising error: an act physically performed by the participant being attributed 
to the experimenter and not when the act had only been imagined by the participant. 
One potential explanation for this is that perhaps the forward model, and the 
hypothesised deficits that individuals within the schizophrenia spectrum have with 
aspects of this, can only be applied to overt actions and not internal mental events such 
as thinking and imagining. Indeed, this model was adapted and used by Frith and 
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colleagues to explain such phenomena as delusions of control and anarchic hand (e.g.
Blakemore and Frith, 2003; Frith et al., 2000). A number of arguments have been 
raised about the possibility of extending this model to covert forms of behaviour, such 
as thinking. Gallagher (2004) argues that using the forward model makes sense for 
overt actions because one needs to know if one’s actions are internally or externally 
caused and if one’s action is not going to achieve its goal, this needs to be known in 
advance so that adjustments can be made. However, these reasons do not make sense 
when applied to thoughts. All of one’s thoughts are internally generated, so there is 
never any possibility of having to work out whether it was oneself who thought 
something or someone else in normal circumstances. Thus there is currently a great 
deal of debate around whether Frith’s forward model can be applied to internal mental 
states (for other work on this issue see Seal, Aleman, and McGuire., 2004; Stephens 
and Graham, 2000; Vicente, 2014).  
To conclude, these results demonstrate that there is a negative relationship 
between scores on the positive dimension of schizotypy, unusual experiences, and the 
ability to correctly identify the source of memory information. Furthermore, the 
correlational analyses indicated that individuals with high scores on unusual 
experiences have deficits in distinguishing between actions they performed versus i) 
imagined and ii) those the experimenter performed. These relationships were only 
found in the action based task and further research is now needed to determine if a 
similar set of results would be found in people with schizophrenia.   
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Chapter Seven: Sensory and Reward Predictive Processing 
in Early Psychosis
7.1. Abstract
This study aimed to investigate behaviourally measured prediction error responses in 
individuals experiencing early psychotic symptoms compared with healthy controls. 
Ten patients with early psychosis and ten controls matched for gender, age and years 
of education took part in a force-matching task and a reversal learning task which 
assessed sensory and reward domains of predictive processing. Patients underwent a 
clinical interview for early psychosis symptoms whereas controls were screened for 
neuropsychiatric disorders and completed a questionnaire for schizotypal personality 
traits. In the force-matching task, patients did not demonstrate higher accuracy (i.e. 
less sensory attenuation and better matching) than controls, and their level of 
attenuation was not significantly correlated with their delusional ideation scores. In 
the reversal learning task, patients made significantly more errors than controls in 
general, and took longer to restore accuracy after the first post-probabilistic error trial.
However, switching tendency was not significantly correlated with their positive 
symptoms. Bayesian methods have on the other hand shown anecdotal levels of 
evidence for the correlations in the directions predicted. In this study there was no 
evidence of a deficit in predictive processing in early psychosis patients and there were 
no correlations between performance and symptomatology. However, these must be 
taken only as preliminary findings given the small sample size.
7.2. Introduction
As outlined in Chapters 2 and 5, previous studies have provided strong, albeit not 
universal, support for the predictive processing model for the pathogenesis of 
psychotic symptoms. In patients with established schizophrenia, deficits have been 
found across the sensory, cognitive and reward domains of prediction error responses 
by both behavioural and neuroimaging methods (e.g. Lindner et al., 2005; Shergill et 
al., 2005; Jones et al., 1992; Corlett et al., 2007). In addition, such deficits often 
correlate with symptom severity. Although these studies do not offer causal 
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explanations due to the cross-sectional and correlational nature, they at least 
demonstrate significant associations between schizophrenic symptomatology and 
neural/behavioural markers of disturbed prediction error signalling. Studies of this 
kind are mostly done in either patients with schizophrenia or healthy individuals with 
schizotypal traits (e.g. Corlett and Fletcher, 2012; Teufel et al., 2010) such as the study 
described in Chapter 5. However, there are few studies conducted in individuals in the 
earlier stages of psychotic disorders (i.e. the stage after latent psychosis 
vulnerability/prodromal symptoms and before fully diagnosed schizophrenia; see 
Fusar-Poli, Yung, McGorry, and van Os, 2014 for a staging model), which may 
present a gap in the understanding of predictive processing deficits from a continuum 
model of psychosis.
In the current Thesis, individuals who have experienced a first brief psychotic 
episode as well as those with attenuated psychotic symptoms were chosen over 
patients with an established diagnosis of schizophrenia. This was mainly due to the 
higher level of positive symptoms (i.e. symptoms of interest for the current project) in 
the early phases of psychosis compared to chronic schizophrenia. Although many of 
the patients were already treated with medication and entered symptomatic remission, 
they had not been taking antipsychotics for over twelve months so that any potential 
behavioural manifestations of antipsychotic side-effects (e.g. parkinsonian symptoms) 
would be minimal. 
Originally only individuals who were considered as ultra-high risk were the target 
population for recruitment, however this was later expanded to patients with first 
episode psychosis as long as they have not received a firm diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder or substance-induced psychosis (in fact, there was no report 
of current illicit drug misuse at all in both patients and controls), and have not been 
receiving treatment from Early Intervention Services for over twelve months. A first 
brief psychotic episode is not always an indicator for later schizophrenia and can 
follow a variety of different trajectories (Marneros, Pillmann, Haring, Balzuweit, and 
Blöink, 2003; Singh, Burns, Amin, Jones, and Harrison, 2004). By focusing on a more 
extended early period of psychosis, one can maximise potential participant pool and 
also expand the concept of early psychosis more broadly, in order to capture a wider 
variability in symptomatology. In fact, in the current project the chosen assessment 
tool was one for prodromal syndromes (the Structured Interview for Prodromal 
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Syndromes, SIPS) and not one for established schizophrenia such as the Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), as the latter would not have been sensitive 
enough to detect the subtleties in the symptomatology of early psychosis. As a
consequence, no formal diagnoses were made in patients. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that the patients in the current study have all been referred to clinical 
services due to functional impairment and/or distress caused by their anomalous 
experiences, and it is still possible that they have been experiencing symptoms for a 
prolonged period of time before deciding to seek help. As such, enquiries were made 
about the approximated date of first symptom onset during assessments, and 
retrospective scores of symptom severity at peak were also recorded.
The tasks chosen in the clinical study were derived from those used in healthy 
volunteers with schizotypal traits (Chapter 5), which consisted of the force-matching 
task and the reversal learning task alongside a source-monitoring task for actions (see 
Chapter 8). The Kamin blocking task was omitted for the clinical study mainly because 
it did not correlate with schizotypy in the previous study and has some conceptual 
overlap with the reversal learning task. Additional reasons for shortening the duration 
of testing were to avoid overloading the patients given the time required (at least 90 
minutes) for symptom assessment and other tasks such as assessment for IQ and 
substance use. Although none of the previous tasks significantly correlated with 
schizotypy, force-matching task was included as it is the only task measuring sensory 
prediction error responses, and reversal learning was chosen as the task measuring 
associative and reward predictive processing. The hypotheses were that individuals 
with early psychosis would display significant resistance to the force-matching 
illusion compared to controls as demonstrated by lower overcompensation and thus 
better performance. Patients would also show a heightened tendency to switch in the 
reversal learning task as indexed by their post-probabilistic error accuracies. Moreover, 
it was predicted that overcompensation (an index of sensory attenuation) would 
correlate negatively with their delusional ideation scores, whereas a tendency to switch 
would correlate positively with general positive symptom scores.
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7.3. Methods
7.3.1. Power Calculation
Power calculations were carried out in order to determine the desired sample size. 
Estimates of effect sizes were derived from three studies using somewhat similar tasks: 
1) a study on the sense of agency and intentional binding in prodromal psychosis 
patients yielded an effect size of r = 0.45 (Hauser et al., 2011); 2) a study on associative 
learning in individuals at risk for psychosis yielded an effect size of partial eta squared 
= 0.17 (Orosz et al., 2010); and 3) a study using a very similar reversal learning 
paradigm in unmedicated schizophrenia patients yielded an effect size of Cohen’s d = 
1.37 (Schlagenhauf et al., 2014). Based upon these figures, if one wanted an 80% 
probability (1-beta) of detecting a difference between patients and controls while 
setting a conventional alpha level of 0.05, between 28 and 31 individuals with early 
psychosis and at least the same number of matched controls would be needed. Unlike 
the healthy volunteer study, power was set at 80% in the clinical study instead of 90% 
to avoid potentially yielding unrealistic target sample sizes while still maintaining an 
acceptable level of power.
7.3.2. Patients with Early Psychosis
Despite continued efforts, only 10 individuals who have experienced an initial brief 
episode of psychotic symptoms were recruited from secondary care (e.g. early 
intervention service clinics) within the specified timeframe of 10 months across two 
NHS Boards in Wales (Cardiff and Vale University Health Board and Aneurin Bevan 
University Health Board), an NHS mental health Trust in south-west England (Avon 
and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust) and databases from other 
research studies in progress at Cardiff University.
Initially members of the research team approached healthcare professionals at 
relevant clinics, asking them to give out invitation letters to patients who may be 
interested. This method of recruitment keeps the identity of the individual unknown to 
the researcher unless they are interested in taking part. If participants were interested 
in taking part they were provided with an Information Sheet (also given to the 
healthcare professionals) and asked to phone, e-mail or send a reply slip to the research 
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team in prepaid envelopes if they wanted further information or to book an 
appointment (or their care coordinators could do this). Follow-up calls with the 
healthcare professional were carried out after a minimum of one week if a participant 
had not already made contact. Participants were given as much time as they needed to 
read and consider these documents and consult with relatives or carers if they wished. 
Participants were contacted a maximum of three times after an expression of interest 
with regard to participating in this study.
Following expressions of interest in taking part in the study, a meeting was 
arranged with the potential participant to establish their suitability for the study. This 
screening session reviewed inclusion and exclusion criteria as well as asking for the 
participant’s written consent to contact their care coordinator to review issues of 
suitability and risk. They were also given the opportunity to ask any questions about 
the study. If the participant was eligible, a mutually convenient day and time was 
arranged for them to come into Cardiff University to take part in the study. 
Inclusion criteria for all patients were:
• Aged 18-60 years old; 
• High fluency in the English language, as indicated on the demographics 
questionnaire (first language or bilingual proficiency);
• Normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing; 
• Attendance at secondary mental health services, including early intervention 
for psychosis services and community mental health teams, provided by the 
organisations listed above; and
• The ability to give informed consent to take part in the study.
Exclusion criteria for all patients were:
• Current presentation or a history of a clinically significant neurological 
condition (e.g. Migraine, stroke, traumatic brain injury, epilepsy, space 
occupying lesions, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, dementia, etc); and 
• Current presentation or a history of clinically significant substance 
misuse/alcohol dependence (not just recreational use).
A larger age range was chosen (18 – 60 instead of 18 – 35, which is the peak age 
group for psychosis onset and cut-off for referrals to most early intervention services 
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in the NHS) because of recent research pointing towards the importance of early 
intervention in adults aged above 35 (Greenfield et al., 2016). The average duration of 
symptoms at the time of referral was 7.2 months (SD = 3.85 months). Medication 
status was not an exclusion criterion; however, patients must not have been receiving 
antipsychotic treatment for over 12 months. This criterion was chosen because of 
potential adverse effects on behaviour and brain physiology following long-term 
antipsychotic treatment (e.g. Ho, Andreasen, Ziebell, Pierson, and Magnotta, 2011). 
Of the ten recruited patients, seven were prescribed low-dose second-generation 
antipsychotics (risperidone 2mg/d, olanzapine 10mg/d and aripiprazole 15mg/d), three 
were prescribed antidepressants (mirtazapine 30mg/d, citalopram 20mg/d and 
sertraline 50mg/d) in addition to their antipsychotics and two were prescribed a 
benzodiazepine (lorazepam 2mg) for use when needed (PRN) in addition to their 
antipsychotics. The remaining three were not taking any form of psychotropic
medication at the time of testing.
7.3.3. Controls
Ten healthy controls matched for gender, age, handedness and years of education were 
recruited from the Cardiff University School of Psychology Community Panel, other 
existing databases and through advertisement. In the initial invitation letter it was 
clearly stated that controls should have no present psychiatric illness or a history of 
psychiatric illness, and that they should also fulfil the first three inclusion criteria 
outlined above (age, language, normal vision and hearing). All interested controls 
received a Participant Information Sheet prior to the testing session Although there 
was a screening interview aimed to ensure the absence of psychiatric illnesses (the 
M.I.N.I. Neuropsychiatric Interview), this only took place after the control participant 
had given consent to ensure that no study procedures would be undertaken without 
prior consent being obtained.
7.3.4. Procedure
Ethical approval for the current study was obtained from Wales Research Ethics 
Committee 2 (Reference: 16/WA/0039) which covered the recruitment of both 
patients and controls. All participants gave informed consent before any of the study 
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procedures commenced and this was documented on the Informed Consent Form. 
Participants completed all the measures outlined below. For patients, the study session 
took approximately 3.5 hours and this was reduced in controls to 3 hours due to a 
shorter clinical assessment. The session for both patients and controls began with a 
demographics questionnaire, followed by behavioural tasks (action source monitoring 
– study phase, force-matching, reversal learning), IQ measure and substance use 
questionnaire, and lastly the test phase of the source monitoring task. For patients, the 
clinical assessment was at the very end of the session whereas the symptom screening 
was at the beginning of the session for controls. Patients also completed an additional 
questionnaire on depression and anxiety before the substance use questionnaire. 
Regular breaks were arranged for both groups and all participants were able to ask for 
a pause in the session whenever they felt necessary. Every participant was paid for 
their time (£35 for patients and £30 for controls) and travel expenses were also 
reimbursed.
7.3.5. Force-matching Task
This was the same force-matching task used in Chapter 5, adopted from Teufel et al. 
(2010).
7.3.6. Reversal Learning Task
This was the same reversal learning task used in Chapter 5, identical to the ‘private 
condition’ used by Ihssen et al. (2016).
7.3.7. Assessments
Both patients and controls were asked to provide basic demographic information and 
information on smoking status, recreational drug use and/or alcohol consumption. The 
levels of substance use must fall below the threshold for a clinically relevant diagnosis 
of substance dependence/abuse, otherwise they would not meet the inclusion criteria. 
A brief IQ measure (WASI; Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second 
Edition, Two-subtest form) were also given to both patients and controls which 
contained items on vocabulary and matrix reasoning, yielding an overall score of 
general cognitive ability.
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Each patient underwent one clinical interview: the Structured Interview for 
Prodromal Syndromes (SIPS, with the companion Scale of Prodromal Symptoms, 
SOPS). Of particular interest for the current study is the SOPS, which has 19 items 
under 4 subscales (positive, negative, disorganised and general symptoms) which are 
rated on a 7-point Likert scale from absent (0) to severe (6). The SIPS includes a 
checklist for Schizotypal Personality Disorder and a research version of the Global 
Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scale which allows the measurement of general 
levels of functioning. The SIPS and SOPS have good predictive validity (Miller et al., 
2003) and in the present study, scores were agreed between two raters who were both 
present at the assessment. 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmund and Snaith, 1983) 
were given to all participants in the case group. The HADS is a 14-item short 
questionnaire which asks about the individual’s current state of anxiety and depression 
levels on a Likert scale from 0 (symptom absent) to 3 (severe symptom). 
Only control participants underwent the M.I.N.I. International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview (Sheehan et al., 1998) in order to screen for any psychiatric disorders before 
completing the rest of the session, as the major criterion for being in the control group 
was the absence of any mental illness. No control was excluded on the basis of the 
M.I.N.I. interview. In addition, control participants were given the Oxford-Liverpool 
Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et al., 1995), a questionnaire 
designed to assess schizotypal personality traits in healthy individuals from a non-
clinical perspective.
7.4. Data analysis
Both frequentist and Bayesian methods, using SPSS 23 and JASP 0.8.1.2, respectively, 
were used in the current study. Although it was found that scores from symptom 
assessment in the current study followed a normal distribution after inspecting Q-Q 
plots, and Shapiro-Wilk tests showed no significant deviation from normality (all ps > 
0.20), this was not the case for all of the measures. Therefore, nonparametric statistical 
tests were used (i.e. Spearman’s rho) when correlating behavioural outcomes with 
symptom assessment scores, but parametric t-tests were used within tasks where the 
measures followed a normal distribution.
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7.5. Results
7.5.1. Sample Characteristics
Table 7.1 below shows the characteristics of both patients and controls:
Characteristics Patients Controls
Demographics
Age [Mean years (SD)] 28.40 (11.96) 29.20 (11.10) t(18) = -0.155
Gender (Male: Female) 9: 1 9: 1
Handedness (% Right) 100% 100%
WASI-II [Mean (SD)] 84.80 (16.28) 96.80 (7.80) t(18) = -2.102*
Years of education 15.20 (3.05) 15.90 (1.45) t(18) = -0.656
SOPS rating: Current [Mean (SD)]
Total positive score 8.60 (5.94)
Delusional ideas 2.40 (1.77)
Suspiciousness 1.90 (1.45)
Grandiosity 1.10 (1.37)
Hallucinations 2.80 (2.04)
Disorganisation 0.40 (0.70)
Total negative score 12.30 (8.46)
Total disorganised score 3.50 (2.88)
Total general score 6.00 (4.29)
SOPS rating: Peak [Mean (SD)]
Total positive score 15.80 (5.12)
Delusional ideas 4.40 (1.26)
Suspiciousness 3.90 (1.29)
Grandiosity 1.90 (1.85)
Hallucinations 4.10 (2.08)
Disorganisation 1.50 (1.43)
Total negative score 17.10 (5.88)
Total disorganised score 5.60 (2.67)
Total general score 11.50 (4.28)
Substance use score 0.00 0.00
HADS rating [Mean (SD)]
Anxiety 9.10 (4.28)
Depression 7.90 (5.59)
O-LIFE score [Mean (SD)]
Unusual experience 1.40 (1.77)
Introvertive anhedonia    4.70 (3.23)
Alcohol use and smoking
Mean weekly alcohol intake (UK 
units)
1.3 3.7
Current smokers 70% 30%
*p < 0.05.
Table 7.1. Sample characteristics for both patients and controls. WASI-II, Two-subset form of the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for Intelligence, Adult version; SOPS, Scale of Prodromal Symptoms; 
HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; O-LIFE, Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and 
Experiences.
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Demographic characteristics (age, gender, handedness) for controls were well-
matched to those of patients; although IQ was significantly higher in controls, the 
years of formal education in the two groups were comparable. In terms of 
symptomatology at the time of testing, positive symptom ratings were relatively low 
on average. For example, hallucinations score was 2.8 (mild to moderate) out of a 
potential 6.0, which would indicate current psychotic syndrome). This was not 
surprising given the early and brief nature of these patients’ psychotic symptoms as 
well as the fact most were on antipsychotic treatment already which would have 
ameliorated acute symptoms. Nevertheless, compared to current symptoms, peak 
symptom levels were much higher on average, potentially indicating effective 
treatment response. In a validation study for the SIPS by Woods et al. (2009), early 
psychosis patients scored an average of 11.9 for positive symptoms, compared with 
8.60 in the current study. Although symptoms scores were indeed considerably higher
during the first episode onset (positive symptom score of 15.80 in the current sample)
at the time of first presentation and referral to mental health services, these were 
difficult to ascertain retrospectively and accurately. Therefore, the peak symptom 
scores were not entered into statistical analyses.
7.5.2. Force-matching Task
Figure 7.1 shows the overall performance of patients and controls in the Finger and 
Slider conditions. Two patients had to be excluded due to exerting forces as high as 
11N and thus suggesting an inability to understand task instructions. No control 
participant was excluded on the basis of performance. It is clear that both patients and 
controls exerted much higher matching forces in the Finger condition, indicating the 
overcompensation effect. On the other hand, both patients and controls were much 
more accurate at matching forces in the Slider condition (where participants match the 
presented force with a slider). This shows that the task itself worked as expected. 
However, patients did not demonstrate lower overcompensation compared to controls 
and the levels of sensory attenuation in patients and controls were in fact very similar: 
a simple t-test revealed no significant differences between the forces exerted by patient 
and controls in the Finger condition (where participants directly match the presented 
force with their own right index finger), [t(16) = 0.70, p = 0.508, Cohen’s d = 1.80]. 
113
Figure 7.1. Comparisons between mean applied force in the Finger and Slider conditions in patients
and controls. Dotted line indicates perfect performance.
Further, in order to replicate the analytic methods employed by Shergill et al. 
(2005), a mixed ANOVA (patients versus controls and Finger versus Slider conditions) 
was carried out, showing no significant interaction between clinical status 
(patient/control) and force condition (Finger/Slider), [F(3, 48) = 0.216, p = 0.885, 
partial eta squared = 0.004], but only a main effect of force condition [F(3, 48) = 
32.353, p < 0.001, partial eta squared = 0.223]. Further, the overcompensation score 
was not significantly correlated with SOPS delusion subscale [ρ(6) = 0.424, p = 0.295].
7.5.3. Reversal Learning Task
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 display the true reversal error accuracies as an index of 
perseveration, and probabilistic error accuracies as an index of switching tendency, 
respectively. In both patients and controls, accuracy restored quickly after the first trial 
post-error and no participants were excluded on the basis of task performance.
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Figure 7.2. True reversal accuracies for patients (black rounded marker) and controls (grey triangular 
marker).  
Figure 7.3. Probabilistic error (PE) accuracies for patients (black rounded marker) and controls (grey 
triangular marker).  Solid line indicates first PE and dashed line indicates late PE. Con, Controls.
However, patients made significantly more errors overall compared with controls 
[t(18) = -2.822, p = 0.011, Cohen’s d = 1.26] but the difference is not statistically 
significant when divided into post-reversal [t(18) = 0.479, p = 0.638, Cohen’s d = 0.21] 
or post-probabilistic error trials [t(18) = 1.867, p = 0.078, Cohen’s d = 0.84]. Further, 
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patients were significantly less accurate and took longer to restore accuracy after the 
first post-probabilistic error trial (Figure 7.3, solid versus dotted black lines) compared 
to controls [t(18) = -2.773, p = 0.012, Cohen’s d = 1.24]. Patients did not show a 
significant relationship between switching and their positive symptom scores [ρ(8) = 
-0.671, p = 0.867]. However, scores for perseverative behaviour (i.e. post-true reversal 
accuracies) were significantly positively correlated with SOPS positive symptom 
scores in patients [ρ(8) = 0.755, p = 0.031]. Such an association was no longer 
significant when controlling for IQ [ρ(7) = 0.659, p = 0.108].
7.5.4. Exploratory Analyses with Other Symptom Domains
Further correlations were carried out for exploratory purposes only. Table 7.2 displays 
correlation coefficients between task performance and other specific positive 
symptoms (e.g. suspiciousness and hallucination) as well as overall negative symptom 
scores.
*, p < 0.05.
Table 7.2. Nonparametric bivariate correlation coefficients (Spearman’s ρ, two-tailed) between SOPS 
symptom measures and task measures in patients. Del, delusional ideation; Sus, suspiciousness; Hal, 
hallucinations; Neg, negative symptoms.
Hallucination scores were found to be significantly correlated with perseveration 
in the reversal learning task; a similar relationship was also found with suspiciousness 
specifically, but not with general delusional ideation/unusual thought content. The 
association between suspiciousness and perseveration diminished when IQ was 
controlled for [ρ(7) = 0.625, p = 0.133], but the relationship with hallucination scores 
remained even after controlling for IQ [ρ(7) = 0.778, p = 0.039]. No other significant 
relationships were found with any other task measure or symptom scores. Nevertheless, 
inferences from these correlations can only be drawn with caution, given they would 
not have survived multiple comparison corrections and were only carried out as post 
hoc exploratory analyses.
Del Sus Hal Neg
Force-matching 
Overcompensation
0.424 0.275 -0.061 0.001
Post Reversal 
Perseveration
0.537 0.718* 0.793* -0.036
Post Probabilistic 
Error Switching
0.085 -0.025 -0.073 0.084
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7.5.5. Bayesian Analysis
Due to the failure to find any differences between patients and controls on the force-
matching task Bayesian statistics were used to determine the level of evidence for the 
null/alternative hypothesis, particularly given the small sample size. A Bayesian 
independent samples t-test was conducted using a default Cauchy prior of 0.707, 
which is generally accepted (Quintana and Eriksen, 2017, accepted preprint) as a 
distribution of effect sizes considered realistic under the alternative hypothesis (H1), 
based on the consensus that mean effect sizes tend to be about half of the standard 
deviation of the effect. As can be seen in Figure 7.4, the Bayes Factor for the null 
hypothesis is 1.552 compared to that for the alternative hypothesis which is 0.644. 
This means that the null hypothesis (i.e. patients did not show less overcompensation 
than controls) is favoured 1.55 times over the alternative hypothesis, and this is 
supported by anecdotal levels of evidence under a range of priors.
Figure 7.4. Results from Bayesian independent samples t-test. BF, Bayes Factor; CI, Credibility 
Interval.
Taking a similar approach to that in the first study, Bayesian correlation pairs 
analyses were then carried out in patients (Figure 7.5) with a conservative beta prior 
of 0.5. For patients, the correlations were between the force-matching 
overcompensation score and SOPS delusional ideation score (Figure 7.5, Panel A), 
and between switching tendency and SOPS overall positive symptoms score (Figure 
7.5, Panel B). The relationships were hypothesised to be negative in the first 
correlation pair and positive in the second one. In the first correlation, Bayes Factor 
for the null hypothesis was favoured 2.78 times over the hypothesis that there was a 
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negative correlation between delusional ideation and overcompensation, with 
anecdotal to moderate levels of evidence. By contrast, Bayes Factor favours the 
hypothesis that tendency to switch was positively correlated with positive symptom 
scores by 1.93-fold over the null hypothesis, albeit with only an anecdotal level of 
evidence.
Figure 7.5. Results from Bayesian correlation pairs analyses for patients. Panels A and B show results 
for the force-matching, and reversal learning tasks respectively. CI, Credibility Interval; BF, Bayes 
Factor.
7.6. Discussion
In this Chapter, a shortened version of the tasks aimed at eliciting behaviourally 
measurable prediction error responses used in the first study (Chapter 5) were adopted 
in a case-control study. In the force-matching task, the overcompensating effect was 
evident in both patients and controls. Frequentist statistical methods found no 
significant differences between patients and controls in overcompensating for the 
force applied by the machine in the Finger condition, and Bayesian methods favoured 
the null hypothesis with anecdotal evidence. This did not replicate Shergill et al. 
(2005)’s behavioural findings of less overcompensation and therefore less sensory 
attenuation in the Finger condition in patients. Relationships with positive symptoms 
were not investigated in Shergill et al.’s original study in established schizophrenia 
patients, but failures to predict self-initiated actions may be most relevant to ‘first-
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rank’ symptoms such as delusions of control and passivity phenomena. However, in a 
follow-up study, Shergill et al. (2014) found significant negative relationships between 
current hallucination severity and sensory attenuation using a different task and 
method (functional MRI). Individuals experiencing auditory-verbal hallucinations 
often do not recognise their voices as coming from their own mind but attribute them 
to an external agent as well, although the reasons for such an externalising attribution 
are multi-layered which may involve metacognitive beliefs and mechanisms other than 
basic disruptions in self-monitoring of inner speech (Jones and Fernyhough, 2007; 
Georgieff and Jeannerod, 1998; Morrison, Haddock and Tarrier, 1995). Bayesian 
methods, on the other hand, demonstrated the highest Bayes Factor supporting the null 
hypothesis that overcompensation and delusional ideation were not negatively 
correlated, with moderate levels of evidence favouring the null hypothesis.
In the reversal learning task, although patients made significantly more errors 
overall than controls, this did not reach the threshold for statistical significance when 
the errors were divided into post-probabilistic errors and post-true reversal errors. 
Switching tendency or sensitivity for post-probabilistic errors can be indexed by 
accuracies after such errors, and has been found to be more pronounced in 
unmedicated schizophrenia patients (Schlagenhauf et al., 2014) experiencing a 
relatively high level of positive symptoms. However, this relationship was not 
significant in the current sample of patients, who, despite never receiving a firm 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, were mostly under antipsychotic treatment (although less 
than 12 months) and with low levels of active symptoms.
A significant correlation between perseverative behaviour and hallucinatory
symptoms was found in patients even after controlling for IQ (a factor which is thought 
to heavily influence reversal learning performance; Wolff, 1967). Although much 
caution needs to be borne in mind when attempting to interpret results from post-hoc 
exploratory analyses (Table 7.2), this relationship seemed to have been driven 
specifically by hallucinations rather than general positive symptoms of the first-rank.
Perseverative behaviours, interestingly, were not associated with negative symptoms. 
Evidence for ‘mapping’ cognitive-behavioural deficits onto specific symptom 
domains has only been weak; in other words, the strengths of relationships between 
observed deficits in behaviour and symptom severity are not consistently high 
(Nieuwenstein, Aleman, and de Haan, 2001; Rund et al., 2004). Many other factors 
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including symptom levels at testing, the exact measurement tools used, the specific 
cognitive tasks employed could all affect the correlations between symptomatology 
and behavioural deficits. First episode psychosis patients might be ‘further along’ the 
psychosis continuum and antipsychotic medications may increase perseverative 
behaviour while making little improvement for decision-making (however, evidence 
is again inconsistent and may depend on a specific medication’s receptor binding 
profile; see Meltzer, Thompson, Lee, and Ranjan, 1996; Meltzer and McGurk, 1999), 
but are often effective against perceptual distortions such as hallucinations. 
There is a small possibility that some patients had difficulties understanding 
relatively demanding written and verbal instructions, despite that high fluency in 
English was an inclusion criterion. On average, patients’ IQ was significantly lower 
than that of controls even though years spent in formal education were comparable. 
Low intellectual ability has been shown as a risk factor for psychosis in longitudinal 
studies (David, Malmberg, Brandt, Allebeck, and Lewis, 1997; Zammit et al., 2004) 
and this could have had an impact on how well the patients understood instructions. 
In the force-matching task, one of the patients excluded had the lowest IQ of 57 and 
the other was consistently exerting forces as high as 11N despite having an average 
IQ. This complicates the interpretation that low IQ is necessarily a barrier to following 
instructions accurately.  
It is also rather unlikely that patients were distracted by cognitive intrusions (e.g. 
auditory verbal hallucinations) as none of the patients appeared to be responding or 
attending to external stimuli and their reported positive symptom levels were 
somewhat low. It may be the case that they had grown ‘used to’ their voices and 
delusions; alternatively, active non-reporting of symptoms and a discrepancy between 
actual experience and patients’ description is another possibility. The latter 
explanation is unlikely however, as rapport was visibly established in every interview 
and patients would have already been assessed and spoken about their symptoms on 
multiple occasions to their clinical teams. 
The current study was under-powered due to practical constraints in patient 
recruitment within the specified timescale Thus the results outlined must be viewed as 
preliminary. However, Bayesian statistical methods are thought to be better at 
overcoming the problems usually posed by small sample sizes (Dienes, 2011). The 
current study has demonstrated moderate levels of evidence in at least some of the 
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Bayesian correlation pairs (i.e. reversal learning), indicating that there is likely to be a 
true relationship detectable between symptom measures and task performance. Such 
relationships would likely emerge and reach frequentist statistical significance if the 
study had been fully powered.
Relationships with other symptom domains, such as disorganisation, 
general/affective symptoms and global assessment of functioning (GAF) scores, were 
not explored. Even though such data were available anyway just from conducting the 
whole SIPS, this was due to deliberately starting from a priori hypotheses and limiting 
the number of correlations, Bayesian or otherwise, carried out in the analyses. A higher 
number of correlations (i.e. ‘correlating everything with everything’) would inflate 
familywise error rates and hence false positives, which would make any significant 
finding uninterpretable. As such, confirmatory and exploratory analyses were 
deliberately set apart. As mentioned in Chapter 5, although Bayesian methods are 
considered more resistant to multiple comparison problems, unnecessary correlations 
are at best questionable, especially given the specific predictions and hypotheses set 
out from the very beginning.
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Chapter Eight: Source Monitoring of Actions in Early 
Psychosis
8.1. Abstract
This study aimed to investigate source monitoring abilities of actions in individuals 
experiencing the early signs of psychosis. Ten early psychosis patients and ten
matched healthy controls took part in an action source memory task where the 
participants were asked to perform, imagine, or watch the experimenter perform 
various simple actions. At test, the participants were asked to remember whether they 
performed the action, imagined the action, if the experimenter performed the action or 
if the action was new. When compared to controls, patients were not significantly more 
impaired in task performance in any measures of memory. No statistically significant 
correlations were found when patients’ levels of current psychotic symptoms were 
correlated with the numbers of both reality monitoring and internal source monitoring 
errors. However, patients’ current hallucination ratings were significantly correlated 
with false alarm rates, and patients were also significantly slower at making a source 
judgement. Given the study was under-powered, any findings must be interpreted with 
caution. These mostly null findings can however inform future, larger studies in the 
early psychosis population.
8.2. Introduction
It is widely accepted that cognitive difficulties associated with established disease 
states, in particular alterations in memory functions, are present at least modestly in 
the prodromal phases of psychosis (Simon et al., 2007). As described in Chapters 3 
and 6, patients with psychosis have persistent problems with memory across different 
domains, but source monitoring is one particular aspect of recognition memory with 
which patients struggle significantly. Deficits in source memory have consistently 
been associated with positive symptoms at least in clinical populations, especially 
auditory-verbal hallucinations and verbal source monitoring (although evidence is less 
consistent with healthy schizotypy; see Chapter 6). However, studies on source 
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monitoring in individuals experiencing early phases of psychosis are relatively scarce 
in comparison to those in established schizophrenia. 
Given the importance of targeted and effective intervention in early psychosis, it 
is crucial to study specific cognitive deficits in this population. The current study acts 
as a follow-up to that described in Chapter 6 and investigates source monitoring of 
actions in individuals who have experienced a first episode of psychosis. The word 
pair source monitoring task has been omitted due to the observation that no significant 
relationships were found between source memory measures and schizotypy in the 
previous study with this task, but they were found with the action memory task.
In Chapter 6, the positive dimension of schizotypy (i.e. psychosis-like 
experiences) was significantly positively associated with errors in reality monitoring 
as well as errors in internal source monitoring. Thus, the same types of deficits are 
hypothesised to be present in the early psychosis patients too. Consistent with the 
majority of previous literature, patients would be more impaired than controls in 
recollection-based task performance measures such as overall source accuracy but not 
in familiarity-based task performance measures. Hypotheses relating source 
monitoring performance and symptomatology were that 1) the number of reality 
monitoring (in particular, errors involving misattributing participant performed 
actions to an external source i.e. the experimenter); and 2) internal source monitoring 
errors (confusing participant performed actions with participant imagined actions) 
made by early psychosis patients would significantly correlate with their current 
scores in hallucinations severity and more generally, positive symptom scores. 
8.3. Methods
8.3.1. Participants
This study was conducted with the same matched patients and controls as those in 
Chapter 7 (10 in each group). All patients and controls performed to a satisfactory 
level, exceeding a threshold of 0.1 above chance (i.e. more than 0.1 for corrected 
recognition and source accuracy of more than 0.43).
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8.3.2. Procedure
Similar to the source memory task used in Chapter 6, the present task consisted of a 
study phase (approximately 8 minutes) and a test phase (varying between 5 – 10 
minutes), with a 100-minute interval in-between. The study phase for the source 
memory task was the first to be carried out in the battery (after signing consent forms 
and filling out demographic details) and the test phase was the last behavioural 
component of the battery (before clinical interview and debriefing).
8.3.3. Action Source Monitoring Task
This task was modified from that used in Chapter 6 in two ways. First, the total number 
of actions in the study phase was reduced from 75 (25 in each condition) to 45 (15 in 
each condition) and the number of new items added in the test phase was reduced from 
25 to 15. Approximately half of the excluded actions involved using actual items 
whereas the other half were without items. Second, unlike the previous task where 
participants had a maximum of 2000ms to make a response in the test phase, items in 
the current task were shown indefinitely and would only progress to the next item once 
the participant had made a choice. The reasons for these two modifications were to 
prevent a high number of missing data as patients tended to respond much slower, and 
to lessen the potential burden or cognitive load on patients so that they would not 
consistently perform at floor levels. 
8.3.4. Assessment of Symptoms
SOPS and O-LIFE were the measures for early psychosis symptoms and schizotypal 
experiences for patients and controls, respectively. Details about sample 
characteristics and mean scores can be found in the previous Chapter (Table 7.1).
8.4. Data Analysis
Similar to the previous study on source monitoring (Chapter 6), most of the data 
obtained in the current task did not follow a normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk test, ps 
< 0.05). Therefore, nonparametric tests were chosen for all statistical analyses, 
including Mann-Whitney’s U for comparing performance between patients and 
controls, Spearman’s rho (ρ) for correlations, and the Friedman’s test (nonparametric 
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two-way ANOVA). All frequentist statistics was carried out in SPSS 23. In addition 
to frequentist statistical methods, a Bayesian independent samples t-test was carried 
out in JASP 0.8.0.0. to assess the levels of evidence for differences in source memory 
errors between patients and controls.
8.5. Results
8.5.1. Overall Task Performance
The same measures for hits, false alarms, corrected recognition (hits minus false 
alarms) and source accuracy were calculated for patients and controls. Table 8.1 below 
summarises these measures. 
Patients Controls
Hits 0.79 (0.18) 0.82 (0.08)
False Alarms 0.11 (0.12) 0.04 (0.03)
Corrected Recognition 0.68 (0.22) 0.78 (0.10)
Source Accuracy 0.86 (0.13) 0.89 (0.08)
Table 8.1. Mean proportions with standard deviations in parentheses for patients and controls in the 
action source memory task.
On first inspection, controls did perform better than patients in every measure as 
demonstrated by higher scores of hits, corrected recognition and source accuracy in 
controls, as well as nearly 1/3 of the false alarms rate as compared with patients. In 
other words, false alarm rates in patients were approximately three times higher than 
those in controls, at least on a numerical level. However, Mann-Whitney’s U tests 
revealed no statistically significant difference between the any measure of 
performance in familiarity or recollection between patients and controls (all ps > 
0.200). In terms of the errors made in each condition, patients did not significantly 
125
make more errors than controls in reality monitoring or internal source monitoring 
when the numbers of errors for each type of error were added together (Mann-
Whitney’s U, all ps > 0.350). For example, although numerically patients made more 
errors than controls by misattributing participant performed (PP) to participant 
imagined (PI), and once again attributing experimenter performed (EP) to participant 
performed (PP), these differences diminish when pooled together with other errors in 
internal source monitoring and reality monitoring, respectively, Figure 8.1. displays 
the number of errors made in each condition.
Figure 8.1. The mean number of errors produced by patients (black bars) and controls (light grey bars) 
with error bars (± SEM). Abbreviations are as follows: PP (Participant Perform), PI (Participant 
Imagine), and EP (Experimenter Perform). The first abbreviation is the actual source of the event and 
the second one is what the participant stated.
In fact, the number of reality monitoring errors that were of the most theoretical 
interest (i.e. misattributing participant perform to experimenter perform, or PP/EP 
errors) were very low across patients and controls. The number of internal source 
monitoring errors (PP/PI and PI/PP), on the other hand, were numerically much higher 
in patients and to a lesser degree in controls, although there was no statistically 
significant difference in the number of this kind of source memory errors made 
between the two groups. In terms of source monitoring errors, patients did not display 
a tendency to misattribute internally generated events to an external source; if anything, 
patients made more errors in the other direction (attributing external events internally) 
in the current sample.
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8.5.2. Bayesian Statistics
Bayesian independent samples t-tests was conducted in order to compare the numbers 
of reality monitoring errors (Panel A) and internal source monitoring errors (Panel B) 
made between patients and controls, using a default Cauchy prior of 0.707 (which is 
generally accepted as a distribution of effect sizes considered realistic under the 
alternative hypothesis, H1). As can be seen in Figure 8.2 (A), the Bayes Factor for the 
null hypothesis is 2.516 compared to that for the alternative hypothesis which is 0.397. 
This means that the null hypothesis (i.e. patients did not make more reality monitoring 
errors than controls) is favoured 2.5 times over the alternative hypothesis, which is 
supported by anecdotal to moderate levels of evidence under a range of priors. For 
internal source monitoring errors a similar pattern was found: the Bayes Factor for the 
null hypothesis is 2.475 compared to that for the alternative hypothesis which is 0.404, 
indicating that patients did not make more internal source monitoring errors than 
controls (also with anecdotal to moderate levels of evidence).
Figure 8.2. Results from Bayesian independent samples t-test for source monitoring in patients and 
controls. Panel A shows the results for reality monitoring errors and Panel B for internal source 
monitoring errors. BF, Bayes Factor; CI, Credibility Interval.
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8.5.3. Source Memory Errors and Symptomatology
Two-tailed Spearman’s rho correlations were carried out between positive symptoms 
(delusion and hallucination scores as measured by the SOPS in patients) and numbers 
of source memory errors (reality monitoring and internal source monitoring) made. 
No significant correlations were found (ps > 0.089) for either measure. As an 
exploratory analysis, hallucination scores in patients were significantly positively 
correlated with false alarm rates [ρ(8) = 0.640, p = 0.046] Nevertheless, this significant 
result between hallucination score and false alarm rate would not have survived 
multiple comparison corrections. Delusion scores did not correlate significantly with 
any task measure (ps > 0.440).  
8.5.4. Relationship between Clinical Status and Reaction Time
Further analyses were carried out to investigate whether there might have been a 
speed-accuracy trade-off and whether this may better account for the absence of any 
statistically significant difference in task performance between patients and controls. 
This was particularly important given the removal of the 2000ms response window, 
which meant participants could in theory take as much time as they felt necessary even 
though the instructions clearly stated ‘as quickly and as accurately as possible’ when 
making a response. The need to respond quickly and not to overthink about the 
correctness of responses was further emphasised by the experimenter prior to the test 
phase. 
Inspecting raw reaction time data across conditions revealed that patients were in 
general slower at responding than controls, however, this was skewed by a handful of 
very long responses (8000 – 12000ms). Before reaction time data was divided into the 
four conditions (Participant Performed, Participant Imagined, Experimenter 
Performed and New) 5 responses which took longer than 8000ms were excluded from 
the dataset. Fig. 8.3 shows the mean reaction times for different types of source hits in 
patients and controls after excluding outliers. Reaction time data were also divided 
into different types of errors after removing 8 responses longer than 8000ms (Figure 
8.4).
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Figure 8.3. The mean reaction times for correct responses produced by patients (black bars) and 
controls (light grey bars) with error bars (± SEM) after removing 5 outliers (> 8000ms). Abbreviations 
are as follows: PP, Participant Perform; PI, Participant Imagine; EP, Experimenter Perform.
Figure 8.4. The mean reaction times for errors produced by patients (black bars) and controls (light 
grey bars) with error bars (± SEM) after removing 8 outliers (> 8000ms). Abbreviations are as follows: 
ISM, internal source monitoring errors; RM, reality monitoring errors; FA, false alarm errors.
A Friedman nonparametric two-way ANOVA was performed with reaction 
time as the dependent variable, clinical status (patient/control) and correct response 
type (participant perform, participant imagine, experimenter perform and new) as 
fixed factors yielded a highly significant main effect of clinical status [χ2(7) = 81.10, 
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p = 0.022, p < 0.001]. A second two-way ANOVA was carried out with reaction time 
as the dependent variable, clinical status (patient/control) and error type (internal 
source monitoring error/reality monitoring error/false alarms/misses) as fixed factors; 
however, this did not yield a significant main effect of clinical status [χ2(7) = 6.22, p
= 0.514].
8.6. Discussion
The current study investigated source monitoring of actions in early psychosis patients 
and healthy controls matched for gender, age and years spent in education. Patients
were able to perform the task to a satisfactory level, and did not demonstrate more 
impairments in familiarity- and recollection-based task performance when compared 
with controls at a statistically significant level. Patients did not make significantly 
more reality monitoring or internal source monitoring errors either, and none of the 
types of source monitoring errors were significantly related to psychotic 
symptomatology. From exploratory analyses, the only significant association was in 
fact between current hallucination scores and false alarm rates in patients. There was 
a potential speed-accuracy trade-off in patients as they were significantly slower in 
making a correct source judgement, but not when making errors, compared with
controls across the four conditions.
The current study was under-powered. As shown in the power calculation in 
Chapter 7, based on previous studies the minimum number of patients required to 
detect an effect was 28. Therefore, the largely null findings were far more likely to be 
due to a lack of power rather than study design, for example, as significant associations 
were found in a much larger sample (Chapter 6) of healthy volunteers using a very 
similar design.
It was interesting that false alarm rates were related to hallucinations. 
Schizophrenia patients have been shown to display greater confidence in incorrect 
source memory responses (Moritz, Woodward, and Ruff, 2003) although this has not 
been related to positive symptoms. False memories have also been implicated in the 
pathogenesis of delusions (Moritz and Woodward, 2002; Bhatt, Laws, and McKenna, 
2010). Nevertheless, the current study did not directly measure memory confidence 
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and as such, the relationship between false alarm rates and hallucinations could only 
be interpreted speculatively. 
Taken together, the null findings in the current study are most likely the 
consequences of lacking statistical power and low symptom levels as indicated in the 
previous Chapter. Had more early psychosis patients been recruited in the timeframe, 
power would have been increased and Type II error rates (false negative findings) 
reduced. It should, however, serve as an indicator of the numbers of patients one may 
need for future studies, perhaps even in collaboration with other Universities to 
maximise recruitment. Still, some of the observations in the current study may point 
towards interesting new directions of inquiry (e.g. confidence in false memory and 
how it may be related to psychopathology). Longitudinal studies may also reveal how 
deficits in source monitoring ‘evolve’ as some of the early psychosis individuals 
transition to florid and more persistent states of psychosis.
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Chapter Nine: General Discussion
9.1. Summary of Findings
The current Thesis examined behaviourally measured prediction error responses and 
source monitoring processes in healthy individuals with schizotypal traits as well as 
in individuals experiencing the early signs of psychosis. In the first study (healthy 
schizotypy) prediction error responses were measured in the sensory, associative and 
reward domains whereas the source monitoring tasks focused on that of action and 
words. In the second study (clinical group) the behavioural task battery was downsized 
to sensory and reward prediction and action source monitoring only, based on results 
from the first study. 
In healthy individuals, there was no marked perturbation in predictive processing 
in those with high schizotypal traits (Chapter 5). This was demonstrated by normal 
levels of sensory attenuation in the force-matching task, no evidence for a reduction 
of the blocking effect in the Kamin blocking task, and no evidence for increased 
switching tendency in the reversal learning task. Performance levels in these tasks 
were not significantly correlated with various domains of schizotypy (delusional 
ideation, hallucinatory experiences, general positive and negative schizotypy) as 
measured by different psychometric scales. On the other hand, in the same healthy 
individuals, source monitoring tasks of action but not of words elicited deficits 
significantly associated with high positive schizotypy (Chapter 6). Such deficits were 
observed in reality monitoring (misattributing participant performed actions to the 
experimenter) as well as internal source monitoring (confusing participant performed 
actions with participant imagined actions). These findings add to the increasing body 
of research that deficits in cognition often seen in clinical states of schizophrenia 
manifest in individuals with no need for care, and support the continuum model of 
psychosis vulnerability. 
Nevertheless, due to the difficulties encountered in participant recruitment only
a very small sample of patients was recruited in the clinical study (Chapters 7 and 8). 
As a result, the under-powered nature of the second study meant that it was unable to 
detect significant differences in performance in a subset of the behavioural tasks 
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(force-matching, reversal learning and action source monitoring) between  individuals 
with early/first episode psychosis and healthy controls matched for gender, age, 
handedness and years of education. Performance in patients was not generally 
associated with current symptom levels (which were relatively low in the current 
sample), however, some patterns have emerged. In the reversal learning task, 
perseverative behaviour was significantly correlated with the level of positive 
symptoms (combined score of delusional ideation, suspiciousness, perceptual 
abnormalities, grandiosity and disorganisation) but switching tendency did not 
correlate significantly with symptomatology. 
9.2. Interpretation and Implication of Findings
In Study 1, the main hypotheses for the predictive processing tasks were that scores 
from three different schizotypy scales would correlate with domains of behaviourally-
measured prediction error responses. In the force-matching task, although participants 
did indeed consistently apply more force in the Finger condition which demonstrated 
the overcompensation effect due to sensory attenuation of self-generated actions, this 
effect was not negatively correlated with their PDI-21 scores. Similarly in the Kamin 
blocking task, although the blocking effect was present (evidenced by a lower rating 
for stimulus B than that of stimulus D given by participants) this was not significantly 
correlated either with O-LIFE positive or negative schizotypy dimension, and did not 
demonstrate the positive association with PDI-21 distress subscale first shown by 
Corlett and Fletcher (2012). In addition, after replicating Haselgrove and Evans 
(2010)’s methodology and performing a median split, blocking effect was not 
significantly different from high or low schizotypy across neither the positive nor the 
negative dimension. In the reversal learning task, PDI-21 scores were correlated with 
neither post-probabilistic error switching nor post-true reversal perseveration tendency. 
Bayesian analyses further provided supportive evidence for the null effects as reflected 
by Bayes Factors calculated from each of the correlation pairs. 
The other part of Study 2, namely those focusing on the source monitoring of 
actions and words, did find statistically significant associations between the numbers 
of reality monitoring/internal source monitoring errors and O-LIFE unusual 
experiences scores and such effects were specific to the action task. In addition, high 
133
levels of positive schizotypy were associated with poorer old/new recognition and 
overall source accuracy measures, again only limited to the action task.
Study 1 was undoubtedly better powered than most previous studies of this kind; 
it also had the advantage of employing a full battery of tasks in the same individuals. 
However, previous studies in prediction error response and schizotypy did find 
significant relationships despite having a lower power. Such null findings from the 
present study may indicate that the concept of healthy schizotypy is noisier than 
previously thought, or even due to publication biases where only positive findings 
were published in the literature. The specificity of deficits in the action source 
monitoring in relation to positive schizotypy may also mean that impairments in action 
source monitoring were more pronounced and perhaps less latent than prediction error 
responses. However, this would not explain why no associations were found in the 
source monitoring of word pairs. One possible explanation would be that O-LIFE 
unusual experience as a general schizotypy measure was not sensitive enough for word 
pair monitoring deficits, which might only be ‘picked up’ by more specific measures 
of hallucinatory experiences in the auditory-verbal modality, for example. Again, this 
points towards the noisiness and non-specificity in at least some of the schizotypy 
measures currently used.
Confirmatory analyses in Study 2 did not find specific associations between 
symptomatology measures and behavioural responses to predictive processing or 
source monitoring of actions either; however, it must be emphasised that this study 
was severely under-powered, which was the most likely explanation for the failure to 
demonstrate significant associations. Another likely explanation was that most 
patients were already in remission due to antipsychotic treatment, which was 
evidenced by a higher rating in all SOPS measures at peak/first onset. Patients did 
perform significantly worse across the reversal learning and source monitoring tasks, 
and the association between perseveration and hallucination scores from exploratory 
analyses remained significant even after controlling for IQ, where in the latter scenario 
patients seemed to demonstrate speed-accuracy trade-off when making correct source 
judgements. However, due to the fact that nonparametric ANOVA was used, it was 
not feasible to assess interactions, hence although interpretation of main effects 
indicated a speed-accuracy trade-off effects, interaction effects could have also played 
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a role. This further complicated the evaluation of the current findings, which were 
already limited because of the lack of power.
Despite the under-powered nature of the clinical study, findings from the two 
studies in the current Thesis nevertheless shed some new light on the cognitive 
mechanisms in two different stages across the psychosis continuum, namely healthy 
schizotypy and early signs/first episode of a psychotic disorder. The results point 
towards differential manifestations of behavioural deficits in predictive processing and 
source monitoring, in that source monitoring deficits are more salient than 
perturbations in prediction error responses in these individuals. Although it could be 
seen that the lack of evidence for the latter is a kind of counterevidence for the 
psychosis continuum, the concept itself is not at odds with the observation that 
nonclinical and subclinical psychosis-like experiences are distributed in healthy 
individuals without a need for clinical care. It is true that such a distribution is heavily 
skewed towards ‘normal experience’, but the continuum approach does not need to be 
fully dimensional. An absence of related cognitive-behavioural deficits in terms of 
prediction error responses does not necessarily challenge the notion of a continuum 
(or even continua) of psychosis-like experiences, given that deficits in source 
monitoring were clearly demonstrated in the same group of individuals.
The findings of the present research are also of clinical relevance, especially for 
the development of potential tools for psychological interventions such as 
psychoeducation. Psychoeducation for schizophrenia has been shown to be at least 
moderately beneficial for treatment (especially antipsychotic medication) adherence, 
relapse prevention and reducing subsequent hospitalisation (Xia, Merinder, and 
Belgamwar, 2011). One particular application of the current findings in a 
psychoeducational framework might be focused on the continuum nature of psychotic 
experiences (that psychosis lies within a spectrum of human experiences, and healthy 
individuals could have attenuated symptoms too), thus potentially alleviating the 
psychological burden and stigma associated with being diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
The very observation that patients are not categorically different deviations from 
‘normality’ may just provide hope and reassurance that they will recover in the future 
and return to the other, healthier end of the continuum. 
Another application of the findings to psychoeducation may be that mental 
illnesses are not the sole products of either the brain or the environment, but a 
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combination of many heterogeneous and highly complex factors. For example, a 
deficit in source monitoring or an externalising bias may be the result of a genetic 
predisposition for difficulties with episodic memory, but may also be the 
consequences of dealing with stressors such as dissociating oneself from negative 
emotions or events in life. It is crucial to understand and accept that there is no single 
theory or framework that can fully explain every aspect of psychosis, neither is there 
a treatment (biological or psychosocial) that works for every patient. As such, 
facilitation of personalised medicine will not only help with symptom reduction but 
will also greatly improve the outlook of recovery. Sadly, an unhealthy competition for 
some kind of political supremacy persists between a minority of practitioners in 
biological psychiatry and in clinical psychology (to use one example). Such 
unnecessary friction between therapeutic professions is not only without scientific 
bases but also highly detrimental, if not unethical, when providing care for vulnerable
patients. To acknowledge the coexistence of both the physical and the psychological -
and to relinquish the dualist notion as if the brain was not a part of the whole person –
may just be a simpler way forward.
A key question for consideration for future research would be whether source 
monitoring is at least related to the detection of prediction error, as the two concepts 
clearly have some overlap (Griffin and Fletcher, 2017). Theoretically, although the 
predictive processing approach is fundamentally reductionist and may not be able to 
capture the full complexity, nature and subjective reality of the psychotic experience 
(Corlett et al., 2010), it (alongside other accounts) does provide important insight into 
at least some aspects of how delusions and hallucinations may be generated. Figure 
9.1. below shows a tentative diagrammatic representation for this relationship:
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Figure 9.1. The relationship between prediction error and downstream cognitive factors. DA, dopamine; 
Glu, glutamate; GABA, gamma-aminobutyric acid.
As the diagram shows, aberrant prediction error signalling is the centre stage 
which is the result of dysregulated neurotransmitter systems (in particular dopamine 
and glutamate). Faulty and imprecise prediction error signalling then leads to two 
related processes, abnormally heightened salience and deficits in source monitoring 
which can feedback to update the prediction error signal. The basis for the relationship 
between salience and source monitoring is that aberrant salience (originating from 
dopaminergic hyperfunction mediated via error signalling) drives new yet incorrect 
associations about all the incoming stimuli to be formed, including the (mis)attribution 
and allocation of stimuli to their perceived source which is in essence also an 
association between the representation of the stimulus and its (perceived) origin. With 
these two factors combined, delusions and hallucinations may occur as the 
consequence of one’s often futile efforts to seek meaning in a confusing and 
threatening world. As mentioned previously, some delusions and hallucinations can 
‘feed’ into each other (e.g. the persecutory delusional content and threatening voices) 
to form a seemingly inescapable vicious circle in which the faulty prediction error
signals are sent higher and higher up the hierarchy of abstraction, and a recent model 
of ‘circular inference’ has supported this (Jardri and Denève, 2013; Denève and Jardri, 
2016; Jardri, Duverne, Litvinova, and Denève, 2017).
Alternatively, alternations in source monitoring especially when the sense of 
agency is in question could be a consequence of (or at least related to) disrupted 
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prediction error signalling which is again not always a pathological phenomenon. 
When viewed through the lens of the predictive processing framework, problems with 
agency as seen in source monitoring paradigms may be at least partly explained by 
inadequate detection and minimisation of prediction error. This theorisation may be 
particularly important for explaining the faulty monitoring of self-generated actions 
seen in both patients with schizophrenia and healthy individuals with high levels of 
schizotypal traits.
Furthermore, not all types of delusions and hallucinations can necessarily be 
explained by the prediction error approach. Therefore, future research should perhaps 
allow the fine-tuning or subtyping of symptoms in order to delineate the deeper 
mechanisms. In a recent review by Griffith, Langdon, Le Pelley, and Coltheart (2014), 
the authors have written extensively on how the prediction error signalling approach 
best explains delusions of control and (some) hallucinations, linking predictions with 
source monitoring as both are important to the discrimination of self- versus other-
generated stimuli whilst providing a careful critique and re-examination of some of 
the findings by Corlett and colleagues. Further, the authors stress that it is not always 
the stimuli themselves that matter but the meaning, associations and consequences 
they create for the patient which give such stimuli personal significance. In fact, 
Corlett et al., (2014) also support the interdependent relationship between source or 
reality monitoring and prediction error signalling: the former is thought to be 
modulated by dopaminergic transmission as well, most likely as a result of aberrant 
prediction error signalling, and a dysconnection in the frontostriatal circuit has been 
implicated in both prediction error signalling and source monitoring deficits. 
In the current Thesis, neither the schizotypy psychometric scales nor the 
symptoms assessment in patients with early psychosis differentiated subtypes of 
delusions and hallucinations beyond broadly paranoid, first-rank and grandiose type 
delusions and sensory modalities (rather than content) of hallucinations. Relationships 
between different domains of prediction error responses and positive symptoms were 
not found in healthy volunteers with schizotypy or early psychosis patients, but 
significant associations were revealed in the source monitoring of actions in healthy 
participants between positive schizotypy and internal as well as reality monitoring 
deficits. It is possible that because most patients were treated with anti-psychotic 
medications (dopamine antagonists), deficits in prediction error signalling have 
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diminished leading to a downstream restoration of source monitoring abilities, 
whereas in healthy (i.e. non-medicated) volunteers, any deficits seen were not affected 
by dopaminergic modulation. Nevertheless, if prediction error signalling is truly 
upstream from source monitoring and there is some kind of cascading relationship 
between the detection of prediction error and reality monitoring for example, deficits 
in both processes would have been found in healthy volunteers with positive 
schizotypy. This could have been the case in the clinical study had it been fully 
powered, but even in the well-powered healthy volunteer study there did not appear to 
be significant relationships between performance in the prediction error tasks and 
various psychosis-like experiences.
It has been suggested that auditory-verbal hallucinations come from strong top-
down priors where the patient believes that voices will occur (Powers, Mathys and 
Corlett, 2017). With regards to hallucinations however, subtyping (Garwood, 
Dodgson, Bruce, and McCarthy-Jones, 2013; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014) may be a 
useful approach in trying to apply the prediction error signalling framework to some 
of the AVHs where source monitoring theories alone may not be sufficient. Source 
monitoring deficit accounts posit that faulty monitoring of self-generated inner speech 
leads to the external misattribution of these internally produced stimuli as sensory 
percepts: for example, whilst traditional source monitoring accounts are able to 
account for ‘inner speech hallucinations’ where attention is inwardly directed, 
‘hypervigilance hallucinations’ are not so well accounted for as badly monitored inner 
speech due to their outwardly directed attention. 
Perhaps a complementary approach can utilise prediction error signalling theories 
in which hypervigilance hallucinations are viewed as excessive error signals arising 
from real external stimuli (e.g. traffic noise) which drive the update of prior beliefs 
about these stimuli in order to minimise the error signals. The result of this updating 
process is that the conscious percept becomes voices or at least voice-like, although 
there is still debate over whether AVHs are truly auditory in nature. Indeed, the 
existence of such hypervigilance hallucinations itself defies the traditional definition 
of a ‘true’ AVH as the hallucination must occur spontaneously without any stimulus 
in external reality which adds to the complex heterogeneity of the psychotic 
experience. 
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In some studies of source monitoring, participants are asked to rate the probability 
or confidence with which they think a certain event is of endogenous of exogenous 
origin (Moritz, Woodward, and Ruff 2003; Mitchell and Johnson, 2000). Gerrans 
(2014) posits that such paradigms are ‘congenial to the Bayesian model, which treats 
source monitoring as the detection of prediction error’ (p. 93), where the probability 
ratings form priors for the Bayesian belief updating system. Nevertheless, the 
definition of source monitoring here is perhaps less based on memory but on the 
determination of agency (self versus other) according to, for example, the forward 
model (see Chapter 1). Indeed, according to the Bayesian framework for predictive 
processing (Chapter 2), the misattribution or externalisation of agency may well be 
the consequence of detecting prediction errors when there should be none. Such error 
signals are then propagated to the higher hierarchies of the Bayesian iterative model 
which call for an update of the current inferences, resulting in erroneous judgements 
about the origin of a self-generated occurrence. This model has been used extensively 
to explain ego-boundary disorders in schizophrenia; most prominently, delusion of 
alien control (Blakemore, Oakley, and Frith, 2003; Frith, 2005, 2012) where the 
patient misattributes self-generated actions to an external (often malign) force 
controlling their behaviour.
However, can the same model be applied to explain disorders of thought 
interference, which are diagnostically meaningful ‘first-rank’ symptoms of 
schizophrenia? For example, thought insertion is the phenomenon where instead of 
overt actions, internal thoughts and mental events are misattributed to an external 
source which often has the power to control the patient’s mental processes (rather than 
direct behaviour). It is widely acknowledged that ‘normal’ or one’s own thoughts are 
immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (the 
immunity principle): that is, ‘when a speaker uses the first-person pronoun (‘I’) to 
refer to him or herself, she cannot make a mistake about the person to whom she is 
referring’ (Gallagher, 2000; Shoemaker, 1968). Hence the same efference copies 
which would have been generated for actions (according to the forward model) would 
not work in the same way for thoughts because in normal circumstances at least, all 
thoughts are internally generated and one would not have to work out who did the 
thinking. As such, even if a thought appears alien or strange, a top-down process 
should be initiated so that any prediction error signals generated by bottom-up 
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information will be minimised if not cancelled out. In fact, many theorists do not agree 
that the comparator model can be extended to explain thinking (e.g. Vosgerau and 
Newen, 2007; Vicente, 2014) whereas others are firm proponents of the ‘thoughts as 
motor acts’ model where the comparator or forward model does apply (e.g. Campbell, 
1999) thus generating a great deal of debate.
Still, another aspect of agency misattribution seen in schizophrenia, namely that 
of exaggeration or internalisation errors, does not seem explainable by the source 
monitoring framework without taking into account its (assumed) Bayesian nature. For 
example, delusions of reference where the self takes the position of heightened 
centrality in receiving external stimuli which are imbued with significance and self-
relevance is phenomenologically the opposite to passivity symptoms where the self 
loses control over one’s own actions and the patient is convinced that other agents can 
influence their self to the extent one’s sense of agency diminishes. Traditional source 
monitoring accounts would fail to explain how within the same person, the sense of 
agency can be both inflated and compromised sometimes simultaneously; however, in 
a very recent paper, Asai (2016) shows for the first time that the over- and under-
attribution of agency where, depending on the S/N ratio (self/other ratio) of the stimuli, 
only self-generated signal would need to be detected by one’s sensorimotor system. 
The S/N ratio might also be determined by the “embodiedness” of the action: 
embodied action (self) would produce a higher S/N ratio, while disembodied (other) 
action would produce a lower one in terms of motor prediction. Further, the author 
points out that the type of attribution would be different in schizophrenia versus 
schizotypy: under-attributed agency should be observed for people with schizophrenia 
or schizotypy only within the range of embodied action, whereas in disembodied 
actions a pattern of over-attribution for patients and underattribution for schizotypy 
should be observed. Figure 9.2 below summarises the model proposed by Asai (2016) 
in Bayesian probability distribution terms:
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Figure 9.2. Diagrammatical representations of attribution errors. Adapted from Asai (2016).
Nevertheless, even Asai’s recent account may be insufficient to explain the 
misattribution of agency for thinking, for the same reason that thoughts are by 
definition internal (self) so the S/N ratio would be maximised to the ‘signal’ or self 
condition. But the very act of misattributing agency implies volition and deliberation 
which borders on the realm of the ‘judgement’ or agency (Synofzik et al., 2008) and 
not just a ‘sense’ which is often far more minimal and basic, sometimes even 
possessing sensory qualities: some patients report knowing the exact location and 
feeling the associated tactile sensation of external thoughts entering their head 
(Mullins and Spence, 2003). Therefore, it is clear that further research is urgently 
needed to elucidate the relationship between thought processes and motor acts if such 
paradoxical observations are ever to be reconciled; no matter how much of a 
parsimonious explanation the source monitoring framework (when viewed in 
Bayesian terms) can offer, there are still discrepancies yet to be resolved.
9.3. Limitations
Study 1 was carried out in healthy and high-functioning individuals recruited from a 
University population. Like many other schizotypy studies done in healthy volunteer 
samples, the issue of selection bias cannot be overlooked. Although specific efforts 
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were in place to expand the participant pool beyond a psychology undergraduate 
sample and indeed younger members of staff across different departments were also 
recruited, in the end the vast majority of participants were still female undergraduates. 
Raine (1992) found significantly higher endorsement rates on the positive dimensions 
(odd beliefs, ideas of reference in the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire) in 
females but higher endorsements on the negative dimension (e.g. constricted affect) in 
males. In clinical patients with schizophrenia, it has been reported that males tend to 
have an earlier age of onset, more acute manifestation and more impairments from 
negative symptoms, whereas females may retain better social functioning 
(Angermeyer and Kühnz, 1988; Shtasel, Gur, Gallacher, Heimberg, and Gur, 1992). 
Nevertheless, in the current sample a post-hoc Mann-Whitney U test found no 
significant differences across the three schizotypy scales with the exception of O-LIFE 
impulsive nonconformity, where males had a higher endorsement rate (p = 0.006). It 
could be that because all participants were extremely high-functioning and as a 
consequence all schizotypy scales were heavily positively skewed, gender effects on 
schizotypal traits have been diluted. Another possibility is that due to the social 
desirability effect, participants may tend to under-report what they consider as 
abnormal experiences at odds with their healthy and high-functioning nature 
(Pedregon, Farley, Davis, Wood, and Clark, 2012).
A major confounder, which was not measured objectively or actively controlled 
for, was substance misuse or even dependence. The exclusion of substance use was 
purely by self-report, and no saliva or blood samples were taken to be examined. 
Potential non-disclosure or misinformation from the participants could have 
implications on the schizotypy ratings, as it is generally accepted that individuals 
troubled by psychosis-like experiences misuse illicit drugs such as cannabis to self-
medicate, which instead worsens their psychotic symptoms (Schiffman, Nakamura, 
Earleywine, and LaBrie, 2005), and that incidence of positive schizotypy is higher in 
cannabis users even without drawing temporal links (Nunn, Rizza, and Peters, 2001). 
However, some evidence suggests that in clinical patients, a history of cannabis use 
was associated with fewer symptoms and prior hospitalisations (Mueser et al., 1990), 
perhaps depending on the dominant active ingredient of cannabis used.
Study 2 had more detailed questionnaires on substance use, even though it was 
also by self-report on the testing day. However, prior to each testing session the 
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patient’s past history of substance use was discussed with the clinician or care 
coordinator in charge of the patient and anyone meeting a criterion of dependence was 
excluded. Still, there was the potential of under-reporting if not actively downplaying 
of active psychotic symptoms. This could be due to the fact that most patients were in 
remission following antipsychotic treatment and they no longer felt ‘unwell’, that lack 
of insight was a hallmark of psychotic disorders by definition, or that self-
stigmatisation prevented the patients from disclosing again what they might think as 
‘crazy’ or ‘abnormal’ experiences. 
Contrasting with Study 1, Study 2 (despite a small sample) almost exclusively 
consisted of male participants. This inevitably limits the generalisability of Study 1 to 
clinical populations (or even to the wider general population), not only because the 
sheer discrepancy in the level of functioning and IQ between patients and controls (for 
example, most patients were not in employment, education or training and only two 
had undergraduate degrees), but also due to many of the gender differences mentioned 
above. In fact, the only female patient scored exceptionally low on all symptom 
domains in the SOPS compared with her male counterparts. The very different 
demographics between participants in Study 1 and 2 perhaps reflects wider issues in 
healthy schizotypy versus clinical psychosis research, where patients with a first 
episode of psychosis and high-functioning individuals exhibiting mild psychosis-like 
experiences have little in common apart from matching age and gender. In this sense, 
such observations also reduce the full dimensionality of the psychosis continuum as a 
whole as mentioned in the previous Section.
There are also a number of conceptual issues the current Thesis did not directly 
address. First, the sense of agency was not investigated in either study. Although proxy 
measures such as sensory attenuation may be seen as a marker for agency, the concept 
is two-fold. These are the feeling of agency and the judgement of agency (Synofzik et 
al., 2008). In fact, the account proposed by Synofzik and colleagues directly 
challenges Frith’s comparator model. Other recent studies such as those by Asai (2016, 
2017) did not explicitly differentiate between feeling and judgement of agency and it 
can sometimes be ambiguous as to what ‘attribution of agency’ means. Theoretically, 
the feeling of agency is much more bottom-up and is largely based on multisensory 
integration whereas judgement of agency relies on higher-order cognitive mechanisms. 
Further, it would be extremely difficult to accurately measure ‘levels’ of agency at a 
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given time using psychometric assessments or questionnaires, even though there have 
been recent attempts (e.g. Lamaitre et al., 2016). The main reason why the two studies 
in the current study did not address the issue of agency was the inherent difficulties 
and ‘noisiness’ of potential measures. Practically, however, it would also have been 
too broad a research question if agency had been incorporated as another variable. 
Although agency may be intrinsic to sensory predictive processing, for example, it is 
less relevant for reward prediction. In addition, given the low level of agency-related 
symptoms (thought interference, delusions of control) in both healthy and early 
psychosis populations, it would be unlikely to be able to detect deficits in agency. This 
is because agency-related symptoms have nosological superiority in the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (i.e. first-rank symptoms) and would signal transition to frank psychosis 
(see Marshall et al., 2017).
Third, the relationship between prediction error tasks and source monitoring tasks 
was not investigated. In the previous Section it is posited that source monitoring may 
be at least related to the detection of certain types of prediction error (most likely in 
the sensory domain), but the question remains as to how to directly measure prediction 
error in a source memory task, for example. It would be interesting to correlate errors 
in reality monitoring of actions with the overcompensation score in the force-matching 
task, as both involve sensory prediction processes. A negative correlation would be 
predicted, however, this method of correlation across tasks may be somewhat crude.
It has been proposed that source monitoring acts at a higher level of explanation than 
predictive processing (Griffin and Fletcher, 2017), however, the precise mechanisms
remain unclear and go well beyond the remit of the current Thesis. 
Fourth, although there was data on the CAPS as a general hallucination measure 
in healthy volunteers, potential associations between this scale and verbal source 
monitoring (the word pair task) was not investigated. As the a priori hypotheses 
focused on general positive schizotypy in the source monitoring tasks, and no 
predictions with CAPS (which measures hallucinatory experiences in more than one 
modality) was made, such correlations were deemed unnecessary. However, specific 
scales on auditory-verbal hallucinations may have been useful in relating to 
performance in the word pair task, as the latter directly tapped into the auditory-verbal 
modality and would have been affected by hallucinations in the same modality. 
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Lastly, one conceptual consideration is how easily detectable these prediction 
error responses are by behavioural measures. As Corlett and Fletcher (2015) points 
out, prediction error responses could be much more latent than previously thought and 
behavioural measures alone might not be sensitive enough to study them. This is 
perhaps why many studies on prediction error have employed neuroimaging methods, 
focusing on specific brain regions such as the ventral striatum (Murray et al., 2008b). 
Nevertheless, in the sensory domain at least, such prediction error responses are 
evidently present as demonstrated by the force-matching illusion. Similarly, Kamin 
blocking and reward learning have been subjected to a wide range of behavioural 
investigations, long before neuroimaging methods were introduced. Also, using 
imaging would not easily have allowed one to study different domains of predictive 
processing in one experimental session. Perhaps another avenue of inquiry would be 
computational psychiatric modelling of behavioural data, and this is indeed a rapidly 
emerging field (e.g. Adams, Stephan, Brown, Frith, and Friston, 2013). There are 
many frameworks available for modelling reinforcement learning (e.g. Q-learning, 
actor-critic algorithms) but optimal model selection and potential over-fitting are 
issues commonly encountered. However, finely-tuned computational modelling has 
the ability to assist with disentangling complex and deeply latent processes.
9.4. Future Directions
There are many ways in which the current findings can inform future research. The 
most basic would be to aim towards much larger sample sizes for patients, perhaps by 
collaborating with other research organisations across multiple recruitment sites. 
Certainly, to require patients to travel long distances would be logistically difficult (or 
even ethically concerning), but with local early intervention services becoming more 
widespread and well established, participant recruitment of prodromal and first 
episode psychosis patients should become less effortful in the near future. Indeed, the 
current project emphasised the importance of early intervention by offering clear 
evidence for the presence of an early stage of psychosis and support for a continuum 
model of vulnerability to schizophrenia-spectrum psychoses. However, it also 
demonstrated that effect sizes were small in the early psychosis/first episode group. 
As mentioned above, recruiting acutely ill psychotic patients is ethically questionable; 
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still, a useful window for recruitment might be soon after a first episode of psychosis 
while the patient continues to experience significant positive symptoms is but not 
behaviourally disturbed. As described in Chapter 1, the prodrome is often a 
retrospective concept and it can be difficult to demarcate the exact point where an 
individual crossed the line into florid psychosis (but see Marshall et al., 2017). Given 
that less than half of the prodromal patients would actually transition to clinical 
schizophrenia longitudinal studies would be needed to ‘track’ who actually transition 
and then check their behavioural performance retrospectively. Alternatively, 
individuals at genetic high risk (e.g. first degree siblings) might be a useful avenue to 
recruit and follow-up as a comparison group to first episode psychosis patients.
Another group of potential interest are healthy hallucinators without a need for 
care or any diagnosis of a psychotic disorder, namely individuals claiming to be 
‘psychics’, for example (Powers, Kelley, and Corlett, 2016). This is again a 
heterogeneous group, but has the clear advantage of hearing (sometimes persistent) 
voices without the confounds of medication. Conversely, it would be very interesting 
to also recruit patients with psychosis who do not hallucinate, as this would tease apart 
the relationships between hallucinations per se and other psychotic symptoms (such 
as delusions). In the current Thesis, it was not logistically possible to sub-group 
patients or controls according to the status of specific symptoms, which could have 
increased the noise in symptom assessments and relations with behavioural tasks.
Methodologically, another potential avenue would be to artificially induce 
anomalous experiences by administering psychoactive substances (mainly 
serotonergic agonists such as psilocybin) in healthy volunteers, even though this kind 
of studies is often very time-consuming and has more risks associated with the 
substances used. These kinds of studies have allowed researchers to closely control, 
capture and monitor such anomalous experiences in otherwise nonclinical samples, 
and the delusions, hallucinations and ego-dissolution experiences induced by 
psychoactive substances mimic those seen in psychosis (hence the name 
psychotomimetic for such substances). Using neuroimaging methods is another 
possibility, whether combined with a drug study or not; indeed, many of the recent 
studies on predictive processing and source monitoring involved some kind of imaging 
(functional MRI being the most popular choice) but this depended largely on the 
research questions being asked. Nevertheless, follow-up studies with both behavioural 
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and neuroimaging methods would certainly be useful in delineating the potential 
neural mechanisms of such processes, especially if using a paradigm that tapped into 
both prediction error responses and source monitoring.
In conclusion, the studies in the current project offered further consolidating 
evidence for a continuum model of psychosis from a cognitive neuropsychiatric 
framework. Although not all the behavioural alterations were demonstrated in 
individuals at various points of the psychosis continuum, deficits in the source 
monitoring of actions remained salient. In addition, the integrated approach taken by 
the current project (i.e. studying different aspects of predictive processing and source 
monitoring in the same cohort of participants) and the combination of frequentist and 
Bayesian statistical methods are novel. Findings from the current project could 
potentially inform cognitive therapies targeting the rehabilitation of self-agency and 
psychoeducation for the patient and their carers. In addition, it contributed to 
disentangling the different domains of neuropsychological processes such as 
prediction error responses and types of source monitoring, and the utility of 
behaviourally focused assessments.
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